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Abstract 
Article 13(3) of Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and 
functioning of the European External Action Service (EEAS) required that the High Representative 
should provide a review of the organisation and functioning of the EEAS by mid-2013. This paper 
provides a legal commentary on the Decision and is intended to inform those involved in the review 
process and to serve as a reference document for practitioners and analysts dealing with the EEAS. 
This commentary provides a textual and contextual analysis of each article of the Decision, taking 
account of i) other relevant legal provisions (primary, secondary, international), ii) the process leading 
to the adoption of the 2010 Council Decision (i.e. travaux préparatoires), iii) the preamble of the 
Council Decision, and iv) insofar as it is possible at this stage, early implementation.  
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Preface 
 
Pursuant to Article 13(3) of Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the 
organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, the High Representative is held 
to provide a review of the organisation and functioning of the EEAS by mid-2013. This review will 
cover, inter alia, the implementation of Article 6(6), (8) and (11), so as to ensure an adequate 
geographical and gender balance and a meaningful presence of nationals from all member states in the 
EEAS. If necessary, the review will be accompanied by appropriate proposals for the revision of the 
2010 Council Decision (e.g., suggestions for additional specific measures to correct possible 
imbalances of staffing). In that case, the Council will, in accordance with Article 27(3) TEU, revise 
the Decision in light of the review by the beginning of 2014. 
This short and user-friendly legal commentary on the 2010 Council Decision is the first of its kind and 
is intended to inform those involved in the review process and to serve as a reference document for 
practitioners and analysts dealing with the EEAS. This commentary is not an elaborate doctrinal piece, 
but rather a textual and contextual analysis of each article, that takes account of i) other relevant legal 
provisions (primary, secondary, international), ii) the process leading to the adoption of the 2010 
Council Decision (i.e. travaux préparatoires), iii) the preamble of the Council Decision, and iv) insofar 
as it is possible at this stage, early implementation. Wherever relevant, cross-references to other 
provisions of the EEAS Council Decision have been made so as to tie in the different commentaries 
and ensure overall consistency. 
The commentary has been produced by an independent, multinational and multidisciplinary team of 
scholars brought together by Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS), the European 
University Institute (EUI) and the Centre of European Policy Studies (CEPS) in the framework of the 
so-called ‘European External Action Service 2.0’ project. This research project is carried out in 
association with the Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance (ACELG), the Centre for 
the Law of EU External Relations (CLEER), the European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA), 
the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, and the University of Copenhagen. 
To serve the ulterior aims of the project, the research team will, in the upcoming months, collect views 
from different stakeholders about problems faced in the implementation of the EEAS Council 
Decision and challenges to the organisation and functioning of the EEAS. In particular, the project 
team will assess whether there is enough interpretative room in the current Council Decision to 
accommodate changes to the organisation and functioning of the EEAS à droit constant’. If the 
margins of appreciation appear too restricted, then the project will offer recommendations as to how to 
amend the 2010 Council Decision in order to improve the organisation and functioning of the EEAS. 
The research outputs of this next phase of the project will take the form of a policy briefing with 
recommendations, to be published at the end of June 2013. A more elaborate academic booklet, 
compiling all papers produced during the project, will appear this autumn. The products of the EEAS 
2.0 project will be published through the regular channels of the research centres involved in this 
collaborative framework. 
 
Christophe Hillion & Steven Blockmans 
Research coordinators, ‘EEAS 2.0’ 
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ARTICLE 1 
Nature and Scope 
  
1. This Decision establishes the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (‘EEAS’).  
2. The EEAS, which has its headquarters in Brussels, shall be a functionally autonomous body of the European 
Union, separate from the General Secretariat of the Council and from the Commission with the legal capacity 
necessary to perform its tasks and attain its objectives. 
3. The EEAS shall be placed under the authority of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy (‘High Representative’).  
4. The EEAS shall be made up of a central administration and of the Union Delegations to third countries and to 
international organisations. 
 
 
Article 1 of the Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European 
External Action Service (hereinafter the ‘EEAS Decision’)1 is entitled ‘nature and scope’. The 
provision not only sets out the nature and scope of action of the Service (Section 2), it also relates to 
the nature and scope of the Decision itself (Section 1). 
1. Nature and Scope of the EEAS Decision  
The EEAS Decision was adopted by the Council on the basis of Article 27(3) TEU,2 which is the sole 
provision in the TEU and TFEU that deals with the EEAS.3 Article 27(3) TEU contains three 
substantive elements on the Service: its name, its basic composition (‘shall comprise officials from 
relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff 
seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States’) and, albeit in broadly defined 
terms, its essential functions:4  namely, to ‘assist’ the High Representative and to ‘work in cooperation 
with the diplomatic services of the Member States’.  The provision otherwise sets out a specific 
procedure to establish ‘[t]he organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service...  
[whereby the] Council shall act on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting the 
European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission’.   
• Article 27(3) TEU thus gives a mandate to EU institutions to build upon the Treaty provisions on 
the EEAS. Yet this mandate appears to be narrowly defined. The Council is empowered to adopt 
                                                     
1 Council Decision 2010/42/EU establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External 
Action Service; OJ 2010 L201/30. 
2 See Preamble EEAS Decision. 
3 The EEAS is also mentioned in Declarations 13 and 14, concerning the common foreign and security 
policy, and Declaration 15 on Article 27 of the TEU. 
4 See the discussion on Article 2 EEAS Decision, below.  
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a decision only to establish the ‘organisation and functioning’ of the EEAS,5 as indeed recalled 
in the first paragraph of the EEAS Decision’s preamble, in its Article 1(1), and in its very title.  
While the notions of ‘organisation and functioning’ could be understood broadly, whether the 
EEAS Decision, in view of its legal basis, could have included anything more than the general 
statements on the Service’s mandate that it encloses is subject to question.6  
• Article 27(3) is located in the CFSP chapter of the TEU (Chapter 2, Title V). Thus, formally, the 
EEAS Decision is a CFSP act, which in turn would suggest that the EEAS is conceived as a 
CFSP creature. Yet, the numbering of the Decision in the Official Journal of the EU 
(‘2010/427/EU’) contains an ‘EU’ rather than the ‘CFSP’ reference that CFSP acts usually 
hold.7 The question can thus be raised as to whether the EEAS Decision was conceived as a 
measure having horizontal nature and scope, rather than of CFSP character only. Such a broad 
ambit appears to be borne out by the provisions of the Decision itself,8 and would incidentally 
explain the General Court’s uninhibited approach to the Decision that transpires from its Order 
in case Elti d.o.o v Delegation of the European Union to Montenegro.9 To be sure, the procedure 
set out in Article 27(3) TEU does contrast with the archetypal CFSP decision-making procedure 
evoked in Article 24(1) and 31 TEU, for example, notably in view of the significant roles it 
attributes to the supranational political institutions of the Union. In particular, the Commission 
has to give its consent for the decision to be adopted, while the Parliament has the right to be 
consulted, a right that in practice endowed it with a significant influence over the decision-
making process.10 The rationale for locating the legal basis of the EEAS decision in the CFSP 
chapter of the TEU can thus be questioned.11 
• If the EEAS Decision was indeed conceived as a CFSP act, its scope is in principle 
circumscribed by the non-contamination principle of Article 40(1) TEU.12 While the Court of 
Justice has recalled that the ‘Union's competence in matters of [the CFSP] shall cover all areas of 
                                                     
5 That the Treaty of Lisbon left it to the EU institutions to elaborate the organisation and functioning of the 
EEAS is quite remarkable in view of the notable preoccupation with competence  that otherwise constrained 
its drafting. It also indicates that the tangible contribution of the EEAS to furthering coherence essentially 
depends on the institutions being willing and able to agree. 
6 See the discussion on Article 2 EEAS Decision, below. 
7 E.g. Council Decision 2012/392/CFSP of 16 July 2012 on the European Union CSDP mission in Niger 
(EUCAP Sahel Niger) (OJ L 187, 17.7.2012, p. 48–51); Council Decision 2012/333/CFSP of 25 June 2012 
updating the list of persons, groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 
2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism and repealing Decision 
2011/872/CFSP (OJ L 165, 26.6.2012, pp. 72–74). 
8 See, for instance, Article 9 of the EEAS Decision, on external action instruments and programming; and 
discussion of that provision, below.  
9 The GC appears to consider that it has jurisdiction on the Decision; see Case T-395/11 Elti d.o.o v 
Delegation of the European Union to Montenegro, Judgment of 4 June 2012, nyr, paras. 31ff. 
10 For more on the process leading to the adoption of the decision, see B. Van Vooren, ‘A Legal-Institutional 
Perspective on the European External Action Service’, CLEER Working Paper 2010/7; and L. Erkelens and 
S. Blockmans, ‘Setting up the European External Action Service: An Institutional Act of Balance’ (2012) 8 
European Constitutional Law Review, pp. 246-279. 
11 The provision on the EEAS in the Treaty establishing the Constitution was also located in the specific 
CFSP Chapter (Article III-296).  
12 According to Article 40(1) TEU: ‘The implementation of the common foreign and security policy shall not 
affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the 
Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences referred to in Articles 3 to 6 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union’. Article 40 TEU is mentioned specifically in Article 4(3)(a) of the EEAS 
decision, in the section concerning the role of CSDP bodies included in the EEAS central administration, as 
if none of the other provisions of the decision were in any way likely to raise issues of compatibility with 
Article 40 TEU. This would tend to further support the notion that the decision has a horizontal dimension.  
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foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security’,13 the provisions of the EEAS 
Decision cannot in principle affect the application of the ‘procedures and the extent of the 
powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences 
referred to in Articles 3 to 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’. That 
would arguably be the case if the Decision legally affected the powers of the Commission,14 for 
example, as established in the TFEU.15 
• Incidentally, the ECOWAS case law leaves important interpretative scope for the EEAS in line 
with the principle of coherence. First, where acts do not resort to ‘legal effect’,16 Article 40 TEU 
is not violated.  Hence the Service can play an important role in non CFSP-issues without 
violating the non-contamination clause.  Second, the Court in ECOWAS also left room for legal 
instruments which do not ‘implement’ TEU (CFSP) or TFEU policies, but which function at a 
level of generality in order to ensure coherent EU external policies, and therefore do not 
‘prejudice questions of competence’.17  Thus, legally the EEAS has quite a bit of leeway to fully 
play its role in ensuring coherence across all EU foreign policies, regardless of Article 40 TEU. 
• The scope and nature of the EEAS Decision should also be considered in the light of Declaration 
14 (annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of 
Lisbon) according to which: ‘the provisions covering the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
including in relation to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy and the External Action Service will not affect the existing legal basis, responsibilities, 
and powers of each Member State in relation to the formulation and conduct of its foreign 
policy, its national diplomatic service, relations with third countries and participation in 
international organisations, including a Member State's membership of the Security Council of 
the United Nations’ (emphasis added). Thus in principle, the EEAS Decision as CFSP act could 
not be formulated in such a way as to affect member states’ (diplomatic services) responsibilities 
and powers in those specific domains.   
2. Nature and Scope of the Service 
 
• In line with the position defended by the member states,18 and in contrast to the wishes of the 
European Parliament (and of the Commission),19 Article 1 EEAS Decision emphasises the 
                                                     
13 See C-130/10 European Parliament v Council, Judgment of 19 July 2012, nyr, at para 62.  
14 In this regard, see the discussion on the ‘normal tasks’ of the Commission evoked in Article 2 EEAS 
Decision, below.  
15 In view of the case law related to former Article 47 TEU (e.g. Case C-91/05 Commission v Council [2008] 
ECR I-3651), questioning the validity of a CFSP act such as the EEAS decision by reference to the non-
contamination principle (now enshrined in Article 40(1) TEU), can arise not only in the context of annulment 
proceedings (Article 263 TFEU, i.e. within two months following the adoption of the decision), but also 
through a plea of illegality (Article 277 TFEU), if a decision was adopted on the basis of the 2010 Decision – 
as there have been in practice (E.g. Joint Decision of the Commission and the HR on Cooperation 
Mechanisms concerning the Management of Delegations of the European Union, JOIN(2012)8, 28.3.2012) 
or arguably through a preliminary ruling procedure (Article 267 TFEU).  
16 See C. Hillion and R.A. Wessel, ‘Competence Distribution in EU External Relations after ECOWAS: 
Clarification or Continued Fuzziness’ (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review, pp. 551-586.  
17 See B. Van Vooren, ‘The Small Arms Judgment in an Age of Constitutional Turmoil’ (2009) 14 European 
Foreign Affairs Review, pp. 231-248.  
18 See e.g. Presidency Report to the European Council on the European External Action Service, 14930/09, 
23 October 2009.  
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autonomous character of the EEAS in several ways. Made up of its own ‘central administration 
and of the Union Delegations to third countries and to international organisations’, the Service is 
conceived as ‘a functionally autonomous body’ of the EU, placed ‘under the authority of the 
High Representative’, and ‘separate from the General Secretariat of the Council and from the 
Commission’. It is endowed with a ‘legal capacity necessary to perform its tasks and attain its 
objectives’. 
 
(i)  A ‘Body’ of the Union 
 
• As a ‘body’ (translated as ‘organe’ in French), the EEAS is not formally included in the list of 
EU institutions enshrined in Article 13 TEU, although it is envisaged as such for the purpose of 
the Staff and Financial regulations,20 respectively.21  
• The notion of ‘body’ is referred to in and regulated by several provisions of EU primary law.22  
Akin to EU institutions, a ‘body’ is bound by e.g. the provisions of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental rights (see Article 51 EUCFR). Indeed, as a body, the EEAS may be brought to 
Court, e.g. under Articles 263 and 265 TFEU, according to which ‘acts of bodies intended to 
have legal effects on third parties’ may be challenged before the European Court of Justice in 
case of violation of EU law.23  
• More generally, some of the Treaty principles governing the functioning of ‘institutions’ are 
arguably applicable to bodies such as the EEAS. For instance, while Article 11 TEU on 
transparency, accessibility, included in the Title on ‘democratic principles’, only refers to EU 
‘institutions’, the rules it encapsulates may apply mutatis mutandis to agencies or bodies given 
that Article 9 TEU, which operates as chapeau of this Title, emphasises that ‘[i]n all its 
activities, the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its citizens, who shall receive 
equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies’ (emphasis added). At the very 
(Contd.)                                                                  
19 See e.g. Brok Report to the Committee on constitutional affairs on the institutional aspects of setting up the 
European External Action Service (2009/2133(INI)) A7-0041/2009. 
20 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1080/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 
2010 amending the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities and the Conditions of 
Employment of Other Servants of those Communities, OJ L311, 26.11.2010, p. 1; Regulation (EU, 
EURATOM) No 1081/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 amending 
Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general 
budget of the European Communities, as regards the European External Action Service, OJ L 311, 
26.11.2010, p. 9 
21 See pt 8 of Preamble of the EEAS Decision; see also the discussion on Articles 6 and 8 EEAS Decision, 
below.  
22 Here are some Treaty Provisions having legal relevance for EU ‘bodies’: TEU: Article 9 (all bodies respect 
democratic principles), TFEU: Article 15(1) (transparency by all EU bodies); Article 15(3) (access to 
documents of all bodies); Article 16 (personal data protection by EU bodies); Articles 20 & 24 (citizens may 
petition ‘advisory bodies’ of the EU); Article 71 (representatives of EU bodies may participate in standing 
committee on internal security); Article 88 (Europol receiving info from ‘bodies’); Articles 123 & 124 
(prohibition of ECB overdraft facilities to EU bodies); Article 226 (EP enquiries into maladministration, 
without prejudice to competence of other EU bodies or institutions), Article 228 (1)(EU ombudsman may 
receive complaints on EU bodies’ activities); Article 263 (review of legality of acts of bodies, and acts of 
those bodies may set up conditions concerning actions against them); Article 265 (failure to act also 
applicable to EU bodies), 267 (prelim. reference on acts of bodies of the EU), Article 287 1 & 3 (CoA 
examines accounts of all EU bodies), Article 298 (EU bodies have support of open efficient and independent 
European administration), Article 325 (combating fraud in all EU bodies).  
23 See in this respect Case T-395/11 Elti d.o.o v Delegation of the European Union to Montenegro, Judgment 
of 4 June 2012, nyr, para. 26, and para. 73 a contrario.  
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least, provisions applying to institutions in the context of primary law apply to the EEAS when 
functioning as an ‘institution’, viz. for the purpose of the Staff and Financial Regulations.24 
• While the EEAS, as a body, may be sued, the question may be raised as to whether it may also 
bring a case before the Courts. Such a standing could be derived from the ‘legal capacity’ with 
which the EEAS is endowed ‘to perform its tasks and attain its objectives’ (Article 1(2) 
EEAS).25 Indeed, akin to the European Parliament in 1970-80s,26  the Service ought to be able to 
defend its prerogatives before the Court of Justice precisely ‘to perform its tasks and attain its 
objectives’, however vaguely crafted they may be in the Decision.27 Admittedly, such standing 
would however be complicated to exercise in practice given that the EEAS falls under the 
authority of the HR, who in turn is structurally tied both to the Commission (as VP) and to the 
Council (as HR and President of the FAC). Still, it is not inconceivable that, occasionally, the 
EEAS and the HR, on the one hand, and the Commission, on the other, might not share the same 
interest.28  
 
(ii)  A ‘functionally autonomous’ Body 
 
• Undoubtedly its structural links with the Council and Commission may circumscribe the 
autonomy of the EEAS. To be sure, in defining the Service as a ‘functionally autonomous body’, 
the decision appears to qualify the very autonomy that it enjoys.  
• This qualified autonomy may indeed be related to the title and scope of the EEAS Decision 
itself, namely the ‘organisation and functioning of the EEAS’.  In particular, it may be wondered 
whether the emphasis in Article 1 on the functional autonomy of the Service suggests that the 
latter is, by contrast, not organisationally autonomous.  If so, then the question arises as to where 
the dividing line lies between ‘functioning’ and ‘organisation’.  Arguably, ‘functioning’ refers to 
carrying out its tasks of formulating policy proposals, information-gathering, etc., which the 
EEAS does autonomously from the Commission, whereas organisation refers to elements such 
as 1) the Staff and Financial Regulations where the EEAS has to respect relevant rules,29 2) 
accountability to the European Parliament, and 3) the fact that it is ‘under the authority’ of the 
HR.   
• A reading of different language versions of the Decision confirms that the EEAS is not 
organisationally but only functionally autonomous in carrying out its tasks. Hence, the French 
text of Article 1 envisages the Service as ‘un organe de l'Union européenne fonctionnant de 
manière autonome’,30 an expression that sounds less conceptual and perhaps more practical than 
                                                     
24 See discussion on Articles 6 and 8 EEAS Decision, below. 
25 The EEAS also has its own Legal Affairs Division.  
26 See Case 294/83 Les Verts v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339; and Case C-70/88 Parliament v Council 
[1990] ECR I-2041.  
27 See the discussion under Article 2 EEAS Decision, below.  
28 The case C-658/11 European Parliament v Council of the European Union on the EU agreement with 
Mauritius is a case in point: it has been suggested that the HR ought to intervene in support of the Council 
against the European Parliament, which is supported by the European Commission, which intervenes 
contrary to the legal advice of the EEAS Legal Affairs Department.  
29 As regards the EU delegation in particular, see Case T-395/11 Elti d.o.o v Delegation of the European 
Union to Montenegro, Judgment of 4 June 2012, nyr. 
30 Similarly, the Italian version refers to ‘un organo dell’Unione europea che opera in autonomia funzionale’, 
while the Danish version mentions ‘et funktionelt autonomt EU-organ’. The Dutch text describes the Service 
as ‘een functioneel autonoom orgaan van de Europese Unie’.  
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the English phrase.31 The notion of functioning autonomously evoked by the French version 
might suggest that when fulfilling its ‘tasks’ (to use the terminology of Article 2 EEAS) the 
Service does not need the organisational support of another actor; i.e. that it is organisationally 
and operationally self-sufficient. Note that many language versions call the EEAS an ‘organ of 
the EU’, with all that this possibly entails in terms of attribution of acts and ability to bind the 
legal person of which it is an organ.32  
• In view of the above discussion on organisational v functional autonomy, the question may be 
raised as to whether the EEAS bringing court cases itself does fall under functioning, or 
organisation.  Via the VP, the EEAS is certainly closely linked to the Commission.  However, it 
stands under the authority of the HR, this means that it is the ‘office of the High Representative’ 
which, due to organisational dependence, is the one that ought to defend the prerogatives of the 
EEAS. Does this then mean that such an office is the entity that should be considered the ‘body’ 
for purposes of Article 267 TFEU? 
• However qualified, the autonomy of the EEAS could increase in view of several elements 
contained in the Decision and as a result of internal practices. Hence, while the Decision foresees 
that the Service has its own budget and staff,33 the latter has been organised and labelled to 
underscore the singular administrative identity of the Service (e.g. ‘Managing Directorates’ 
rather than the classical Directorates-General, headed by a ‘Corporate Board’), epitomised by a 
distinct logo, separate website, and indeed specific email address. 
• The autonomy of the EEAS could also be bolstered thanks to the ‘legal capacity’ it is endowed 
with ‘to perform its tasks and attain its objectives’. In particular, this capacity may be used for 
articulating the Service’s mandate by reference to ‘objectives’ which, in contrast to its ‘tasks’ 
listed in Article 2, are not spelled out anywhere in the Decision – at least not explicitly.  
 
(iii)  ‘separate from the General Secretariat of the Council and from the Commission’ 
 
• Unlike the autonomy of the EEAS, the notion that the Service is separate from the General 
Secretariat of the Council (GSC) and from the Commission is not qualified, either 
organisationally or functionally.  
• Separate from the GSC and from the Commission, the Service organisationally falls under the 
authority of the HR, as stipulated in Articles 1(3) and 2. It is indeed noteworthy that Article 1(3) 
EEAS Decision only refers to the HR, while it does not contain any reference to the incumbent’s 
function as Vice-President of the European Commission (the same holds true for Article 2(1)).34 
This suggests that the EEAS cannot be regarded as a service of the Commission and must 
                                                     
31 Since the Decision was drafted in English, this text arguably best reflects the inter-institutional 
compromise, yet formally and legally, this does not matter as all language versions have equally authentic 
value.  
32 See in this respect, H.G. Schermers and N. M. Blokker, International Institutional Law (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 5th Edition, 2011).  
33 See the discussion under Articles 6 and 8 EEAS Decision, below. Indeed, as regards the EEAS personnel, a 
number of cases already having been decided by or are currently pending before the civil service tribunal: 
See cases F-15/11 (on EEAS officials having to move out of a hotel in Kabul) and F-64/12 (on refusal of a 
promotion).  
 
34 It should be noted that para 1 of the Preamble of the EEAS Decision stipulates that ‘the reference to the 
term ‘High Representative’ will be interpreted in accordance with his/her different functions under Article 18 
TEU’. Further on this point, see the discussion under Article 2 EEAS Decision, below.  
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therefore be separate from it. This also means that, formally, only the HR/VP can instruct the 
EEAS.  
• However, other provisions ought to be considered. Article 2(2) EEAS Decision establishes the 
obligation of the Service to assist the presidents of the European Council and of the Commission 
respectively, as well as the Commission as a whole, ‘in the exercise of their respective functions 
in the area of external relations’. This obligation could be read as allowing the actors mentioned 
to instruct the EEAS, albeit arguably in consultation with the HR/VP. Moreover, it should be 
recalled that the EEAS staff, particularly Heads of Delegations, might sometimes operate qua 
Commission, for instance when acting with delegated powers of budget implementation.35 The 
Commission’s Rules of Procedure may also apply to the EEAS when it leads the negotiations of 
framework agreements covering both CFSP and non-CFSP matters – as regards the latter.36 
• While relative, the separate character of the EEAS has been consolidated in practice, at least 
partly. The Service’s original umbilical link with the Commission and GSC will at some point be 
severed. While originally made of transferred staff from the Commission and the Council, the 
EEAS personnel will be increasingly diversified, notably as the Service will be able to recruit 
not only from other institutions, but also more broadly on the basis of open competitions.37 
Moreover, and perhaps more symbolically, the EEAS has its own separate premises. Instead of 
being located in a building of the Commission (e.g.: Charlemagne) or of the Council (e.g. Lex), 
it is placed in-between the headquarters of these institutions, on the Schuman Roundabout.38 
 
                                                     
35 See Case T-395/11 Elti d.o.o v Delegation of the European Union to Montenegro, Judgment of 4 June 
2012, nyr; and commentary of Article 8, below. 
36 See the Vademecum on the External Action of the European Union (SEC(2011)881); and the ‘Operational 
guidelines for the preparation and conduct of negotiations for framework agreements with third countries 
involving both the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy (HR)’.  
37 See also discussion on Article 6 EEAS Decision, below.  
38 Some units of the EEAS nevertheless remain located within the Council or the Commission premises (see 
the discussion under Article 12 EEAS Decision, below), while the EEAS hosts Commission staff (viz. 
Foreign Policy Instruments Service). 
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ARTICLE 2 
Tasks 
 
 
1. The EEAS shall support the High Representative in fulfilling his/her mandates as outlined, notably, in Articles 
18 and 27 TEU:  
- in fulfilling his/her mandate to conduct the Common Foreign and Security Policy (‘CFSP’) of the European 
Union, including the Common Security and Defence Policy (‘CSDP’), to contribute by his/her proposals to the 
development of that policy, which he/she shall carry out as mandated by the Council and to ensure the 
consistency of the Union’s external action,  
- in his/her capacity as President of the Foreign Affairs Council, without prejudice to the normal tasks of the 
General Secretariat of the Council,  
- in his/her capacity as Vice-President of the Commission for fulfilling within the Commission the 
responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations, and in coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external 
action, without prejudice to the normal tasks of the services of the Commission.  
2. The EEAS shall assist the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, and the 
Commission in the exercise of their respective functions in the area of external relations.   
Article 2 defines the tasks of the External Action Service. It does this both in functional (section 1) 
and policy terms (section 2). 
 
1. The Functional Tasks of the EEAS 
 
• In describing the mandate of the EEAS, Article 2 of the Council Decision largely reflects the 
structure of Articles 18 and 27 TEU to which it refers in the chapeau.  Article 18 is found in 
Title II ‘Institutions’ of the TEU, and is therefore of general application. By contrast, Article 27 
is included in Title V – Chapter 2 of the TEU, and is therefore specific to the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy. Article 2 of the EEAS Council Decision merges these general and CFSP-
specific aspects to attain an integrated support mandate for the office of the HR/VP/FAC 
Chairperson.  
• The aforementioned triple-hatted position is set out in Article 18 TEU.  The first paragraph 
contains the procedure for the appointment of the office holder, and the following paragraphs 
describe the three hats in the following succession: Article 18 (2) refers to the High 
Representative conducting the EU’s CFSP; Article 18 (3) refers to the High Representative 
presiding the Foreign Affairs Council; and Article 18 (4) establishes that the High 
Representative shall be one of the Vice Presidents of the Commission, ensure the consistency of 
the Union’s external action, and be responsible within the Commission for responsibilities 
incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating aspects of the Union’s external action. 
Article 2 (1) EEAS Decision exactly follows the sequencing of functions set out in Article 18 
TEU; and merges them, through its first indent, with the CFSP-related tasks as described in 
Article 27 TEU.  
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• In other words, Article 2 creates a mandate of support for the EEAS in relation to all three hats 
of the High Representative, and this with no hierarchy between them. Arguing to the contrary 
would imply the re-introduction of the pre-Lisbon pillar approach, which contravenes the spirit 
of the Treaties. Indeed, the rationale of the triple hats – even since the European Convention in 
2002 - is that the person holding this office would integrate all aspects of EU external relations 
more smoothly to ensure coherence across the multitude of EU actors and instruments.39  It is 
therefore crucial to point out that the triple-hatted post of High Representative is created by 
Article 18 in the general institutional Title of the Treaty on European Union, and not the specific 
Chapter on CFSP in the TEU. Indeed, CFSP as described in Article 27 TEU is but one of the 
three main tasks of the High Representative named in the more fundamental Article 18 TEU, 
alongside that of FAC Chairperson and Commission Vice President.  The EEAS then works 
rather like a chameleon: functioning akin to a Commission DG in relation to certain VP-related 
tasks; functioning akin to the Council General Secretariat in CFSP or FAC related tasks; without 
one support function taking precedence over the other, but with interlocking and equal 
importance. 
• The EEAS’ tasks are largely described by reference to the tasks of other prominent actors40 in 
EU external relations: the HR/VP/FAC Chairperson predominantly, but also the Presidents of 
the European Council and of the Commission, respectively, the Council General Secretariat and 
the Commission.  The description in relation to them is thus both ‘negative’ and ‘positive’:  e.g. 
positive - by stating that its task is one of support/assistance in light of the mandates or functions 
of these EU actors; negative – by proscribing its function ‘without prejudice’ to the ‘normal 
tasks’ of the Commission services and the Council General Secretariat.  One must thus look at 
the exact description of the tasks and functions of the EEAS in relation to these actors, and 
establish what the normal tasks of the respective actors are in order to uncover the EEAS’ 
mandate.  The reference to ‘normal’ creates a tension where it assumes there is a common 
understanding of the respective tasks of the competent EU actors in external policy-making.  
However, it is axiomatic that the advent of the EEAS would create a ‘new normal’, which this 
provision does not define. In the context of the ongoing Review, and in view of the possible 
revision of the EEAS decision, the ‘normal tasks’ of each of the actors/institutions could be 
clarified, notably in consideration of the way in which they have been fleshed out in the first two 
years of the EEAS’ work: namely a predominant classical foreign policy (CFSP) focus over an 
emphasis on the coherence mandate across EU external action as a whole.41  
• In terms of wording, Article 2 meticulously balances the different functional and substantive 
positions and inter-relationships to ensure the ‘sui generis’ nature of the EEAS in relation to the 
other actors mentioned in that provision. As previously indicated, it also fleshes out the triple 
hats of the HR/VP. As regards the subtle differences in wording, we may note the following:  
1. Paragraph 1 speaks of ‘mandates’ (plural) of the HR and paragraph 2 speaks of 
‘function’ in relation to the Presidents of the Commission and the European Council. 
2. Within paragraph 1 there is then a differentiation between the first indent, which 
speaks of the ‘mandate’ to conduct the CFSP, and the second and third indents which 
speak of her ‘capacity’ as Chair of the FAC and VP of the Commission.  
                                                     
39 The European Convention, Final Report of the Working Group VII on External Action, CONV 459/02, 
Brussels, 16 December 2002, 19.  
40 E.g. not only EU institutions in accordance with Article 13 TEU.  
41 See report prepared for the AFET Committee of the European Parliament, The Organis?zation and 
Functioning of the EEAS: Achievements, Challenges and Opportunities, to be published end February 2013. 
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3. There is also the distinction between the task of ‘supporting’ the High Representative 
in fulfilling her mandates, and that of ‘assisting’ the President of the European 
Council, President of the Commission, and the Commission itself.  
4. Finally, the third indent of paragraph 1 then establishes a link between the 
Commission and the EEAS through the HR qua VP.  It reads that the EEAS shall 
support the HR/VP ‘...in his/her capacity as Vice-President of the Commission for 
fulfilling within the Commission the responsibilities incumbent on it in external 
relations’ (emphasis added).  The word ‘it’ refers to the Commission, and thus the 
EEAS is to support the VP in carrying out the external relations responsibilities of the 
Commission.  
• In two years of EEAS practice, it can be observed that these differences in formulation have a 
real-life relevance and policy impact. In relation to assisting the function of the Presidents of the 
European Commission and the European Council, the task of the EEAS mainly consists of 
providing preparatory material for summits and visits in the form of briefings.  ‘Assisting’ these 
two Presidents in their ‘function’ is hence more limited than ‘supporting’ the High 
Representative in her ‘mandates’ and ‘capacities’. We may thus observe that ‘mandates’ refers to 
substantive policy tasks being given to the actor holding the mandate; whereas ‘function’ and 
‘capacity’ are more informative and managerial in nature.  This is underlined by the fact that the 
kind of support tasks (paragraph 1) or assistance (paragraph 2) to be given by the EEAS are also 
different.42   This has an important consequence for the mandate of the EEAS in relation to the 
triple hats of the High Representative.  Through an a contrario reasoning we submit that the 
EEAS is thereby more than a mere ‘briefing-generating machine’ in all three tasks listed in 
Article 2 (1) of the EEAS Decision, but an entity that is meant to proactively generate novel 
policy ideas, notably in line with the coherence mandate which it is expected to support (Art 18 
(4) TEU iuncto Article 2 EEAS Council Decision). This means that the notion of ‘normal tasks’ 
of the Council Secretariat and the Commission must duly take account of this. Finally, these 
findings ought therefore to be connected to different provisions in the Council Decision, notably 
Article 3 (Duty of Cooperation), Article 5 (Delegations) and Article 9 (Programming).  
• The fact that Article 2 (1) and (2) differentiate between support and assistance for the High 
Representative and the actors named in Article 2 (2) creates a different functional relationship as 
regards being able to ‘instruct’ the EEAS to carry out certain task for the respective office holder 
or institution. This can be illustrated by reference to the EEAS’ tasks in relation to the President 
of the European Council. It has been reported that the work of the EEAS in supporting Mr. Van 
Rompuy – for example at the G20 – has been ‘top notch’43, but that the notion of what 
‘assistance’ means causes practical difficulties: in the pre-Lisbon era, the rotating presidency had 
a clear top-to-bottom chain of command in preparing external representation all the way down to 
                                                     
42 Compare however different language versions of these two paragraphs, which paint a mixed picture. In 
French, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 2 of the Council Decision use the same verb ‘assister’, but they 
distinguish between ‘dans l'exécution de ses mandats ’ in paragraph 1 and ‘dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions 
respectives’ in paragraph 2. In the Dutch and Danish versions two different verbs are used: ‘ondersteunen’/’ 
støtter’ (para 1) and ‘bijstaan’/’bistår’ (para 2) ‘in de uitoefening van zijn mandaat’/’ dennes mandater’ (para 
1) and ‘hun taken’/’deres funktioner’ (para 2).  The Dutch and Danish versions thus precisely match the 
English language version (which was the language in which the document has been negotiated), but this is 
less true for the French version. Moving to the Italian version, there is yet another reading : here these 
paragraphs twice use the identical ‘Il SEAE assiste’ and both paragraphs also refer to ‘funzioni’, thus 
contradicting the subtle differences of the English language version. Finally the German version speaks twice 
of ‘unterstützt’, but distinguishes between ‘seines Auftrags’ and ‘ihrer Aufgaben’.  
43 See the report prepared for the AFET Committee of the European Parliament, The Organisation and 
Functioning of the EEAS: Achievements, Challenges and Opportunities, to be published end February 2013. 
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expert working group level.  However, in the new system the office of the European Council, 
and that of the EEAS, have been created without truly ‘embedding them’ in a clear structure and 
hierarchy.  Thus, President Van Rompuy only has ‘chain of command’ over his cabinet, and 
while the EEAS is there to ‘assist’ the office holder. This implies that the President of the 
European Council holds no hierarchical superiority and has no legal competence to give 
instructions.44 This means that the preparatory process within the Union is more infused with a 
number of political or institutional interests, is more based on personal relationships and good 
will, which require more energy to steer EU external relations towards a desirable outcome.  
2. The Substantive Tasks of the EEAS 
 
• Whereas Article 2 EEAS Decision defines the tasks of the EEAS in functional terms, there is 
very little reference to the substantive policy tasks of the Service. Article 2(1), indent 1, is the 
only segment of the provision which mentions two explicit substantive policy-related tasks: first, 
support the High Representative to conduct and formulate policy proposals in the field of 
CFSP/CSDP; and second to support the High Representative in ‘ensuring consistency’ of EU 
external relations as a whole.  
• In terms of drafting there is an important, yet subtle difference between Article 2 (1) first and 
third indents; and Article 18 (2) and (4).  In the Treaty, Article 18 (2) refers only to policy-
making tasks in relation to the CFSP of the High Representative.  Article 2 (1) first indent of the 
EEAS Decision copies the Treaty formulation, but adds the task of ensuring consistency in EU 
external action.  Conversely, in Article 18 (4) TEU we find the Vice-Presidential Commission 
hat of the High Representative, which explicitly includes tasks in relation to consistency of EU 
external action, which are faithfully reproduced in Article 2 (1) third indent, EEAS Decision. 
This implies that the EEAS is given a stronger (compared to the Treaties) coherence-oriented 
mandate for EU external relations as a whole, and not simply a CFSP-oriented mandate. 
• As regards balancing the CFSP task versus the over-arching coherence mandate of the EEAS, it 
is being reported that the EEAS has so far focused mainly on its foreign policy tasks, even to the 
point where the EEAS finds itself in competition with the member states on ‘classical foreign 
policy’.45  This begs the question of whether the coherence mandate of the EEAS ought to be 
strengthened. A revised EEAS Decision could strengthen the Service’s mandate as regards EU 
policy coherence by including additional legal bases of a more substantive nature.  This would 
then change the purely ‘CFSP nature’ of the Decision, and therefore support a wider ambit of 
EEAS tasks, albeit within the current Treaty framework.  Notably, a new Decision could have 
regard to Articles 21 TEU and 205 TFEU. In this sense, such a new legal basis of the EEAS 2.0 
Decision on the ‘(organisation and) functioning’ of the EEAS would constitutionally embed and 
substantively widen its function of contributing to the HR’s mandate of ensuring consistency in 
EU external action (as currently stated in Article 2(1), first indent, of the EEAS Decision; as well 
as the Decision’s preamble). As previously stated in this commentary, such a dual legal basis is 
not necessarily incompatible with Article 40 TEU as it can be seen as implementing a duty of 
coherence and cooperation, ‘without prejudice’ to questions of competence.46 
• As regards the formulation of the EEAS’ tasks in relation to those of the High Representative, 
one must also be aware of the fact that Article 2 uses the words ‘as outlined, notably’ in Articles 
18 and 27 TEU. Two textual elements are relevant: on the one hand, the word mandates is 
                                                     
44 Ibid. 
45 Interview with a Former Head of Delegation, 24 October 2012. 
46 Cp. Case C-130/10 European Parliament v Council, judgment of 19 July 2012, nyr. 
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plural; and second, the words ‘outlined’ and ‘notably’ indicate the open-ended nature of the 
HR’s mandate, and the fact that alongside Articles 18 and 27 TEU, other provisions may be 
relevant. One must therefore piece together the whole mandate of the HR from the Treaties, and 
thereby also substantively broaden the support tasks of the EEAS itself.  According to the TEU, 
the High Representative:  
 
‘shall assist the President of the European Council’;47 ‘shall conduct the CFSP’;48 ‘shall be 
responsible within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and 
for coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external action’;49 ‘shall ensure the unity, 
consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union in the CFSP’;50 shall ‘put into effect the 
CFSP’;51 ‘shall chair the Foreign Affairs Council’;52 ‘shall contribute through his proposals 
towards the preparation of the CFSP’;53 ‘shall ensure implementation of the decisions adopted by 
the European Council and the Council’;54 ‘shall represent the EU for matters related to the 
CFSP … shall conduct political dialogue on the Union’s behalf … shall express the Union’s 
position in international organizations’;55 and finally, she has an important role in CSDP decision-
making.56  
 
• Characteristic of the EEAS Decision is that not all information on any given issue is found in 
one article of the legal instrument.  As such, Article 4 (3) on the fashion in which the Central 
Administration of the EEAS shall be organised is crucial for a good understanding of the 
Service’s tasks.  Indeed, with the limited substantive policy references in the EEAS’ support 
tasks, it must be acknowledged that much information on the EEAS’ policy work can be inferred 
from its organogram and the staff it has absorbed from the Council and Commission. Indeed, 
Article 4 (3) states that the EEAS shall have geographic DG’s covering all areas of the world, as 
well as thematically focused organisational sub-entities. 
•   Evidently, having to interpret and define the substantive tasks of an organisation by looking at 
the fashion in which it is internally structured is putting the cart before the horse: institutional 
organisation and staffing should be organised in light of projected and clearly defined tasks, 
rather than the reverse. This problem can be glossed over in relation to the geographic desks of 
the EEAS. In this case they can be viewed as the logical consequence of the EEAS’ function to 
aid the HR/VP in ensuring coherence of EU external policy. This is also why, since the 
European Convention, a consensus emerged that no geographically organised units should exist 
in the Commission or Council General Secretariat.57 The thematic desks are more problematic, 
as their substantive policy tasks are the result of the 2009-2010 negotiation process and the tug-
of-war over the competences of the EEAS and the Commission.  For example, the absence of a 
                                                     
47 Article 15(6) penultimate paragraph, TEU.  
48 Article 18(2) TEU. 
49 Article 18(3) TEU. 
50 Article 26(2) second indent TEU, together with the Council. 
51 Article 26(3) TEU. 
52 Articles 18(3) TEU and 27(1) TEU. 
53 Articles 18(2) TEU and 27(1) TEU. 
54 Article 27(1) TEU. 
55 Article 27(2) TEU. 
56 Article 42(4) TEU.  
57 See note 39, above. Although certain Commission DGs have since the advent of the EEAS begun to 
organise themselves around geographic scope, where this is ‘deemed necessary’. See report prepared for the 
AFET Committee of the European Parliament, The Organisation and Functioning of the EEAS: 
Achievements, Challenges and Opportunities, to be published end February 2013. 
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thematic desk on energy is the result of Commission efforts to avoid the EEAS siphoning in EU 
external energy policy, rather than a principled decision on whether or not such a desk would be 
useful for EU policy.58 Another example: the initial proposal for a thematic desk dealing with 
gender issues was due to the specific interest of the person holding the mandate of the HR/VP in 
this issue.  
• Apart from Article 4 EEAS Decision, certain other provisions in the EEAS legal instrument, 
such as Article 5(9) and (10), also contain a number of tasks which are not contained in Article 
2.  They cannot be considered lex specialis provisions in relation to Article 2 of the Council 
Decision, but more additional tasks. This indeed seems to be a recurrent problem with the EEAS 
decision, namely: despite the fact that provisions are regrouped under ‘tasks’, ‘cooperation’, 
‘nature and scope’, etc. one still finds provisions that could fall under either of these categories, 
in various other articles.  More generally, we must also look to other legal/non-legal sources to 
tease out the tasks of the EEAS:  
o  the TEU describing the mandate of the HR/VP;  
o  the debate and documents relating to which elements of the Council General 
Secretariat/Commission the EEAS would/has absorbed;  
o  the organogram, in all its different iterations over the last 2 years, provides a source of 
information on the substantive tasks of the EEAS: the geographic scope of its work, as 
well as the thematic desks.  
o  other documents such as the EEAS-Commission working arrangement of January 
2012; and the Joint Decision on managing delegations of March 2012. 
• A final consideration is the extent to which the mandate of the EEAS is circumscribed in an 
exhaustive fashion. Arguably, Article 2(1) allows it to be entrusted with tasks not explicitly 
mentioned in the articles it refers to, and that the European Council could entrust the HR and 
with that the EEAS with other tasks not explicitly provided for in the Treaty, the way the 
Commission has in the past been endowed with tasks not explicitly foreseen in primary law (e.g. 
management of the European Development Fund, or the conduct of the EU pre-accession 
strategy). 
• In sum, Article 2 did not lay down the tasks of the EEAS in any solid, ascertainable fashion, 
though that is not necessarily problematic.  The question is then, to what extent it is necessary to 
do so in a potentially revised EEAS decision; and if so, whether this should be done in the 
Council Decision. The bigger question is then whether the current Treaty rules even allow for 
any such definition and deepening of the EEAS’ mandate. 
                                                     
58 J. F. Braun, "EU Energy Policy under the Treaty of Lisbon Rules - Between a new policy and business as 
usual" (February 2011) CEPS Working Paper No 31, 4.  
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ARTICLE 3 
Cooperation 
 
 
1. The EEAS shall support, and work in cooperation with, the diplomatic services of the Member States, as well 
as with the General Secretariat of the Council and the services of the Commission, in order to ensure 
consistency between the different areas of the Union’s external action and between those areas and its other 
policies.  
2. The EEAS and the services of the Commission shall consult each other on all matters relating to the external 
action of the Union in the exercise of their respective functions, except on matters covered by the CSDP. The 
EEAS shall take part in the preparatory work and procedures relating to acts to be prepared by the Commission 
in this area. 
This paragraph shall be implemented in accordance with Chapter 1 of Title V of the TEU, and with Article 205 
TFEU. 
3. The EEAS may enter into service-level arrangements with relevant services of the General Secretariat of the 
Council, the Commission, or other offices or interinstitutional bodies of the Union. 
4. The EEAS shall extend appropriate support and cooperation to the other institutions and bodies of the Union, 
in particular to the European Parliament. The EEAS may also benefit from the support and cooperation of those 
institutions and bodies, including agencies, as appropriate. The EEAS internal auditor will cooperate with the 
internal auditor of the Commission to ensure a consistent audit policy, with particular reference to the 
Commission’s responsibility for operational expenditure. In addition, the EEAS shall cooperate with the 
European Anti-Fraud Office ("OLAF") in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999. It shall, in 
particular, adopt without delay the decision required by that Regulation on the terms and conditions for internal 
investigations. As provided in that Regulation, both Member States, in accordance with national provisions, and 
the institutions shall give the necessary support to enable OLAF’s agents to fulfil their tasks.   
While Article 2 of the EEAS Decision predominantly purports to allocate ‘tasks’ to the Service by 
reference to the functions of other EU external relations actors, Article 3 is entirely devoted to 
fostering cooperation among them (section 1). Generally, Article 3 is formulated in mandatory 
language. It thus establishes an obligation of cooperation that recalls the terminology of the TEU 
(Section 2). It is in turn expressed as various obligations of conduct involving procedural duties 
(Section 3), whose scope of application is broad, particularly in terms of the number of actors to which 
they are addressed (Section 4).  
1. The Rationale of Cooperation in the EEAS Decision  
That an entire article of the EEAS Decision should be dedicated to cooperation is unsurprising for at 
least three reasons. First, it is essential for the very establishment of the EEAS, which according to 
Article 27(3) TEU, is based on the absorption and (partial) amalgamation of the relevant services and 
tasks of the Commission and of the General Secretariat of the Council, and on the participation of 
member states’ diplomats. Second, cooperation appears all the more necessary since the allocation of 
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‘tasks’ between the EEAS and others external relations players is vague,59 thus making power overlaps 
and frictions almost inevitable. Third, cooperation is instrumental to the coherence mandate of the 
HR/VP supported by the EEAS, given the essential function that such cooperation plays in ensuring 
coherence.60 Indeed, as a ‘Service’ rather than a fully-fledged political institution, located between the 
Commission and the Council, the EEAS is primarily conceived to work for and with other actors, and 
thus needs the latter’s cooperation to effectively fulfil its tasks.  
2. A Specific Expression of the Obligation of Cooperation Enshrined in the TEU  
 
• The cooperation foreseen in Article 3 is crafted as an obligation, as testified by the recurring 
usage of the phrase ‘shall’ throughout the text.  
• Paragraph 1, which may be read as a chapeau of the whole article, recalls the function of 
cooperation as a means to ensure consistency. Indeed in referring to consistency and in 
emphasising its multifaceted application (viz. between different areas of the EU external action, 
and between those areas and other policies), the requirement evoked in Article 3 echoes the 
comprehensive coherence imperative set out in Article 21(3) TEU, of which it can thus be seen 
as a specific application. To be sure, the preamble of the EEAS Decision does make an explicit 
reference to Article 21(3) TEU in its second indent, immediately after the paragraph on the 
purpose of the measure. 
• The role of the EEAS in ascertaining overall consistency resonates in paragraph 2 of Article 3 of 
the EEAS Decision, which underlines the duty of the Commission and the EEAS to consult on 
‘all matters relating to the external action of the Union in the exercise of their respective 
functions’ (emphasis added), except CSDP (see further below). The two shall thus consult each 
other not only on EU policies that are primarily external (e.g. trade, neighbourhood, 
development) but equally on all EU policies having an external dimension (e.g. environment, 
transport, climate change, energy). 
• The terminology of cooperation used in Article 3 EEAS Decision also recalls the terms of 
Article 4(3) TEU establishing the principle of sincere cooperation between the member states 
and the EU, as well as the provisions of Article 13(2) TEU on inter-institutional cooperation. 
The obligation of cooperation between the EEAS and other actors of the EU external action thus 
arguably finds its ultimate foundations in the TEU, and could thereby be enforced accordingly.  
• In particular, while the EEAS Decision is of a CFSP nature, thereby limiting its enforceability 
given the circumscribed jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in this area, the obligations 
it contains nonetheless ought to be conceived and possibly applied by reference to the 
constitutional principles and obligations they encapsulate, particularly where those are 
specifically articulated in subsequent documents, such as the Joint Decision of the Commission 
and the High Representative on Cooperation Mechanisms concerning the Management of 
                                                     
59 See discussion under Article 2 EEAS Decision, above.  
60 On this connection, see e.g. C. Hillion, ‘Tous pour un, Un pour tous!  Coherence in the External relations 
of the European Union’ in M. Cremona (ed.), Developments in EU External Relations Law, Collected 
Courses of the Academy of European Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) pp. 10-36. More 
generally on coherence, see I. Bosse-Platière, L'article 3 du traité UE : Recherche sur une exigence de 
cohérence de l’action extérieure de l’Union européenne (Brussels : Bruylant, 2009). 
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Delegations of the European Union,61 or the ‘operational guidelines for the preparation and 
conduct of negotiations for framework agreements involving both the HR and the 
Commission’.62 According to the latter, the EEAS is expected to work in close cooperation with 
the services of the Commission when negotiating such comprehensive agreements (i.e. covering 
CFSP and non-CFSP dimensions) on behalf of the EU. These arrangements arguably ‘represent 
the fulfilment of [the] duty of cooperation’63 as expressed in Article 3 EEAS Decision and 
ultimately founded on Article 4(3) TEU.64 
• Indeed, akin to the duty of cooperation articulated by the European Court of Justice, Article 3 
EEAS Decision points to several obligations of conduct. 
 
3. Cooperation as Multiple Obligations of Conduct  
• The obligation of cooperation enshrined in Article 3 takes various expressions in the different 
paragraphs that compose it. It is formulated as duties to ‘support’, ‘work in cooperation with’ 
(paragraph 1), ‘consult’, and ‘take part in preparatory work’ (paragraph 2). Article 3 thus points 
to several more specific duties that remind of the obligations of conduct which the Court of 
Justice has derived from the principle of cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU.65  
• It should be noted that all the procedural duties are not absolute, as some appear to vary 
depending on the subject matter and/or the actor concerned. Hence, as suggested above, Article 
3(1) should perhaps be read as introducing the obligation of cooperation as a general EEAS duty 
to ‘support and work in cooperation with’ all actors involved, viz. the services of the 
Commission, the General Secretariat of the Council, the member states’ diplomatic services, and 
possibly ‘other institutions and bodies of the Union, in particular the European Parliament’ 
                                                     
61 Joint Decision of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy on Cooperation Mechanisms concerning the Management of Delegations of the European 
Union; JOIN(2012)8, 28.3.2012.  
62 ‘Operational guidelines for the preparation and conduct of negotiations for framework agreements with 
third countries involving both the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR)’, signed by the Secretary-General of the Commission and the Chief 
Operating Officer of the EEAS.  
63 See in this regard, C-25/94 Commission v Council [1996] ECR I-1469.  
64 Paragraph 6 of the preamble of the Joint Decision explicitly refers to Article 3(1) EEAS Decision, while its 
paragraph 1 evokes the need for the Commission and the EEAS ‘to collaborate closely’ in view of the post-
Lisbon EU ‘institutional set up in the external relations area’. In the same vein, the Guidelines mention that 
‘These arrangements… are designed to ensure the full involvement of the Commission services and optimise 
cooperation with the EEAS’.  
65 See in particular: Case C-266/03 Commission v Luxembourg [2005] ECR I-4805; Case C-433/03 
Commission v Germany [2005] ECR I-6985; Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland (‘MOX plant’) [2006] 
ECR I-4635; Case C-246/07 Commission v Sweden (‘PFOS’), judgment of 20 April 2010, nyr; and more 
generally: M Cremona, ‘Defending the Community Interest: the Duties of Cooperation and Compliance’ in 
M Cremona & B De Witte (eds.) EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional fundamentals (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2008) 125; E Neframi, ‘The Duty of Loyalty: Rethinking its Scope through its Application in the 
Field of EU External Relations’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 323; C Hillion, ‘Mixity and 
coherence in EU external relations: the significance of the duty of cooperation’ in C Hillion and P Koutrakos 
(eds), Mixed Agreements Revisited – The Union and its Member States in the World (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2010);  G De Baere, ‘O, Where is Faith? O, Where is Loyalty? Some Thoughts? On the Duty of 
Loyal Co-operation and the Union’s External Environmental Competences in the light of the PFOS Case’ 
(2011) 36 European Law Review 405. 
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(Article 3(4)).66 Other paragraphs (as well as other provisions in the EEAS Decision) would by 
contrast establish special duties of consultation, participation and assistance, which would have a 
more specific and thus differentiated application.  
 
(i)  Duty to Assist and Duty to Support  
• The obligation of cooperation envisaged by the Decision seemingly makes a distinction between 
the duty to ‘support’ and the duty to ‘assist’. For example, while the EEAS ‘shall support’ the 
diplomatic services of the member states, the GSC and the services of the Commission (Article 
3(1)), it ‘shall assist the President of the European Council, the President of the European 
Commission, and the Commission in the exercise of their respective functions’ (Article 2(2), 
emphasis added), but it ‘shall support the [HR] in fulfilling his/her mandates’.67 Other provisions 
of the Decision that appear to articulate the duty of cooperation also refer to the obligation to 
‘assist’ (e.g. Articles 2(2) and 10(3)).  The question may thus be raised as to whether the two 
notions, ‘support’ v ‘assist’, ought to be understood differently, in the sense of possibly 
generating distinct obligations of conduct. If so, the obligation of cooperation would take 
different forms depending on the actor with which the EEAS has to cooperate.  
• A look at other linguistic versions of the Decision may nuance the importance of such 
distinction. For instance, the French text appears to use the word  ‘assiste’ both where the 
English refers to either ‘support’ or ‘assist’.68 This would indicate that the notion could be used 
interchangeably. Indeed, the duty to ‘assist’ is constitutive of the general principle of cooperation 
enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU. The latter notably foresees that pursuant to such principle, the 
Union and the member states, shall in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks 
which flow from the Treaty. Thus in calling the EEAS generally to work in cooperation with 
other players, Article 3(1) implicitly encapsulates a duty to assist.  
 
(ii)  Duty to Consult   
• Article 3(2) establishes a specific obligation of consultation between the EEAS and the 
‘services’ (plural) of the Commission, on all matters relating to the external action of the Union 
in the exercise of their respective functions. As briefly evoked above, this entails that the 
Commission is deemed to consult the EEAS on all external aspects of internal policies too. 
Hence alongside trade, neighbourhood and development policies, for example, the Commission 
is supposed to consult the EEAS in exercising its own powers in the field of energy policy, 
environmental protection, justice and home affairs, insofar as these fields touch upon the 
external action of the Union.  
• Similarly, the EEAS has to consult the Commission services when exercising its functions, for 
instance in the context of international negotiations as referred to above, but also in supporting 
the HR in e.g. the conduct of political dialogue with third states. As the only express limitation 
                                                     
66 Article 3(1) could also be understood as establishing a specific duty of cooperation, involving procedural 
obligations of particular relevance to relations with the member states and the Council General Secretariat. 
For the Commission this would then be the lex generalis, while being subject to a lex specialis in the form of 
a duty of consultation in paragraph 2, specifically related to Article 21 TEU.  
67 Emphasis added. The same distinctions can be found in Article 2(2) EEAS Decision, see discussion above.  
68 For instance, the first paragraph of Article 3 uses the word ‘assiste’ in French, where the English version 
says ‘support’.  
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in Article 3(2) to the obligation of consultation of the Commission concerns the CSDP, it may be 
assumed that the EEAS shall consult the Commission on the non-CSDP dimension of the CFSP. 
• The duty to consult is explicitly addressed to the EEAS and the Commission. Article 3 does not 
evoke a possible application of such duty between the EEAS and the Council services or 
members states’ diplomatic services. The question may thus be raised as to whether this silence 
entails that such consultation is neither required, nor even envisaged. Arguably however, one 
may submit that the latter is implicit, and ultimately results from the duty of sincere cooperation 
imposed by primary law.  Indeed, Article 21(3) TEU foresees that the Commission and the 
Council cooperate to ensure consistency, assisted by the HR, him/herself assisted by the EEAS. 
Arguably, the ability of the HR and EEAS to fulfil this coherence-making task primarily 
depends on the cooperation that both the Commission and Council are able to provide.    
 (iii)  Duty/Right to Take Part  
• While the Commission is explicitly compelled to consult with the EEAS, Article 3(2) also 
obliges it to involve the Service in preparatory work and procedures relating to acts it prepares in 
the area of EU external action.69 Thus, the cooperation obligation of Article 3 goes further than 
mere consultation as regards the Commission. It also entails participative rights of the EEAS in 
policy shaping in all areas of EU external action, thus including development, neighbourhood, 
and trade, but also in forging the external dimension of EU environment, transport, energy 
policies.70 This participation has already materialised in various ways (e.g. ‘Joint 
Communications’) and is sometimes required by the Treaty provisions (cf. Articles 215 and 222 
TFEU).71 
• The cooperation between the EEAS and the Commission, both in the form of consultation and 
preparatory collaboration is determined by a specific normative framework:  Article 3(2) 
foresees that ‘this paragraph shall be implemented in accordance with Chapter 1 of Title V of 
the TEU, and with Article 205 TFEU’ (emphasis added). Given that this Chapter 1 sets out the 
‘general provisions of the Union’s external action’, it is somewhat surprising that the reference 
to this normative framework should only be made in the specific context of paragraph 2, as if the 
objectives and tasks it encapsulates were to be achieved only by the EEAS-Commission 
cooperation, and not by the member states and the General Secretariat of the Council. It is 
contended that all the activities of the EEAS and of other institutions too, and all their 
interactions within the EU system of external relations are legally determined by the ‘general 
provisions of the Union’s external action’ set out in that Chapter 1.  
                                                     
69 Indeed, the phrase ‘this area’ at the end of the sentence relates to the ‘external action of the Union’ (cf 
proposal of Ashton), not the CSDP evoked in the previous sentence as a prima facie reading would suggest. 
The ambiguity comes from the fact that originally (i.e. in Ashton’s proposal of March 2010), the preceding 
sentence did not contain the expression ‘except on matters covered by the CSDP’.  
70 The practice is somewhat more nuanced, as regards energy policy for instance, see B Van Vooren, ‘Europe 
Unplugged: Progress, potential and limitations of EU external policy three years post-Lisbon’ (2012) SIEPS 
Report 2012:5. 
71 See e.g. Joint Communication Delivering on a New European Neighbourhood Policy, JOIN(2012) 14 
15.5.2012; Joint Communication Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: progress 
since 2008 and next steps, JOIN(2012) 19, 26.6.2012; Joint Communication EU Counter-terrorism Action 
Plan for the Horn of Africa and Yemen, JOIN (2012) 24, 31.8.2012; Joint Communication Human Rights and 
Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action – Towards a more effective approach, COM(2011) 886 
12.12.2011; Joint Communication Global Europe : A New Approach to financing EU external action 
Brussels, COM(2011) 865, 7.12.2011. 
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4. Scope of Application of the Obligation of Cooperation   
(i)  Cooperation with Whom?  
• The first paragraph of Article 3 emphasises the duty of the EEAS to cooperate with the member 
states’ diplomatic services, with those of the Commission and with the General Secretariat of the 
Council. While the Service was deemed, through its initial composition, to incarnate the 
requested cooperation between previously competing Commission and Council services,72 this 
provision is an acknowledgement that the GSC and the Commission continue to play a key role 
in the external action of the Union – as do indeed the member states. 
• Indeed, it is noteworthy that the obligation referred to in Article 3(1) concerns in equal terms the 
member states’ diplomatic services, the General Secretariat of the Council and Commission 
services. This can be taken as an indication that the EEAS is equidistant from those three actors, 
at least in terms of obligation to cooperate.  
• The EEAS’ duty of cooperation is not limited to those actors mentioned in the first paragraphs. 
Article 2(2) envisages that the EEAS assists the presidents of the European Council and of the 
European Commission, respectively. As suggested above, the reference to ‘assist’ rather than 
‘support’ ought not to be overrated.   
• Moreover, Article 3(4) foresees that the EEAS ‘shall extend appropriate support and cooperation 
to the other institutions and bodies of the Union, in particular the European Parliament’. Indeed, 
Article 3(3) envisages possible inter-service arrangements not only with the Commission and the 
GSC, but also with ‘other offices or interinstitutional bodies of the Union’. In essence, the duty 
is of the same kind as the obligation to cooperate with other actors given that the provision refers 
to extending support and cooperation. Equally mandatory (‘shall’), it is nonetheless expressed in 
more nuanced fashion by using the notion ‘appropriate’. In other words the support might not be 
as general and automatic as in the case of, e.g., the Commission, Council or member states 
services. The notion of appropriateness suggests that the cooperation might be decided by the 
EEAS itself, under the authority of the HR, on a case-by-case basis, taking account of the limited 
role of the EP in EU foreign policy. In practice however, the EP has found means to influence 
the behaviour of the EEAS and HR, and strengthen its commitment to provide information, to 
report to, as well as to consult with the EP.73  
• Recital 7 of the Preamble provides specific information as to the other bodies which the EEAS 
might be called to support: e.g. the European Defence Agency, the EU Satellite Centre, the EU 
Institute for Security Studies and the European Security and Defence College; on the ground that 
they all involve HR responsibilities. Apart from the European Parliament and these bodies, one 
may presume that the most obvious candidates for such extended cooperation would be the 
various EU agencies with an external remit (e.g. Frontex, Europol).  
• Cooperation between the EEAS and Commission services is also required at the level of EU 
Delegations, in view of the inclusion of Commission staff within the Delegations (Article 5 
EEAS Decision). As evoked above, a Joint Decision of the Commission and the HR ‘on 
Cooperation mechanisms concerning the management of delegations of the European Union’ has 
been adopted in March of 2012, which seemingly fulfils the duty of cooperation of Article 3, to 
which it explicitly refers. 
                                                     
72 See Article 27(3) TEU; Article 6 EEAS Decision, as well as the Annex thereto.  
73 See, e.g., Declaration by the High Representative on Political Accountability, OJ 2010 C 210/1, and the 
Framework Agreement on Relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission, OJ 
2010 L 304/47). 
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• Other provisions in the Decision envisage internal cooperation, among the different services of 
the EEAS. Hence, Article 4(3)(b) EEAS Decision emphasises that full coordination between all 
the structures of the EEAS ‘shall be ensured’. This is particularly important in view of the initial 
composition of the EEAS, but also considering the level of procedural and organisational 
differentiation that has been maintained in the creation of the EEAS, as evidenced in the last 
indent of Article 4(3)(a) EEAS Decision.74 
• Article 3(4) requires the EEAS to cooperate also with the EU Anti-Fraud Office, OLAF, an 
office set up by the Commission deemed to help it perform its duty to implement the budget.75 
The provision includes a reference to Regulation 1073/199976 about OLAF’s investigation 
powers, and the request that the EEAS adopt a decision on the terms and conditions for internal 
investigations. Cooperation is equally needed between the Commission and the EEAS respective 
internal auditors, with a view to ensure consistent audit policy.77 It should be noticed that this 
fourth paragraph was much leaner in HR /VP Ashton’s proposal of March 2010, which read as 
follows: ‘The EEAS shall extend appropriate support and cooperation to the other institutions 
and bodies of the Union’.  
(ii)  Reciprocal Cooperation?  
• The obligation of cooperation enshrined in Article 3 appears to operate only one way in the 
EEAS-member states diplomatic services nexus. Indeed, in contrast to earlier drafts, the 
Decision is mostly silent on a possible reverse member states’ duty of cooperation vis-à-vis the 
EEAS. Thus Article 5(9) EEAS Decision no longer expressly foresees that the Union delegation 
diplomatic services of the member states exchange information, on a reciprocal basis.78 
Seemingly, only Article 10(3) EEAS Decision requires assistance from member states, in the 
specific field of security.79 One may thus surmise that member states’ diplomatic services are 
mostly free from any obligation towards the services of the EEAS. 
• It may nevertheless be argued that the duty of cooperation mutually applies to the EEAS and the 
member states. The provisions of Article 4(3) TEU on sincere cooperation entail that the 
member states cooperate with the EEAS in fulfilling its tasks, akin to the cooperation member 
states are expected to show in relation to the Commission in other areas. One could for instance 
expect national Ministries of Foreign Affairs to consult with the relevant EEAS services before 
taking initiatives in relation to a third country with which the EU is in the process of forging new 
ties, especially if the EEAS has been entrusted with the negotiations of a comprehensive 
agreement with that country.80 At the very least, the cooperation of member states is required in 
                                                     
74 See discussion on Article 4, below. 
75 In this respect, see Case C-11/00 Commission v ECB [2003) ECR I-7215.  
76 Regulation (EC) no 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 may 1999 concerning 
investigations conducted by the European anti-fraud office (Olaf) [OJ 1999 L 136/1].  
77 See the discussion under Article 8, below; and Case T-395/11 Elti d.o.o v Delegation of the European 
Union to Montenegro, Judgment of 4 June 2012, nyr.  
78 Ashton’s proposal of March 2010 read as follows: ‘The Union delegations shall work in close cooperation 
with the diplomatic services of the Member States. They shall, on a reciprocal basis, provide all relevant 
information’ (emphasis added).  
79 See further discussion under Article 10 EEAS Decision, below.  
80 As envisaged in the ‘Guidelines’ mentioned above. In this situation, the obligations of conduct, evoked by 
the Court in cases such as C-266/03 Commission v Luxembourg [2005] ECR I-4805; Case C-433/03 
Commission v Germany [2005] ECR I-6985Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland (‘MOX plant’) [2006] ECR 
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organisational terms to ensure the smooth functioning of the EEAS, given the national element 
of its composition.81 Incidentally, the EEAS Decision provision on the cooperation between 
Union delegations and member states’ diplomatic services, evoked above, does not seem to 
exclude reciprocity entirely as regards transmission of information. Article 5(9) foresees that 
Union delegations ‘share information with the diplomatic services of the Member States’ rather 
than ‘share their information with’.82 
• The GSC is not explicitly covered by the mutual obligation of cooperation set out in Article 3(2) 
either. Does this entail that only the Commission is subject to an obligation of consultation with 
the EEAS? Arguably, such a silence could be explained by the fact that, first, the GSC is not a 
policy initiator as the Commission is, and second, all relevant services of the GSC that have been 
involved in external action in the past have in principle been transferred to the EEAS. In practice 
however, the GSC is not disconnected from policy-making in the external sphere. Indeed, 
various units in the GSC continue to deal specifically with external relations,83 while several 
preparatory bodies in the Council, working for the FAC, are not chaired by EEAS staff, but by 
the rotating presidency of the Council thus helped by the GSC.84 It is indeed noteworthy that at 
no point is the Council Presidency mentioned in the EEAS Decision, notably as regards the duty 
of cooperation, despite the latter’s involvement in the external action of the Union post-Lisbon.85 
• It is thus contended that the obligation of cooperation also operates in relation to the Council 
services, at least to allow the EEAS to fulfil its key consistency-seeking function. Support for 
this can be found in Article 3(3) which opens the possibility for the EEAS to conclude inter-
services arrangements, to specify the desired cooperation not only with the services of the 
Commission, but also with those of the Council.86 Arguably, this provision would not have much 
sense if there were no GSC duty to cooperate with the EEAS. Moreover, Article 4(5) EEAS 
Decision explicitly foresees that the HR and the EEAS shall be assisted where necessary by the 
General Secretariat of the Council and the relevant departments of the Commission. Here too, 
(Contd.)                                                                  
I-4635; Case C-246/07 Commission v Sweden (‘PFOS’) (Judgment of 20 April 2010, nyr), could be 
applicable mutatis mutandis in relation to the EEAS.  
81 In the same vein, Article 13(1) EEAS Decision foresees that both the HR and the Council (as well as the 
Commission and the member states) are responsible for implementing the decision, it also says that they 
‘shall take all measures necessary in furtherance thereof’.  
82 Similarly, the French version of Article 5(9) says ‘échangent des informations avec les services 
diplomatiques des États membres’; rather than ‘échangent leurs informations’. Indeed, the word ‘échangent’ 
suggests a two way process, as could the phrase ‘share’.  
83 Directorate General C of the GSC deals with ‘Foreign Affairs, Enlargement and civil protection’ 
comprising Directorate 1 - Trade, Development, EU–ACP relations; Directorate 2 - Enlargement, Europe 
(non-EU), Foreign Affairs Council Support and Directorate 3 - Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection.  
84 For instance: the Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors (RELEX), the Working Party on 
Terrorism (International Aspects) (COTER), the Working Party on the application of specific measures to 
combat terrorism (COCOP), the Working Party on Consular Affairs (COCON), the Working Party on Public 
International Law (COJUR), and the Working Party on the Law of the Sea (COMAR), the ACP Working 
Party, the Working Party on Development Cooperation (DEVGEN), the Working Party on EFTA, the 
Working Party on Dual-Use Goods, the Working Party on Trade Questions, the Working Party on 
Commodities, the Working Party on the Generalised System of Preferences, the  Working Party on 
Preparation for International Development Conferences/UNCCD Desertification/UNCTAD, the Working 
Party on Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid ; see Council Decision 2009/908/EU of 1 December 2009 laying 
down measures for the implementation of the European Council Decision on the exercise of the Presidency 
of the Council, and on the chairmanship of preparatory bodies of the Council, OJ 2009 L 322/28. 
85 See Editorial Comments, ‘The post-Lisbon institutional package: Do old habits die hard?’ (2010) 47 
CMLRev 597.  
86 Indeed, Article 3(3) mentions the GSC before the Commission for possible service-level arrangements, 
while the Ashton proposal put the Commission first, before the GSC.  To our knowledge, no such service 
arrangement has yet been agreed between the GSC and the EEAS. 
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the Decision evokes the possibility of inter-services arrangements to specify such assistance. 
Incidentally, one may   wonder why this provision was not included in Article 3. 
• More generally, one could invoke the Treaty provisions on sincere cooperation, namely Article 
4(3) TEU to fill the gaps of Article 3 EEAS. Hence, despite the silence of Article 3 EEAS, the 
Council, including all its services, being subject to an obligation of cooperation with other 
institutions under Article 13(2) TEU, should by extension cooperate with the EEAS, notably 
when the latter performs functions on behalf of, or which were previously performed by the 
Commission. It would be surprising that, as a result of the transfer of Commission functions to 
the EEAS, notably to fulfil the consistency objective of the Treaty makers, the cooperative duties 
of the Council would diminish.     
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ARTICLE 4  
Central Administration of the EEAS                    
 
 
 
               
 
 
1. The EEAS shall be managed by an Executive Secretary-General who will operate under the authority of 
the High Representative. The Executive Secretary-General shall take all measures necessary to ensure the 
smooth functioning of the EEAS, including its administrative and budgetary management. The Executive 
Secretary-General shall ensure effective coordination between all departments in the central 
administration as well as with the Union Delegations. 
2. The Executive Secretary-General shall be assisted by two Deputy Secretaries-General. 
3. The central administration of the EEAS shall be organised in directorates-general. 
(a) It shall, in particular, include: 
— a number of directorates-general comprising geographic desks covering all countries and regions of 
the world, as well as multilateral and thematic desks. These departments shall coordinate as necessary 
with the General Secretariat of the Council and with the relevant services of the Commission, 
— a directorate-general for administrative, staffing, budgetary, security and communication and 
information system matters, working in the EEAS framework managed by the Executive Secretary-
General. The High Representative shall appoint, in accordance with the normal rules of recruitment, a 
Director-General for budget and administration who shall work under the authority of the High 
Representative. He/she shall be responsible to the High Representative for the administrative and internal 
budgetary management of the EEAS. He/she shall follow the same budget lines and administrative rules 
as are applicable in the part of Section III of the Union’s budget which falls under Heading 5 of the 
Multiannual Financial Framework, 
— the crisis management and planning directorate, the civilian planning and conduct capability, the 
European Union Military Staff and the European Union Situation Centre, placed under the direct 
authority and responsibility of the High Representative, and which shall assist him/her in the task of 
conducting the Union’s CFSP in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty while respecting, in 
accordance with Article 40 TEU, the other competences of the Union. 
The specificities of these structures, as well as the particularities of their functions, recruitment and the 
status of the staff shall be respected. 
Full coordination between all the structures of the EEAS shall be ensured. 
(b) The central administration of the EEAS shall also include: 
— a strategic policy planning department, 
— a legal department under the administrative authority of the Executive Secretary-General which shall 
work closely with the Legal Services of the Council and of the Commission, 
— departments for interinstitutional relations, information and public diplomacy, internal audit and 
inspections, and personal data protection. 
4. The High Representative shall designate the chairpersons of Council preparatory bodies that are 
chaired by a representative of the High Representative, including the chair of the Political and Security 
Committee, in accordance with the detailed arrangements set out in Annex II to Council Decision 
2009/908/EU of 1 December 2009 laying down measures for the implementation of the European Council 
Decision on the exercise of the Presidency of the Council, and on the chairmanship of preparatory bodies 
of the Council. 
5. The High Representative and the EEAS shall be assisted where necessary by the General Secretariat of 
the Council and the relevant departments of the Commission. Service-level arrangements may be drawn 
up to that effect by the EEAS, the General Secretariat of the Council and the relevant Commission 
departments. 
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The principal aim of Article 4 is to set out the key management and administrative bodies responsible 
for the everyday running of the Service. In the following, both the basic shape of the EEAS (1) and the 
specific roles and functions of the Executive Secretary-General and Director-General for budget and 
administration (2), the geographical, thematic and multilateral desks (3), the crisis management 
structures (4), the departments (5) and Council working parties (6) are discussed.   
1. Basic Shape of the Service 
 
• It will be recalled that Article 27(3) TEU sketches out only the basic aspects of the EEAS, 
including its mandate (to assist the High Representative) and its composition (the relevant 
departments of the General Secretariat of the Council, the Commission and staff seconded from 
the national diplomatic services of the Member States). 
• Article 1(4) of the Council decision specifies that the EEAS shall be made up of a ‘central 
administration’ and of ‘Union delegations to third countries and to international organisations’. 
It is also worth noting that the terminology used in the EEAS differs from that commonly found 
in the EU institutions (Managing Directors instead of Director-Generals, Divisions instead of 
Directorates-General, as well as the presence of a Corporate Board). 
• The basic shape of the Service had, however, been outlined in a number of preparatory 
documents. The Joint Progress Report of Solana and Barroso of 9 June 2005 indicated an 
expansive Service comprising ‘geographical desks which cover all countries/regions of the 
world’. Alongside these there should be a number of ‘single thematic desks’87 focusing on issues 
such as ‘human rights, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation and relations with international 
organisations such as the UN’.88 
• Even at this early stage, the Joint Progress Report raised prescient questions regarding the 
central administration of the EEAS. These included how it would be possible to have a single 
‘tableau d'effectifs’ when drawing staff from three sources; how the High Representative, as the 
highest appointing authority, can be responsible for recruitment on the basis of merit, while 
ensuring that ‘staff are recruited on the broadest possible geographical basis’; how to reflect 
specific EEAS requirements in the Staff Regulations, and how to meet the administrative costs 
of the EEAS while retaining a level of autonomy.89 
• The Swedish Presidency Report to the European Council on the EEAS of October 2009 briefly 
mentioned the need for EEAS to have a limited number of support functions, ‘in particular, IT, 
management of human resources. The EEAS will need a small capacity for specific legal advice 
within its structure’.90 For the purpose of cost-efficiency, the report recommended that the High 
Representative and the EEAS be able to draw on ‘other services within both the Commission 
and the General Secretariat of the Council in order to fulfil his/her mandate’.91 
                                                     
87 Joint Progress Report by the Secretary-General/High Representative and the Commission on the European 
External Action Service, 9956/05, Brussels, 9 June 2005, para. 13.  
88Joint Progress Report by the Secretary-General/High Representative and the Commission on the European 
External Action Service, 9956/05, Brussels, 9 June 2005, para. 14.  
89 Ibid. para. 21.  
90 Presidency Report to the European Council on the European External Action Service, 14930/09, 23 
October 2009, para. 12. 
91Presidency Report to the European Council on the European External Action Service, 14930/09, 23 October 
2009, para. 12.  
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• Due to the multiple roles performed by the HR/VP, as well as the need to personally attend 
meetings in both Brussels and abroad, the importance of delegation has been widely recognised. 
The European Parliament advocated the establishment of three deputies in charge of multilateral, 
bilateral and crisis management.92 The EEAS Decision does not contain any provisions for the 
nomination of Deputies, but it was suggested that Article 33 TEU allowing nomination of 
special representatives, could provide a legal basis for such nomination. It is still questionable 
whether the role of the HR/VP could be truly ‘deputised’ in the sense of allowing another 
individual to fulfil the role of the HR/VP, such as chairing the Foreign Affairs Council without a 
specific legal basis for such a role. 
• The lack of any formal deputisation (the formal delegation of ) for the High Representative in 
either the Lisbon Treaty (Article 18 TEU) or the Council decision is surprising given the 
attention to the issue in the Convention on the Future of Europe and the fact that Article 17.6c 
TEU and Article 25 of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure clearly envisage deputisation for 
the President of the Commission. The complexity of deputising for the HR/VP in all of her 
various roles (Commission, Foreign Affairs Council, European Parliament and external 
representation) has created slightly different challenges. For the European Parliament, 
deputisation is carried out in accordance with the Declaration on Political Accountability (8 July 
2010), an Inter-Institutional Agreement between the Parliament and Commission and the Rules 
of Procedure of the Council. Namely, a Commissioner will replace her for issues falling 
exclusively or primarily under Commission competences or, for those issues falling under CFSP, 
the rotating Presidency or one of the two relevant ministers of the ‘trio Presidency’. In the case 
of the Commission the absent member can be represented by the appropriate Chef de Cabinet, 
but with no voting rights or other rights beyond expressing the absent Commissioner’s position. 
In the case of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Minister of the rotating Presidency can be 
invited to chair in the absence of the High Representative.. For external representation and 
dialogues the HR/VP is, when necessary, represented by the rotating Presidency with a 
Commissioner (normally Stabilisation and Association and Cooperation Council meetings). In 
those cases where the rotating Presidency is unable to replace the HR/VP, an appropriate 
ministerial representative from another member state may be invited. 
• The article also makes provision for two Deputy Secretaries-General (para. 2). One addresses 
Political Affairs while the other concentrates on Inter-Institutional affairs. Along with the High 
Representative and the Executive Secretary-General, the four constitute the Corporate Board of 
the EEAS. Since the two Deputies are charged with ‘assisting the Executive Secretary-General’ 
their roles should therefore be understood in terms of ensuring effective coordination between all 
departments and with the delegations. 
2. Executive Secretary-General and Director-General for Budget and Administration 
 
• The original draft decision of 25 March 2010 (‘the March draft decision’) did not mention the 
Director-General for budget and administration. These aspects fell under the ‘Secretary-
General’. The revised draft decision following the 21 June 2010 Quadrilogue (‘the June draft 
decision’) showed clear concern from the European Parliament’s perspective regarding the 
budgetary aspects of the Service. This reflected in the post-quadrilogue draft of Article 4, which 
introduced the post of ‘Director General for budget and administration who shall work under the 
authority of the High Representative’ and who, in this capacity, is responsible for the 
administrative and budgetary management of the EEAS. Mention of this post was included in a 
                                                     
92 Proposal for the Establishment of the EEAS, Working Document by Elmar Brok (AFET) and Guy 
Verhofstadt (AFCO), rapporteurs on EEAS, Updated Version, 20 April 2010, pp.4-5. 
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statement given by the HR, mentioning that the incumbent would be a ‘senior figure in the 
EEAS with proven experience of EU budget and administration’.93 
• The role of the Secretary-General was also altered to reflect management responsibilities for 
administrative, staffing, budgetary, security and communication and information systems94 – 
rather than the attribution of ‘direct authority’ in the March draft decision.95 Compared to the 
March draft decision the Secretary-General became an ‘Executive Secretary-General’. In 
addition to his coordination role, the March draft decision also mentioned that he shall ‘represent 
the EEAS’. Under the EEAS Decision the role of the Executive Secretary-General omits this 
broader representative function, limiting the post-holder to responsibility for the ‘smooth 
functioning’ of the EEAS. The original intention was therefore to assist in the need to delegate 
certain representative functions of the HR to the Executive Secretary-General. 
• The subsequent drafts of the Council decision clearly illustrate the shifting role of the Executive 
Secretary-General and the insertion of the Director-General for budget and administration, 
largely at the behest of the European Parliament. The EEAS Decision reflects both of these 
changes but, by so doing, it introduces significant elements of ambiguity regarding the role of 
the Executive Secretary-General and the relationship between this post and that of the Director-
General for budget and administration.  Since the former is responsible for ‘all measures’ 
necessary for the smooth functioning of the Service, including the administrative and budgetary 
measures, it is noteworthy that the latter works ‘under the authority of the High Representative’ 
and not, as might be anticipated, the Executive Secretary-General. This is most likely because 
legal responsibility for budgetary and personnel matters resides with the HR and, with this in 
mind, reporting on these issues goes directly to the HR.   
3. Geographical, Thematic and Multilateral Desks  
• In paragraph 3, mention is made of both geographical and thematic desks. The former is more 
obvious, based upon the transferral of the desks from the Commission and the General 
Secretariat of the Council (these are laid out in the Annex to the EEAS Decision). A limited 
impression of the latter can be gleaned by reading through the annex. It was evident prior to the 
creation of the Service that certain areas like climate change (see first organogram of the EEAS 
accompanying the March draft decision) were contested in terms of competences. The result is 
that the thematic areas covered apparently exclude some global issues that are important in terms 
of EU policy, such as climate change or energy security. There is also little guidance in the 
Decision as to how the thematic and geographic desks should inter-relate. The horizontal 
thematic desks can offer support to geographic desks on a wide range of issues including human 
rights and democracy, counter-terrorism and non-proliferation, however this requires co-
ordination between the thematic and geographic desks. 
• It was agreed that the thematic and geographic desks should not be duplicated within the 
Commission or Council General Secretariat, taking into account the Commission DGs’ roles in 
enlargement, humanitarian aid, trade, and development policy. 
                                                     
93 Elements for a statement to be given by the High Representative in the plenary of the European Parliament 
on the basic organisation of the EEAS central administration, 21 June 2010.  
94 Revised draft (21 June 2010), Consolidated Version with Latest Amendments Post-Quadrilogue of 21 June 
2010, Article 4.  
95 Article 4(1), second para., in fine, proposal for a Council Decision establishing the organisation and 
functioning of the European External Action Service (25 March 2010).  
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4. Crisis Management Structures  
• The provisions on the crisis management bodies (CMPD, CPCC, EUMS, EU Situation Centre) 
make them work under the authority and responsibility of the HR. The travaux préparatoires 
indicate sensitivity about the role of these bodies, with the Swedish Presidency report noting the 
need to take ‘full account of the specificities of these structures and preserving their particular 
functions, procedures and staffing conditions’.96 The ambiguous position of the crisis 
management bodies was reinforced by some of the member states. For instance, Slovakia 
recommended that ‘ESDP and crisis management should stay out of the EEAS (definitely at the 
beginning)’.97 Although this view did not prevail, the sense of separateness and the specific link 
to the HR was reflected in Ashton’s ‘Step Change’ paper.98 Belgium, although in favour of the 
integration of these structures into the Service, wanted ‘to preserve their specificity as a single 
Directorate General, under direct authority of and direct access to the High Representative’.99 
The Finnish government saw the inclusion of the crisis response and the crisis management tasks 
within the EEAS as a ‘major structural improvement’.100 The formulations of the October 2009 
Swedish Presidency report, as well as some positions of member states, were reflected in both 
the draft decision and the final version. Hence, mention is made of the ‘specificities’ and 
‘particularities’ of the crisis management bodies mentioned (all of which were formerly in the 
General Secretariat of the Council). The challenge is to be found in the following sentence of the 
EEAS Decision, which states that ‘[f]ull coordination between all the structures of the EEAS 
shall be ensured’. 
• The stipulations regarding the crisis management bodies are framed in accordance with Article 
40 TEU and, by reference, to Articles 3-6 TFEU. The presence of such references serves to 
remind the reader of the still partially pillarised nature of the Union and, more specifically, that 
the attainment of any comprehensive security approach should be mindful of the other related 
areas partially or exclusively falling under the Commission’s competences (crisis prevention; 
civil protection; post-conflict stabilisation; security sector reform etc). More specifically, the 
lack of linkage, other than through the HR, between the crisis management bodies mentioned in 
this paragraph and other parts of the Service having a more general crisis response function 
implies that there are challenges to ‘coordination’ and potentially to the ‘smooth functioning of 
the EEAS’ (see above), which raises legitimate questions about the soft nature of these 
stipulations. It is also worth noting that the reference in the text of the Council decision to the 
EU Situation Centre is incorrect since it has since been renamed the Intelligence and Analysis 
Centre (IntCen).  
5. Departments  
• Article 4 of the EEAS Decision mentions a number of specific departments to be included in the 
EEAS central administration. These include a department for strategic policy planning, 
departments for inter-institutional relations, information and public diplomacy, internal audit and 
                                                     
96 Presidency Report to the European Council on the European External Action Service, 14930/09, 23 
October 2009, para. 7. 
97 Non-paper of the Slovak Republic on EEAS (Replies to the Presidency questions), undated. 
98‘A Step Change in external policy for the Union: Delivering on the promise of the Lisbon Treaty’, Annex 1, 
3 March 2010. 
99 Letter of Steven Vanackere, Belgian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Institutional Reform, to Ashton, 4 March 2010.  
100 Finnish views on the European External Action Service (undated), p.3. 
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inspections, personal data protection, as well as a legal department. The EEAS legal department 
remains relatively small, and is to work closely with the Legal Services of the Council and 
Commission. A policy planning department is responsible for longer term and strategic planning 
of the EEAS, and should be in constant dialogue with the thematic and geographic desks. The 
EEAS Decision builds upon Ashton’s ‘Step Change’ document where she stressed that a 21st 
century external service required a professional communications structure, a substantive media 
operation to manage dialogues with NGOs, civil society, non-state actors, and other interested 
parties.101 
• Most of the suggested departments subsequently materialised in the EEAS although, 
surprisingly, public diplomacy was placed in the Foreign Policy Instrument (FPI) (alongside 
election observation, which also appears under Human Rights and Democracy in the Global and 
Multilateral Issues division), which has a particular status vis-à-vis the EEAS but which is not 
touched upon in this article. The clear intent of this paragraph was to place this function within 
the ‘central administration’ of the EEAS. It is arguable whether this has been done in practice, 
especially bearing in mind that public diplomacy goes beyond strategic communication. 
6. Council Working Parties  
• The stipulation in paragraph 5 that the High Representative and the EEAS shall be assisted by 
the General Secretariat of the Council and the relevant departments of the Commission, relates to 
the Preamble (Para. 3) since any assistance has to be understood in the context of the ’normal 
tasks’ of the Council Secretariat and the Commission. Article 3(2) creates an obligation of 
mutual assistance in the context of the Commission but not the Council Secretariat.102 
• The Decision also expressly refers to chairing arrangements of the Council’s preparatory bodies. 
This was necessary due to the changes introduced to the rotating Presidency by the Lisbon 
Treaty.103 Article 4(4) stipulates that the High Representative ‘shall designate the chairpersons 
of Council preparatory bodies that are chaired by a representative of the High Representative, 
including the chair of the Political and Security Committee, in accordance with the detailed 
arrangements set out in Annex II to the Council Decision concerned.’104 
 
                                                     
101 ‘A Step Change in external policy for the Union: Delivering on the promise of the Lisbon Treaty’, Annex 
1, 3 March 2010.  
102 See commentary of Article 3, above. 
 
103 For an overview of the chairing arrangements see Annex 1, (Foreign Affairs) List of Council Preparatory 
Bodies, Council doc. 12223/12, 4 July 2012.  
104 Council Decision 2009/908/EU of 1 December 2009 laying down measures for the implementation of the 
European Council Decision on the exercise of the Presidency of the Council, and on the chairmanship of 
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ARTICLE 5 
Union Delegations 
 
1. The decision to open or close a delegation shall be adopted by the High Representative, in agreement with the 
Council and the Commission. 
2. Each Union Delegation shall be placed under the authority of a Head of Delegation. 
The Head of Delegation shall have authority over all staff in the delegation, whatever their status, and for all its 
activities. He/she shall be accountable to the High Representative for the overall management of the work of the 
delegation and for ensuring the coordination of all actions of the Union. 
Staff in delegations shall comprise EEAS staff and, where appropriate for the implementation of the Union 
budget and Union policies other than those under the remit of the EEAS, Commission staff. 
3. The Head of Delegation shall receive instructions from the High Representative and the EEAS, and shall be 
responsible for their execution. 
In areas where the Commission exercises the powers conferred upon it by the Treaties, the Commission may, in 
accordance with Article 221(2) TFEU, also issue instructions to delegations, which shall be executed under the 
overall responsibility of the Head of Delegation. 
4. The Head of Delegation shall implement operational credits in relation to the Union’s projects in the 
corresponding third country, where sub-delegated by the Commission, in accordance with the Financial 
Regulation. 
5. The operation of each delegation shall be periodically evaluated by the Executive Secretary-General of the 
EEAS; evaluation shall include financial and administrative audits. For this purpose, the Executive Secretary-
General of the EEAS may request assistance from the relevant Commission departments. In addition to internal 
measures by the EEAS, OLAF shall exercise its powers, notably by conducting anti-fraud measures, in 
accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999. 
6. The High Representative shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the host country, the international 
organisation, or the third country concerned. In particular, the High Representative shall take the necessary 
measures to ensure that host States grant the Union delegations, their staff and their property, privileges and 
immunities equivalent to those referred to in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961. 
7. Union delegations shall have the capacity to respond to the needs of other institutions of the Union, in 
particular the European Parliament, in their contacts with the international organisations or third countries to 
which the delegations are accredited. 
8. The Head of Delegation shall have the power to represent the Union in the country where the delegation is 
accredited, in particular for the conclusion of contracts, and as a party to legal proceedings. 
9. The Union delegations shall work in close cooperation and share information with the diplomatic services of 
the Member States. 
10. The Union delegations shall, acting in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 35 TEU, and upon 
request by Member States, support the Member States in their diplomatic relations and in their role of providing 
consular protection to citizens of the Union in third countries on a resource-neutral basis. 
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The establishment of Union delegations is a major innovation of the Lisbon Treaty (1). The purpose of 
Article 5 of the EEAS Decision is to articulate their operation. In commenting this article, the 
exchange of information with and between the member states will be discussed (2), the role and 
functions of the Head of Delegation (3), the status of Delegations in third states and at international 
organisations (4), and Delegations’ (potential) role in diplomatic and consular protection (5).  
1. A Single Diplomatic Presence 
 
• The pivotal role in external representation by EU delegations finds its basis in Article 221(1) 
TFEU, which was newly inserted with the Lisbon Treaty: ‘Union delegations in third countries 
and at international organisations shall represent the Union.’ The ambition flowing from this 
new provision in the TFEU is quite clear: the Union no longer wishes to have an international 
presence through delegations of only one of its institutions (e.g. Commission Delegations), or 
through the diplomats of the member state holding the rotating Presidency.105 The purpose of 
this Treaty provision was to have ‘less Europeans and more EU’106, a single diplomatic presence 
for the Union speaking on behalf of a single legal entity active globally. Implementing this 
ambition has meant that the former ‘Commission Delegations’ have been turned into ‘Union 
delegations’107 and that for all practical diplomatic purposes they are seen as EU ‘embassies’.108  
• Given the objective of a single diplomatic presence, it is striking that the Special Representatives 
are not mentioned in Article 5 of the Decision. Still, the European Union currently has eleven 
Special Representatives (EUSRs) in different countries and regions of the world. They support 
the work of the High Representative and form part of the EEAS external machinery. 
• In a joint letter of 3 March 2010 from Foreign Ministers Bildt of Sweden and Miliband of the 
UK to High Representative Ashton, it was nevertheless stressed that the EEAS will need an 
‘intimate relationship with its principal stakeholders in the rest of the Commission, but it must 
have the keys to its own house’.109 
• According to Article 5(1), the High Representative is responsible for opening or closing 
delegations. He/she does so in agreement with the Council and the Commission. Given the fact 
that the former delegations were part of the Commission, this is a major innovation. Opening a 
mission in a foreign state and thereby institutionalising diplomatic relations with that state is a 
fundamental step in international law. It is an important power vested in the High 
Representative, but the Commission and the Council must concur. This raises the question what 
possibilities the High Representative has when one of the latter, or both, do not agree. The 
                                                     
105 But see the EEAS document ‘EU Diplomatic Representation in third countries – First half of 2012’, 
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decision to send an envoy or set up a less prestigious type of presence, such as an ‘office’, is not 
made dependent on their agreement. 
• The facilities offered by the Union Delegations are not just at the service of the EEAS itself and 
the Commission, but also of other institutions. As Article 5(7) refers to ‘institutions of the 
Union’, it is clear that it applies to the formal institutions listed in Article 13(1) TEU (European 
Parliament, European Council, Council, European Commission, Court of Justice, European 
Central Bank, Court of Auditors). It could be submitted, though, that other EU bodies may also 
want to rely on Delegations to ‘respond to their needs’ in their contacts with third states and 
international organisations. This submission is supported by the provisions of Art 3(4) of the 
EEAS Decision about the mandatory extension of EEAS’ ‘appropriate support to the other 
institutions and bodies of the Union’. The latter’s formulation is general: the EEAS is envisaged 
as a whole, i.e. including central administration and delegations. The idea is to have Delegations 
function as a portal for the EU and it makes sense not to limit the quest for consistency on the 
basis of formal rules. The European Parliament is mentioned explicitly. While this is legally not 
necessary, the reason may be to ensure specifically that for visits abroad MEPs can also rely on 
the services of the Delegations. 
• In terms of evaluation, the Delegations are covered by the same rules as other EU bodies (Article 
5(5)). A similar provision is not included for the EEAS as such, although Article 3(4) does refer 
to specific inspections by OLAF.  
2. Exchange of Information between the Union Delegations and Member States 
 
• Article 5(9) of the Council Decision obliges Union Delegations to work in close cooperation and 
share information with the diplomatic services of the member states. While the March draft 
decision imposed a reciprocal obligation to share information, the EEAS Decision only refers to 
the Delegations and their obligation to share information with the diplomatic services of the 
Member States. The question is whether this would imply that member states are not under any 
obligation to share information with Union Delegations. Pursuant to the principle of sincere 
cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU), the loyalty obligation (Article 24(3) TEU) as well as the specific 
obligation of the diplomatic missions of the member states and the Union delegations to 
cooperate (Article 32(3) TEU), this cannot, in our view, be the correct interpretation. As to the 
EEAS-Commission relationship, one must again look at the Working Arrangements of January 
2012, which states the following concerning reporting back to headquarters:  
 
EU Delegations shall provide political reporting to the HR/VP, President Barroso and relevant 
Commissioner(s), the EEAS and Commission services …A two way flow of information is 
essential - from the political and trade/economic sections of EU Delegations to the EEAS and 
Commission services and in the opposite direction. The geographical desks in the EEAS shall be 
systematically copied on all reports and information relative to her/his respective country. 
Delegations shall provide relevant reporting to other Commission services outside the external 
relations ‘family’. The Commission services shall keep EU Delegations informed about relevant 
developments, providing lines to take etc.110  
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However, the challenge of political reporting is less one between the institutions themselves than 
one between the EU Delegations and the member states.  At present the member states are 
mainly on the receiving end of EU Delegations’ reports, but share very little in the other 
direction. There is the hope and expectation that this will change as member states diplomatic 
representations come to trust and get used to their EU counterparts.111 
3. Head of Delegation 
 
• Pursuant to Article 5(2) of the Council Decision, the Head of Delegation shall have authority 
over all staff in the delegation and is accountable to the High Representative. Heads of 
Delegations de facto act as ‘EU Ambassadors’.112 The EU Heads of Delegations representing the 
Union in third states and at international organisations are thus conferred the authority to 
perform functions equivalent to those of national diplomats. It is interesting to note that s/he has 
authority over all staff, irrespective of their briefs. This implies that the Head of Delegation has 
overall authority, even on dossiers that were not primarily prepared by the EEAS, but by the 
Commission. Furthermore, s/he shall be accountable to the High Representative in all cases, and 
not to any of the Commissioners. 
• The Head of Delegation shall receive instructions from the High Representative and the EEAS, 
and shall be responsible for their execution (Art. 5(3) of the Council Decision).  
• During the negotiations on setting up the EEAS questions arose from some of the member states 
wanting to see ‘appropriate’ involvement of the Commission but with ‘all instructions to the 
delegations’ flowing through the HR and the EEAS to HoDs.113 Arguably, the formulation of 
Article 5(3) of the Council Decision does not prevent the Commission from issuing instructions 
to delegations in areas belonging to its competences, but these shall also be executed under the 
overall responsibility of the Head of Delegation. The 2012 Working Arrangements between the 
Commission and the EEAS refer to the situation where the Commission, through the Head of 
Delegation, calls on EU Delegations to carry out activities related to policy implementation, 
demarches and policy advocacy on issues of Commission competences (e.g. trade, humanitarian 
affairs, etc.).114 The reference in Article 5(3) to Article 221(2) TFEU serves as a reminder that 
the Treaty itself has placed ‘Union delegations […] under the authority of the High 
Representative’. The general authority of the Head of Delegation, together with the overall 
responsibility to execute all instructions is meant to strengthen the consistency of the EU’s 
policies in a particular third state or at an international organisation. 
• The authority and responsibility of the Head of Delegation extends to the implementation of the 
financial dimensions of projects in third countries, as s/he shall implement the operational 
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credits.115  In this context, the Head of Delegation might be acting on behalf of the 
Commission.116  
• The EU enjoys international legal personality, which allows it to enter into legal relations with 
states and other international organisations.117 Article 5(8) of the Council Decision allows the 
Union to be legally represented by the Head of Delegation in the country where the Delegation is 
accredited. The provision explicitly refers to the conclusion of contracts, and the role of the Head 
of Delegation as a party to legal proceedings, 118 but this is not to be seen as a limitative list. In 
this context, the question arises whether a Head of Delegation could initial international 
agreements on behalf of the Union; that would obviously require adherence to the provisions of 
the treaty-making procedure of Article 218 TFEU.  
4. Status of Delegations in Third States and at International Organisations 
 
• The EU is obviously not a state. Yet, it is an active participant in the diplomatic network of 
states that is – primarily ‒ regulated by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 
(‘VCDR’). Not being a party to the VCDR, the Union has developed a steady practice to opt in 
to its application in a contractual manner, typically through the conclusion of an establishment 
agreement or headquarters agreement.119 Article 5(6) of the Council Decision foresees 
‘arrangements’ to do exactly this. Although the text refers to ‘arrangements’ and ‘measures’, in 
practice an international agreement will be concluded with the host state or the international 
organisation concerned, in which diplomatic privileges and immunities are procured. 
• The fact that the international rules on diplomatic (and consular) relations were drafted for states 
makes it difficult for the EU to play along. On an ad hoc basis it needs to come to an agreement 
with a third state or an international organisation to regulate its status abroad. This is further 
complicated by the fact that in most cases external competences are divided between the EU and 
its member states. A practical issue, for instance, concerns the provision of diplomatic passports. 
Most Member States (CZ, FR, IRL, LUX, LV, NL, PL, SK, SW) offer passports to EEAS 
officials of their nationality, while others cannot do so without legal changes (DE, EE, GR). 
Germany is reluctant to grant diplomatic passports because it would feel compelled to provide 
them to all Commission officials as well. FR, GR, IRL, SW support the idea of a common 
European travel document (laissez-passer discussions were halted in 2009 with the objective of 
issuing all EEAS officials with a high quality travel document).  
 
 
                                                     
115 See Article 9 of the EEAS Decision.  
116 Cf. Case T-395/11 Elti d.o.o. v Delegation of the European Union to Montenegro, Order of the General 
Court (Eighth Chamber), judgment of 4 June 2012, nyr.  
117 See more extensively R.A. Wessel, ‘Revisiting the International Legal Status of the EU’, (2000) 5 
European Foreign Affairs Review 507-537; R.A. Wessel, ‘The European Union as a Party to International 
Agreements: Shared Competences, Mixed Responsibilities’, in A. Dashwood and M. Maresceau (eds.), Law 
and Practice of EU External Relations – Salient Features of a Changing Landscape (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) pp. 145-180.  
118 Ibid. In Case T-395/11 referred to above, the General Court nuances this role by making it dependent on 
the specific situation.  
119 See J. Wouters and S. Duquet, o.c., 38-39.  
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5. Diplomatic and Consular Support  
• Another question is to what extent Delegations would also be able to act as legal representatives 
of EU citizens, for instance when the member state of origin does not have a diplomatic or 
consular representation in the particular third state. This question is related to the more general 
question whether and to what extent Delegations would be competent to act on behalf on EU 
citizens and to protect their interests abroad.  
• The March 2010 draft decision mentioned ‘support the Member States in their diplomatic 
relations and in their role of providing consular protection to Union citizens in third countries’. 
The EEAS Council Decision refers to the same rights but adds the qualification that this must be 
‘on a resource-neutral basis’ (Article 5(10)). 
• Articles 3(5) TEU and 23 TFEU provide the basis for diplomatic protection and consular 
assistance to EU citizens. Article 3(5) TEU obliges the EU to protect the interests of its citizens 
abroad, and persons holding the nationality of a member state are citizens of the Union (Article 
20(1) TFEU). The issue is currently under discussion on the basis of a proposal for a Council 
Directive on consular protection for citizens of the Union abroad. In relation to a number of 
issues, the EP’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) proposed the 
inclusion of an additional role of the Union delegations in consular protection as well as a clear 
coordinating role of the EEAS.120 However, member states are divided on how far the 
implementation of these provisions should go. Some  support a greater role for the EU 
Delegations in consular affairs. There seems room for discussion on a specification of a civil 
protection or evacuation role of Delegations for facilitating, pooling and disseminating 
information drawing on the experiences of Japan and Syria. In the long term, if the Union were 
to achieve full diplomatic maturity, the most far-reaching implication might be that the EU 
provide such protection as if the persons concerned were ‘nationals of the EU’ for the purposes 
of international law. While Article 3(5) TEU could accommodate that interpretation, the role 
explicitly foreseen in the EEAS Decision for diplomatic protection and consular assistance by 
the EU currently does not, and is merely supplementary. What is certain from the perspective of 
the EEAS, is that if the Union wishes to pursue such a role for EU Delegations abroad, 
significantly more financial and human resources will need to be allocated to the EU diplomatic 
service. The December 2011 EEAS evaluation report stated that ‘it is difficult to see how this 
objective could reasonably be achieved ‘on a resource- neutral basis’ as required by the EEAS 
Decision. It would certainly not be responsible for raising citizens’ expectations about the 
services to be provided by EU Delegations, beyond their capacity to deliver in such a sensitive 
area. And the existing expertise within the EEAS in this area is extremely limited. However, 
over the past year we have also seen that EU Delegations can play an important role in the 
coordination of evacuations of citizens and that pragmatic solutions can be found on the ground. 
• Article 5(8) of the Council Decision refers to third states and not to international organisations. 
Yet, the legal representation of the Union may also become relevant there.  
 
                                                     
120  Report of 10 October 2012, PE 492.575v03-00, A7-0288/2012 on the proposal for a Council directive on 
consular protection for citizens of the Union abroad, (COM(2011)0881 – C7-0017/2012 – 2011/0432(CNS)), 
available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-2012-
0288+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> (last visited on 31 January 2013). 
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ARTICLE 6 
Staff 
 
 
1. This Article, except paragraph 3, shall apply without prejudice to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the 
European Communities (‘Staff Regulations’) and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of those 
Communities (‘CEOS’), including the amendments made to those rules, in accordance with Article 336 
TFEU, in order to adapt them to the needs of the EEAS.  
2. The EEAS shall comprise officials and other servants of the European Union, including personnel from 
the diplomatic services of the Member States appointed as temporary agents.  
The Staff Regulations and the CEOS shall apply to this staff.  
3. If necessary, the EEAS may, in specific cases, have recourse to a limited number of specialised seconded 
national experts (SNEs).  
The High Representative shall adopt rules, equivalent to those laid down in Council Decision 2003/479/EC 
of 16 June 2003 concerning the rules applicable to national experts and military staff on secondment to the 
General Secretariat of the Council ( 1 ), under which SNEs are put at the disposal of the EEAS in order to 
provide specialised expertise. 
4. The staff of the EEAS shall carry out their duties and conduct themselves solely with the interests of the 
Union in mind. Without prejudice to the third indent of Article 2(1) and Articles 2(2) and 5(3), they shall 
neither seek nor take instructions from any government, authority, organisation or person outside the 
EEAS or from any body or person other than the High Representative. In accordance with the second 
paragraph of Article 11 of the Staff Regulations, EEAS staff shall not accept any payments of any kind 
whatever from any other source outside the EEAS.  
5. The powers conferred on the appointing authority by the Staff Regulations and on the authority 
authorised to conclude contracts by the CEOS shall be vested in the High Representative, who may 
delegate those powers inside the EEAS.  
6. Recruitment to the EEAS shall be based on merit whilst ensuring adequate geographical and gender 
balance. The staff of the EEAS shall comprise a meaningful presence of nationals from all the Member 
States. The review provided for in Article 13(3) shall also cover this issue, including, as appropriate, 
suggestions for additional specific measures to correct possible imbalances.  
7. Officials of the Union and temporary agents coming from the diplomatic services of the Member States 
shall have the same rights and obligations and be treated equally, in particular as concerns their eligibility 
to assume all positions under equivalent conditions. No distinction shall be made between temporary 
agents coming from national diplomatic services and officials of the Union as regards the assignment of 
duties to perform in all areas of activities and policies implemented by the EEAS. In accordance with the 
provisions of the Financial Regulation, the Member States shall support the Union in the enforcement of 
financial liabilities of EEAS temporary agents coming from the Member States’ diplomatic services which 
result from a liability under Article 66 of the Financial Regulation.  
8. The High Representative shall establish the selection procedures for EEAS staff, which shall be 
undertaken through a transparent procedure based on merit with the objective of securing the services of 
staff of the highest standard of ability, efficiency and integrity, while ensuring adequate geographical and 
gender balance, and a meaningful presence of nationals from all Member States in the EEAS. 
Representatives of the Member States, the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission shall 
be involved in the recruitment procedure for vacant posts in the EEAS. 
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9. When the EEAS has reached its full capacity, staff from Member States, as referred to in the first 
subparagraph of paragraph 2, should represent at least one third of all EEAS staff at AD level. Likewise, 
permanent officials of the Union should represent at least 60 % of all EEAS staff at AD level, including 
staff coming from the diplomatic services of the Member States who have become permanent officials of the 
Union in accordance with the provisions of the Staff Regulations. Each year, the High Representative shall 
present a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the occupation of posts in the EEAS.  
10. The High Representative shall lay down the rules on mobility so as to ensure that the members of the 
staff of the EEAS are subject to a high degree of mobility. Specific and detailed arrangements shall apply to 
the personnel referred to in the third indent of Article 4(3)(a). In principle, all EEAS staff shall periodically 
serve in Union delegations. The High Representative shall establish rules to that effect.  
11. In accordance with the applicable provisions of its national law, each Member State shall provide its 
officials who have become temporary agents in the EEAS with a guarantee of immediate reinstatement at 
the end of their period of service to the EEAS. This period of service, in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 50b of the CEOS, shall not exceed eight years, unless, it is extended for a maximum period of two 
years in exceptional circumstances and in the interest of the service.  
Officials of the Union serving in the EEAS shall have the right to apply for posts in their institution of 
origin on the same terms as internal applicants.  
12. Steps shall be taken in order to provide EEAS staff with adequate common training, building in 
particular on existing practices and structures at national and Union level. The High Representative shall 
take appropriate measures to that effect within the year following the entry into force of this Decision.  
This long article addresses staffing issues at the EEAS. As Article 27(3) TEU envisaged the 
composition of the Service only in general terms (‘shall comprise officials from relevant departments 
of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from 
national diplomatic services of the Member States’), the EEAS Decision had to include a fair degree 
of detail, –on what are primarily internal matters. Frequent reference is made in this article to the 
(amended) Staff Regulations and to the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants (CEOS).121 The 
amended Staff Regulations note that, ‘in view of [the Service’s] specific tasks, the EEAS should be 
granted autonomy within the framework of the Staff Regulations’.  For the purposes of the Staff 
Regulations and the CEOS, the EEAS should be treated as an institution of the Union. 
1. Composition 
• The basic (initial) composition of the staff had already been determined in the final report of the 
Convention’s Working Group VII on External Action of 16 December 2002, which touched 
upon staffing for the projected EEAS en passant, mentioning that it would be composed of staff 
from DG Relex, Council Secretariat officials and staff seconded from the national diplomatic 
services.122 The 2005 Barroso and Solana Joint Progress Report stressed the importance of 
having a ‘sufficient number’ of national diplomats in the EEAS and argued that they should be 
temporarily assigned, rather than seconded, so that all staff should have the ‘same status and 
conditions of employment’. It was also agreed that the nomination of staff to the EEAS should 
                                                     
121 Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council amending the Staff Regulations of Officials of the 
European Communities and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of those Communities, PE-
CONS 52/10, Strasbourg, 9 November 2010.  
122 Final Report of Working Group VII on External Action, Brussels, CONV 459/02, 16 December 2002, p. 
6.  
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be ‘based on merit with appropriate selection procedures’.123 A fiche on ‘Specific arrangements 
concerning EEAS staff’ of 12 October 2009 helpfully distinguished between the staffing 
demands of the initial set-up of the Service and the following period and noted the need for a 
policy of mobility in order to avoid the creation of ‘flagged posts’.124 
• The High Representative’s ‘Step Change’ document, which was in effect a preview of the March 
2010 draft decision, gave an overview of both the architecture of the Service as well as 
reaffirming many of the previously discussed staffing aspects, including transitional 
arrangements for the start-up of the Service and a pledge that the EEAS Decision would 
establish the principle of rotation within the EEAS.125 The actual explanatory memorandum of 
the March draft decision reiterates many of the above points but, somewhat curiously, introduces 
the Consultative Committee on Appointments (CCA), which is a selection panel for senior 
appointments (director and above) as well as having a more general mandate to monitor gender 
and geographical balance, although this is not mentioned in the EEAS Decision itself.126 The list 
of staff due to be transferred to the EEAS (was) transmitted in an annex to this document 
communicated almost a month later.127 
• The specifics of how to ensure the desired one-third contribution from the member states (at AD 
level) received further thought and attention in a report by the High Representative on the 
contribution from the member states in June 2010.128 
• Amendments to the Staff Regulations and CEOS were necessary to incorporate the EEAS. The 
revised Regulations reflect many of the issues discussed in the travaux préparatoires, such as 
the balance between AD officials coming from member states’ diplomatic services and 
permanent EU officials. The issue of geographical and gender balance was discussed intensively 
during the co-decision procedure, resulting in the legal text being supplemented by statements by 
the High Representative pledging appropriate action to promote geographical and gender 
balance.129 Reference in Article 6(1) of the Council Decision to Article 336 TFEU serves as a 
reminder of the procedures for the amendment of the Staff Regulations (‘in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting other institutions concerned...’). 
• Article 6(2) of the Council Decision reaffirms the composition of the EEAS. It should be noted 
that the general wording of the paragraph serves both the current (transition) composition of the 
EEAS until 30 June 2013 (in line with Article 98(1) of the Staff Regulations) and the situation 
thereafter whereby the Service shall consider applications of officials from other EU institutions. 
• The importance of the quota of permanent officials to temporarily assigned diplomats reflects 
concerns stemming from a number of the travaux préparatoires. Article 6(9) does not specify 
when the EEAS should ‘reach full capacity’ but the amended Staff Regulations make it clear that 
                                                     
123 Joint Progress Report by the Secretary-General/High Representative and the Commission on the European 
External Action Service, 9956/05, Brussels, 9 June 2005, Paras. 13-14.  
124Fiche on Specific Arrangements concerning EEAS staff, 12 October 2009, p. 5.  
125 ‘A Step Change in external policy for the Union: Delivering on the promise of the Lisbon Treaty’, Annex 
1, 3 March 2010, Section 5.  
126 Draft decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, 
from the High Representative to the Council, Explanatory Memorandum, 8029/10, Brussels, 25 March 2010, 
p. 3.  
127Annex to the proposal for a Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the 
European External Action Service, from the High Representative to COREPER, 8870/10, 22 April 2010.  
128 Report from the High Representative, EEAS Staffing – the contribution from the Member States, 4 June 
2010.  
129 See European External Action Service – adoption of final legal acts, MEMO/10.521, Brussels, 25 October 
2010. 
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this should be by 1 July 2013 (at which time derogations from Article 98(1) of the Staff 
Regulations should desist). The latest EEAS report on staffing, reflecting the situation as of 1 
June 2012, demonstrates good progress on attaining the desired one-third level for staff from the 
member states at AD level. The paragraph refers only to a general balance and does not specify 
how any such balance should be attained between the headquarters and Delegations. The 
indication of the desirable ‘balance’ between temporarily assigned national diplomats and EU 
officials gives rise to the question, with regard to paragraphs 6 and 8, of whether other forms of 
balance should not be expressed in general terms. 
• The situation following expiry of the derogations noted above (which will coincide with the 
review of the EEAS) implies that direct recruitment to the Service will be possible on the basis 
of open competition, beyond the pool of primarily transferred staff (see Article 7 of the Council 
decision) who comprised much of the initial Service. The likely implications of this for any 
necessary rebalancing in line with Article 6(6 and 8) should be carefully considered. 
• The Rules regarding Seconded National Experts referred to in Article 6(3) of the Council 
Decision have since been adopted.130 Paragraph 3 states that rules shall be adopted equivalent to 
those laid down in Council Decision 2003/479/EC of 16 June 2003, but these have since been 
repealed and replaced by Council Decision 2007/829/EC of 5 December 2007. 
• Article 6(7) reflects concerns voiced in the travaux préparatoires regarding equal treatment of 
national diplomats and officials of the Union, according them the same rights and obligations. 
This is confirmed in the amended Staff Regulations (Preamble, fourth recital). 
2. Appointing Authority 
 
• A report from the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs stressed that ‘all 
staff of the EEAS should have the same permanent or temporary status and the same rights and 
obligations irrespective of origin’, that the powers of appointing authority within the EEAS 
should reside with the High Representative/Vice-President, and that EEAS staff should ‘possess 
a certain objective independence’.131 The Swedish Presidency Report to the European Council 
of 23 October 2009 also assigned the High Representative as the appointing authority.132 In this 
context, Article 6(5) of the Council Decision is rather straightforward. 
• In practice those appointments at director level and above require a decision by the High 
Representative/Vice-President while those below are delegated. This is confirmed in the Staff 
Regulations (third recital of the preamble and Article 95(1)). 
3. Meaning of Merit and Relationship with Geographical/Gender Balance  
• Notions such as ‘merit’ and ‘adequate geographical and gender balance’ (see paragraphs 6 and 8 
of Article 6) are subjective terms and are open to interpretation. The former, however, could be 
understood in terms of whether a candidate for a position within the Service meets the job 
                                                     
130 See Decision of the High Representative of 23 March 2011 establishing the rules applicable to National 
Experts Seconded to the EEAS.  
131 ‘Report on the Interinstitutional aspects of setting up the European External Action Service’, Committee 
on Constitutional Affairs, Elmar Brock, rapporteur, A7-0041/2009, 20 October 2009, para. 7.  
132 Presidency Report to the European Council on the European External Action Service, 14930/09, 23 
October 2009, para. 21.  
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requirements expressed in the job announcement. The EP amendments to the March draft 
decision suggested that equivalent measures should be undertaken akin to Council Regulation 
401/2004/EC, which advocated that special temporary measures should be undertaken departing 
from the Staff Regulations due to the ‘exceptional nature’ of the ‘forthcoming enlargement’–i.e. 
some form of special recruitment should be envisaged (but this only deals with geographical 
balance and does not address adequacy or meaningful presence). The word ‘ensuring’ was 
introduced by MEP Franziska Brantner et al. to ensure ‘stronger and more appropriate phrasing’.  
• The wording of paragraph 8 of the same article confuses the situation further by referring to 
‘adequate geographical and gender balance, and a meaningful presence of nationals from all 
Member States’; thus introducing a further layer of subjectivity without reference to the Staff 
Regulations or other internal documents that might add meaning to these terms. The High 
Representative is authorised to ‘promote equal opportunities for the under-represented gender in 
certain function groups, more particularly in the AD function group’ in Articles 1d(2-3) of the 
amended Staff Regulations. Given that specific mention of the balance issue is made in relation 
to the forthcoming review (Article 13(3)), the lack of any precision regarding the nature of any 
inadequacy and its possible consequences may pose problems. 
4. Selection Procedures  
• As has been suggested above, paragraphs 6 and 8 are somewhat duplicative and could be merged 
and, if not, the confusing reference to gender and geographical balance in this paragraph could 
be omitted since it appears in paragraph 6. The absence of any mention of the Consultative 
Committee on Appointments (CCA) is understandable since it was not formally created until 
March 2011. Its establishment, however, was clearly envisaged in the High Representative’s 
explanatory memorandum accompanying the March draft decision.133 The explanatory 
memorandum notes that in addition to their duties regarding senior appointments, the CCA ‘shall 
also monitor selection procedures at other levels in the EEAS and the development of EEAS 
staffing, including with regard to gender and geographical balance’.134 Since the issue of 
geographical and gender balance is mentioned twice in this article, the role of the CCA could 
now be usefully mentioned in terms of its general mandate as well as its specific duties regarding 
the monitoring of geographical and gender balance, especially in the absence of any other 
objective measurement of balance. Mention of the CCA would also permit the High 
Representative to ask them for further guidance on the development of this facet. With regard to 
this paragraph and paragraph 3, neither makes it clear that seconded national experts shall not be 
counted in the one-third of all EEAS staff at AD level, although this is mentioned in the 
amended Staff Regulations (eighteenth recital of the preamble).  
5. Mobility, Reinstatement and Training 
 
• The CCA met on 14 June 2012 to discuss the evolution of EEAS mobility policy being 
developed on the basis of Article 6(10) of the Council Decision. The Service is at an early stage 
of the development of such a policy. The principal challenge facing the EEAS is its absorption 
                                                     
133 Explanatory Memorandum from the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy attached 
to Draft Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action 
Service, 8029/10, Brussels, 25 March 2010, p. 3. 
134 Ibid.  
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capacity to make room for those rotating back to headquarters from the Delegations. A further 
challenge is the diversity of national systems of mobility. 
• Article 6(11) also addresses concerns raised in the travaux préparatoires, this time regarding the 
rights of temporary agents serving in the EEAS from the Member States to ensure immediate 
reinstatement. The paragraph mentions Article 50(b) of the CEOS, which specifies that staff 
from national diplomatic services may be engaged ‘for a maximum period of four years’ and that 
‘contracts may be renewed for a maximum period of four years’, with the engagement not 
exceeding eight years in total (with exceptional provision for an extension of a further two 
years). It should, however, be noted that the principle of mobility (see paragraph 10) implies that 
member state diplomats who have served four years and who wish to remain for a further four 
years, would not be guaranteed automatic renewal and would have to apply for a new job; 
whereas the possibility of continuing service at the end of the eighth year is an extension of an 
existing contract. 
• The provisions on ‘adequate common training, building in particular on existing practices and 
structures at national and Union level’ (Article 6(12) of the Council Decision) were predicated 
upon the assumption that the EEAS would have some budgetary independence in this regard. 
The inclusion of EEAS-related training under the Commission’s budget (DG HR) and the 
existence of pre-existing framework contracts mean that the EEAS has been unable to fully 
develop ‘adequate common training’ and has not systematically involved ‘practices and 
structures at national and Union level’. It is debatable whether the steps taken are adequate, and 
there is relatively little national involvement. This aside, the expression of a timescale that has 
now passed is inappropriate and serves as a specific example of the overall emphasis of the 
EEAS Decision upon the establishment of the Service in its transitory phase – not as a document 
that looks much beyond the immediate period until the first major review in mid-2013. Hence, 
the choice is to amend the paragraph with more specific directions and an amended timescale or 
to delete it. 
6. Conduct 
 
• Finally, Article 6(4) of the Council Decision reminds EEAS staff that they shall carry out their 
duties ‘solely with the interests of the Union in mind’. Reference is made to several other parts 
of the EEAS Decision (Articles 2(1) third indent, 2(2) and 5(3)). The main implication of these 
references is to ensure that such conduct is reflected as broadly as possible, which includes the 
support role played by the Service with regard to the High Representative/Vice-President, as 
well as the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, and the 
Commission (as stipulated by Arts 2(2) and 3 of the EEAS Decision), which significantly 
broadens the envisaged function of the Service as laid out in Article 27(3) TEU. It also applies to 
Heads of Delegation.135  Complications may arise with temporarily assigned diplomats who may 
have taken similar oaths of allegiance in the national context. In practical terms, it may be 
difficult to determine whether national diplomats always conduct themselves ‘solely with the 
interests of the Union in mind’. It is worth noting that ‘an EEAS official who has to carry out 
tasks for the Commission as part of his duties’ is expected to follow instructions given by the 
Commission in accordance with Article 221(2) TFEU (Staff Regulations, fifth recital of the 
preamble and Article 96). 
                                                     
135 See Article 5 of the Council Decision. 
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• A comparison of the provision with the June draft decision demonstrates that the only 
substantive concern with Article 6 was the insertion of a stipulation that EEAS staff may not 
accept any payments of any kind from any source outside the Service.   
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ARTICLE 7 
Transitional Provisions Regarding Staff 
 
 
1. The relevant departments and functions in the General Secretariat of the Council and in the Commission 
listed in the Annex shall be transferred to the EEAS. Officials and temporary agents occupying a post in 
departments or functions listed in the Annex shall be transferred to the EEAS. This shall apply mutatis 
mutandis to contract and local staff assigned to such departments and functions. SNEs working in those 
departments or functions shall also be transferred to the EEAS with the consent of the authorities of the 
originating Member State. 
These transfers shall take effect on 1 January 2011. 
In accordance with the Staff Regulations, upon their transfer to the EEAS, the High Representative shall 
assign each official to a post in his/her function group which corresponds to that official’s grade. 
2. The procedures for recruiting staff for posts transferred to the EEAS which are ongoing at the date of 
entry into force of this Decision shall remain valid: they shall be carried on and completed under the 
authority of the High Representative in accordance with the relevant vacancy notices and the applicable 
rules of the Staff Regulations and the CEOS.  
 
One of the initial challenges of the EEAS was integrating staff from EU institutions and member 
states. Paras. 1-2 of this Article deal with the transitional arrangements for staff of the Council General 
Secretariat and the Commission who were transferred to the EEAS and seek to maintain the privileges, 
status, and mobility of Council and Commission staff. This article was required when around 1,500 
staff were transferred to the EEAS on 1 January 2011.    
• The ‘relevant departments’, as envisaged by Article 27(3) TEU are laid out in the annex attached 
to the Council Decision.  The annex refers to ‘administrative entities’  but the list provided is not 
intended to prejudge ‘the additional needs and the allocation of resources to be determined in the 
overall budget negotiations establishing the EEAS, nor decisions on the provision of adequate 
staff responsible for support functions, nor the linked need for service-level arrangements.’ The 
Council decision does, however, effectively prejudge these issues by stipulating in Article 1(15) 
that the EEAS should be guided ‘by the principle of cost-efficiency aiming toward budget 
neutrality.’  This raises the interesting issue of what might happen if there were found to be 
inadequate staff for support functions, which might imply budgetary adjustments beyond 
‘neutrality’. 
• The Swedish Presidency report emphasised that there should be no distinction made between the 
sources of staff in terms of conditions and tasks.136 The transitional period meant that the human 
resources department initially faced a number of questions, complaints and administrative issues 
relating to the transitional provisions touching upon issues such as functions, responsibilities, 
promotion, pay, leave and social benefits. These administrative issues have largely been dealt 
                                                     
136 Presidency Report to the European Council on the European External Action Service, 14930/09, 23 
October 2009, para. 19. 
EEAS 2.0 
51 
with. Importantly, the equal treatment of staff from different backgrounds is vital to establishing 
a strong esprit de corps within the new Service.   
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ARTICLE 8 
Budget   
1. The duties of authorising officer for the EEAS section of the general budget of the European Union shall be 
delegated in accordance with Article 59 of the Financial Regulation. The High Representative shall adopt the 
internal rules for the management of the administrative budget lines. Operational expenditure shall remain 
within the Commission section of the budget. 
2. The EEAS shall exercise its powers in accordance with the Financial Regulation applicable to the general 
budget of the European Union within the limits of the appropriations allocated to it. 
3. When drawing up estimates of administrative expenditure for the EEAS, the High Representative will hold 
consultations with, respectively, the Commissioner responsible for Development Policy and the Commissioner 
responsible for Neighbourhood Policy regarding their respective responsibilities. 
4. In accordance with Article 314(1) TFEU, the EEAS shall draw up estimates of its expenditure for the 
following financial year. The Commission shall consolidate those estimates in a draft budget, which may contain 
different estimates. The Commission may amend the draft budget as provided for in Article 314(2) TFEU. 
5. In order to ensure budgetary transparency in the area of external action of the Union, the Commission will 
transmit to the budgetary authority, together with the draft general budget of the European Union, a working 
document presenting, in a comprehensive way, all expenditure related to the external action of the Union. 
6. The EEAS shall be subject to the procedures regarding the discharge provided for in Article 319 TFEU and in 
Articles 145 to 147 of the Financial Regulation. The EEAS will, in this context, fully cooperate with the 
institutions involved in the discharge procedure and provide, as appropriate, the additional necessary 
information, including through attendance at meetings of the relevant bodies.  
At first sight Article 8 is an oddly structured provision, which contains cryptic formulations and ample 
cross-references to treaty articles and secondary legislation. Yet, it is an important article, as it 
determines the scope of budgetary control the EEAS has over its organisation and functioning. Article 
8 is a provision which bears the marks of the inter-institutional strife in the travaux préparatoires, and 
one that packs a few surprises, such as the qualification of the EEAS as an institution – albeit for 
budgetary matters only (Section 1), a reference to the ‘powers’ of the Service and other peculiarities 
(Section 2). 
1. The EEAS, an Institution for Budgetary Purposes137  
• In its October 2009 ‘guidelines’ to the future HR/VP, the European Council stated that ‘The 
EEAS should be a service of a sui generis nature separate from the Commission and the General 
Secretariat of the Council. It should have autonomy in terms of administrative budget and 
management of staff’.138 
                                                     
137 See the discussion under Article 1 EEAS Decision, above. 
138 Presidency Conclusions of the European Council of 29/30 October 2009, doc. 15265/1/09, Brussels, 1 
December 2009, item 16. 
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• Although on the basis of Article 27(3) TEU the European Parliament only needed to be 
consulted on the draft EEAS Decision, the EP enjoys the right of co-decision with regard to both 
the staff and budgetary regulations which needed to be amended to operationalise the EEAS. The 
EP maximised its negotiating position on the former by coupling the two issues and wielding its 
veto power over the latter. 
• The EP undertook to promote the ‘Community’ method, for instance by proposing to increase 
the influence of the Commission on the administrative, in particular the budgetary structures of 
the new Service. The EP stated its belief that: ‘(...) as a service that is sui generis from an 
organisational and budgetary point of view, the EEAS must be incorporated into the 
Commission’s administrative structure, as this would ensure full transparency’.139 In their Non-
paper on the EEAS, MEPs Brok and Verhofstadt insisted that the EEAS should be an 
autonomous service assisting the HR/VP and accountable to the European Parliament, both in 
political and budgetary terms.140 
• In the quadrilogue, the EP negotiated rather successfully to enhance the influence of the 
Commission on the administrative structure of the EEAS, in particular with regard to budgetary 
procedures. In the talks it became clear that the EEAS would have to follow the same budget 
lines and administrative rules as applicable to the EU budget falling under Heading V of the 
Multiannual Financial Framework.141 Article 8(1) EEAS Decision reinforces this by prescribing 
that – all – ‘operational expenditure shall remain within the Commission section of the budget’, 
and not just the operational expenditure arising from the implementation of the CFSP budget and 
a number of  programmes,142 as proposed by the HR/VP in Article 7(3) of her draft EEAS 
Decision of March 2010.  
• The EU operational expenditure is the total EU programme budget less the administrative 
expenditure administrative costs of the European Commission.143 The administrative cost 
calculation is both financial and in kind. The financial cost calculation is towards the fixed 
overhead costs, such as rental of offices, expenses of meetings and publications. The in-kind 
expenditure refers to the supply of human resources to the EEAS through the secondment of 
national experts. These experts are cost-free for the EU as their salary and benefits are covered 
by their employers in their home countries. 
• The Commission also obtained the discretionary power to consolidate budget estimates and to 
amend the budget (Article 8(4)).144 Such a budgetary procedure is fully in keeping with the 
general rules of the TFEU, which prescribe that, with a view to helping to prepare the 
establishment of the EU’s annual budget, the institutions of the Union have to draw up budget 
estimates, and that it is the competence of the Commission to consolidate and (wherever 
                                                     
139 European Parliament resolution of 22 October 2009 on the institutional aspects of setting up the European 
External Action Service (2009/2133(INI), operative paragraph 7. 
140 Non-paper EEAS of 18 March 2010 (plus attached to it an organisational chart of the EEAS) by Elmar 
Brok and Guy Verhofstadt, available at the website of Euractiv <http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-
eu/parliament-pulls-its-weight-eeas-negotiations-news-375926> (last accessed 31 January 2013). 
141 Cf. Article 4(3)(a), last sentence of the second indent of the EEAS Council Decision. The HR/VP’s 
proposal of 25 March 2010 did not contain such a provision. 
142 The Instrument for Stability, the Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries, the 
Communication and Public Diplomacy, as well as Election Observation Missions. 
143 See, generally,  <http://ec.europa.eu/budget/explained/budg_system/structure/struct_en.cfm> (last 
accessed 31 January 2013). Note that Article 41 TEU speaks of ‘operating’ budget. 
144 This provision (and the Commission competence included in it) did not feature in the HR/VP’s proposal 
of 25 March 2010.  
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necessary or considered appropriate) to amend these budget estimates.145 The EEAS emerges 
here – by implication – as an institution of the Union with respect to budgetary matters. 
• The EP hammered the importance of the institutional status of the EEAS home (i.e. to the 
Council and the HR/VP) during the negotiations on the collateral Financial Regulation. 
Regulation No 1081/2010 amended the existing Financial Regulation applicable to the general 
budget so as to include the European External Action Service as an ‘institution’ with a specific 
section in the Union budget.146 
• Thus, also for the discharge procedure the EEAS should been seen as an institution and therefore 
‘fully subject to the procedures provided for in Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union and in Articles 145 to 147 of the Financial Regulation’.147 
• The budgetary lines between the EEAS and the Commission were further tightened in the area of 
development cooperation and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). According to Article 
8(3) EEAS Decision, the estimates of administrative expenditure in these areas have to be drawn 
up by the HR ‘in consultation with the Commissioners for Development Policy and for European 
Neighbourhood Policy regarding their respective responsibilities’.148 The Financial Regulation 
extended this obligation of budgetary cooperation to international cooperation, humanitarian aid 
and crisis response.149 Such a provision of close cooperation did not feature in the original 
HR/VP proposal at all. 
• Further, the internal auditors of the EEAS and the Commission would have to cooperate to 
ensure the audit policy. In accordance with the applicable rules, and as is the case for other 
institutions, a part of the annual report of the Court of Auditors is dedicated to the EEAS,150 and 
the EEAS is expected to respond to such reports.151 
• Finally, the European Office Against Fraud (OLAF) has been granted investigative powers with 
regard to the EEAS.152 
• From the foregoing, one can draw a few conclusions. Firstly, operational expenditure (i.e. 
excluding costs for administration) remains within the Commission section of the budget. This 
gives the Commission control over what the EEAS can do in the operational sphere. Secondly, 
with regard to administrative expenditures in three shared competence areas (development, ENP, 
and international cooperation, humanitarian aid and crisis response) the EEAS and the 
Commission have to consult each other. Thirdly, the budgetary procedures of the EEAS have 
been aligned with those of the Commission. This should facilitate cooperation. Fourthly, the 
                                                     
145 Article 314(1) TFEU (first two sentences): ‘With the exception of the European Central Bank, each 
institution shall, before 1 July, draw up estimates of its expenditure for the following financial year. The 
Commission shall consolidate these estimates in a draft budget which may contain different estimates.’ 
146 Article 1(2) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1081/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 November 2010 amending Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation 
applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, as regards the European External Action 
Service, OJ 2010 L 311/ 9.’ 
147 See third preambular paragraph of the EEAS Decision.  
148 Again, this provision did not feature in the HR/VP’s proposal of 25 March 2010.  
149 Article 1(6) of the 2010 Financial Regulation: ‘The High Representative will hold consultations with the 
Members of the Commission responsible for development policy, neighbourhood policy and international 
cooperation, humanitarian aid and crisis response, regarding their respective responsibilities.’  
150 See, e.g., Court of Auditors, Annual Report Concerning the Financial Year 2011, OJ 2012 C 344, Chapter 
9, paragraphs 9.25-9.28: EUR 682 Mio made in payments, amounting to 0,5% of the EU total.  
151 See the discussion under Article 3(4) EEAS Decision, above.  
152 Ibid. See Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 
concerning investigations conducted by the European anti-fraud office (Olaf), OJ 1999 L 136/1. 
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standard procedures for drawing up budget estimates and for the discharge of the budget apply to 
the EEAS as well. As such, the EEAS has emerged as an institution with regard to budgetary 
matters, with its own section in the EU budget. But, fifthly, the assumption of these specific 
responsibilities does not by itself enhance the status of the EEAS as an institution in the sense of 
Article 13 TEU. Rather, these responsibilities enhanced the position of the European Parliament 
as a budgetary authority over the EEAS. From a political and institutional perspective, the 
outcome of the negotiations on the 2010 Council Decision and the collateral Financial 
Regulation has enhanced the position of the EP as a budgetary authority and strengthened its 
supervisory powers over the EEAS. The EP’s Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) got it right 
when it said that the operational part (in particular the management of the external action 
programmes) of the EEAS budget would be part of that of the Commission, whereas the 
administrative part would remain separate from the EU budget but still fall under the control of 
the EP.153 
2.  Institutional and Procedural Peculiarities  
(i) Split Budget Lines: Representation and Delegation  
• Article 8 opens with a rather cryptic paragraph which, when deciphered, exposes a multi-layered 
regulatory framework. In its first sentence it states that ‘The duties of authorising officer for the 
EEAS section of the general budget of the European Union shall be delegated in accordance with 
Article 59 of the Financial Regulation.’ According to Article 59(1) of Council Regulation No 
1605/2002, the ‘institution shall perform the duties of authorising officer’.  Article 8(1) thus 
implicitly qualifies the EEAS as an ‘institution’ for the budgetary matters contained in the 
provision. 
• According to Article 59(2) of the Financial Regulation, ‘[e]ach institution shall lay down in its 
internal administrative rules the staff of an appropriate level to whom it delegates in compliance 
with the conditions in its rules of procedure the duties of authorising officer, the scope of the 
powers delegated and the possibility for the persons to whom these powers are delegated to sub-
delegate them’. Resonating the language of the Financial Regulation, the second sentence of 
Article 8(1) states that ‘The High Representative shall adopt the internal rules for the 
management of the administrative budget lines’. To that end, the HR adopted Decision PROC 
HR(2011) 001 of 31 January 2011 ‘On the Internal Rules on the implementation of budget of the 
European External Action Service (Section X)’.154 As such, the HR ‘represents’ the EEAS in 
performing the duties of authorising officer pursuant to Article 59(1) of the Financial 
Regulation. 
• In accordance with Article 59(3)155 and (4)156 of the Financial Regulation, the High 
Representative decided to delegate the Service’s ‘powers of budget implementation to the Chief 
Operating Officer (Director General for Budget and Administration), who carries out the duties 
                                                     
153 See EP press release of 30 June 2010, ‘External Action Service: EP's budgetary powers guarantee 
parliamentary oversight’.  
154 Ref. Ares(2011)109103 - 01/02/2011.  
155 ‘The powers of authorising officer shall be delegated or sub-delegated only to persons covered by the 
[Staff Regulations]’.  
156 ‘Authorising officers by delegation or sub-delegation may act only within the limits set by the instrument 
of delegation or sub-delegation. The responsible authorising officer by delegation or sub-delegation may be 
assisted in his/her task by one or more members of staff entrusted, under his/her responsibility, to carry out 
certain operations necessary for implementation of the budget and presentation of the accounts’.  
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of delegated authorising officer of the EEAS’ and who exercises those delegated powers ‘in 
accordance with the provisions of the ‘Charter of tasks and responsibilities of authorising 
officers by delegation’, which the authorising officer by delegation shall sign upon taking up 
duty and whenever any changes are made to the Charter’.157 The powers delegated to the Chief 
Operating Officer under these internal rules allow him to implement the budget by making 
budgetary and legal commitments, validating and authorising payments, establishing 
entitlements and issuing recovery orders, taking individual decisions on the award of grants or 
public contracts and proposing transfers of appropriations in accordance with the Internal 
Rules.158 As delegated authorising officer, the Chief Operating Officer may in turn delegate his 
powers to sub-delegated authorising officers,159 in keeping with the principles, rules and limits 
fixed in Articles 7-11 of the Internal Rules. 
• In order to ensure the ‘continuity of the functioning of Union Delegations and, in particular, 
continuity and efficiency in the management of external aid by the Delegations’,160 the 2010 
revision of the Financial Regulation added a fifth paragraph to Article 59: ‘Where Heads of 
Union Delegations act as authorising officers by sub-delegation in accordance with the second 
paragraph of Article 51, they shall be subject to the Commission as the institution responsible for 
the definition, exercise, control and appraisal of their duties and responsibilities as authorising 
officers by sub-delegation. The Commission shall, at the same time, inform the High 
Representative thereof’.161 
• In line with Article 317 TFEU, which attributes responsibility to the European Commission for 
the implementation of the operational budget, Article 59(5) of the Financial Regulation 
entrenches the rift between the EEAS and the Commission in matters of budgetary control, 
established by Article 8(1) EEAS Decision. The latter’s second sentence imposes an obligation 
on the HR to adopt internal rules for the management of ‘administrative budget lines’, whereas 
the third sentence prescribes that ‘[o]perational expenditure shall remain within the Commission 
section of the budget.’ Thus, leaving aside the question of blurred boundaries between 
‘administrative budget lines’ and ‘operational expenditure’, the combination of Article 8(1) 
EEAS Decision and Article 59(5) of the 2010 Financial Regulation effectively creates split 
financial circuits at the level of EU Delegations. 
• In order to overcome potential difficulties arising from the split of circuits, procedures and 
accountability,162 Article 15 of the Internal Rules decided upon by the High Representative 
provides that ‘[o]n an exceptional basis, and for reasons of good budgetary execution, in the 
European Union’s Delegations, specific administrative arrangements may be agreed between the 
EEAS and the European Commission, in accordance with Article 50 of the Financial 
Regulation’.  
                                                     
157 Article 4(1) and (2) of HR PROC(2011) 001.  
158 Article 4(3) of HR PROC(2011) 001.  
159 Articles 6 resp. 5 of HR PROC(2011) 001.  
160 Recital 7 in the preamble to Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1081/2010.  
161 Article 51(2) of the Financial Regulation provides that ‘the Commission may delegate its powers of 
budget implementation concerning the operational appropriations of its own section to the Heads of Union 
Delegations’ and that, ‘[w]hen Heads of Union Delegations act as sub-delegated authorising officers of the 
Commission, they shall apply the Commission rules for the implementation of the budget and shall be 
submitted to the same duties, obligations and accountability as any other sub-delegated authorising officer of 
the Commission’. See, in this respect, Order of the General Court of 4 July 2012 in Case T 395/11, Elti d.o.o. 
v. Delegation of the European Union to Montenegro, nyr.  
162 Recital 14 in the preamble to the EEAS Decision: ‘Decisions having a financial impact will, in particular, 
comply with the responsibilities laid down in Title IV of the Financial Regulation, especially Articles 64 to 
68 thereof regarding liability of financial actors, and Article 75 thereof regarding expenditure operations’.  
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• The ‘Working arrangements between Commission services and the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) in relation to external relations issues’ agreed to in January 2012 lay down in 
considerable detail how the financial circuits between the EEAS and the Commission pan out. It 
states, inter alia, that, the Heads of Delegation ‘can receive sub-delegation of power of 
authorising officer for budget implementation tasks belonging to the Commission's competence 
and responsibility, for operational appropriations only’. As such, the Heads of Delegation apply 
the Commission rules and are subject to the same duties, obligations and accountability as any 
other sub-delegated authorising officer of the Commission.163 They can sub-delegate these 
powers only to Commission staff in the Delegation, not to EEAS staff. Conversely, the Heads of 
Delegation can receive sub-delegation of power of authorising officer for budget implementation 
tasks belonging to the EEAS' competence and responsibility; powers which they can sub-
delegate only to EEAS staff in the delegation, not to Commission staff.164 In the financial 
circuits in EU Delegations the roles of verification and authorisation are restricted to the staff 
belonging to each ‘institution’;165 with the exception of the double-hatted role of the Head of 
Delegation, in accordance with Article 51 of the Financial Regulation. 
• This split financial regime has been confirmed by order of the General Court, which observed 
that the EU Delegations may have a role of assisting the Commission in the implementation of 
the EU budget at local level, more specifically in the event of implementation of projects 
financed under EU external aid programmes. That assistance, the General Court ruled, ‘which is 
part of a sub-delegation to the Head of Delegation, is done under the strict control of the 
Commission, which is, pursuant to Articles 317 TFEU and 319 TFEU, charged with the 
implementation of the budget and holds, under Article 51 of the Financial Regulation, the power 
to withdraw the delegation granted.’ In a rather liberal interpretation of its own jurisdiction,166 
the General Court then concluded that it ‘follows from Article 221 TFEU, from the decision of 
26 July 2010 and from the relevant provisions of the Financial Regulation referred to above that 
the legal status of the Union Delegations is characterised by a two-fold organic and functional 
dependence with respect to the EEAS and the Commission, which precludes their being 
considered a body for the purposes of Article 263 TFEU’.167   
 
 
                                                     
163 Article 60a of the Financial Regulation states that Heads of Union Delegations acting as authorising 
officers by sub-delegation must, first, report to their authorising officer by delegation concerning, inter alia, 
the management of operations sub-delegated to them and, second, reply to any request by the authorising 
officer by delegation of the Commission. According to Article 85 of the Financial Regulation, the Heads of 
Union Delegations acting as authorising officers by sub-delegation ‘shall be subject to the verifying powers 
of the internal auditor of the Commission for the financial management sub-delegated to them’. Furthermore, 
the 2010 Financial Regulation and the 2010 amendment to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European 
Communities and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of those Communities (OJ 2010 L 311/ 
1) added a new Article 96 to those regulations, the second paragraph of which provides that an ‘EEAS 
official who has to carry out tasks for the Commission as part of his duties shall take instructions from the 
Commission with regard to those tasks, in accordance with Article 221(2) [TFEU]’.  
164 Ref. Ares(2012)41133 - 13/01/2012, p. 5. See also responsibility for staff in EU Delegations in Article 5 
EEAS Council Decision. 
165 Nevertheless initiation tasks for the EEAS budget can be entrusted to Commission staff, in exceptional 
cases and on a transitional basis, as foreseen in the Internal Rules decision of both institutions. For more 
details on inter-service arrangements on financial issues, ibid., pp. 6-9.  
166 See the discussion under Article 1 EEAS Decision, above.  
167 Order of the General Court of 4 July 2012 in Case T 395/11, Elti d.o.o. v. Delegation of the European 
Union to Montenegro, nyr, paragraphs 44-46.  
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(ii) Powers of the EEAS 
 
• Two observations can be made with respect to Article 8(2). The first concerns the one and only 
direct reference in the Council Decision to the ‘powers’ vested in the EEAS itself. The second 
observation concerns the scope of those powers. 
• The use of terminology is striking if one considers that the EEAS Decision otherwise only 
speaks of the Service’s ‘tasks’ (Articles 1(2) and 2). Whereas the latter are derivative from the 
powers vested in the High Representative (as outlined, notably, in Articles 18 and 27 TEU), the 
President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, and the Commission (in the 
exercise of their respective functions in the area of external relations), the reference to the 
EEAS’ own powers has to be understood in the sense that these are powers which have been 
bestowed upon the Service by virtue of Articles 8(1) EEAS Decision and 1(2) of the 2010 
Financial Regulation, which – for budgetary matters – elevated the status of the European 
External Action Service to that of an ‘institution’. 
• As has been noted in the commentary on Article 8(1), the scope of the EEAS’ budgetary powers 
is limited to administrative expenditures. Paragraph 2 makes it clear that these powers will be 
exercised in accordance with the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the 
EU, ‘within the limits of the appropriations allocated to [the Service]’.   
(iii) Duty of Cooperation 
 
• Article 8(3) provides that, ‘[w]hen drawing up estimates of administrative expenditure for the 
EEAS, the High Representative will hold consultations with, respectively, the Commissioner 
responsible for Development Policy and the Commissioner responsible for Neighbourhood 
Policy regarding their respective responsibilities’. 
• The rationale for the inclusion of this paragraph lies within the agreement between member 
states that the establishment of the EEAS should be guided by the principle of cost-efficiency 
and the avoidance of unnecessary duplication of tasks, functions and resources with, e.g., the 
Commission.168 As such, the duty to consult enshrined in Article 8(3) is an elaboration of Article 
3(2) and of the High Representative’s duty to ensure consistency in the Union’s external action 
pursuant to Articles 18(4), 21(3) and 26(2) TEU. 
• Apparent in paragraph 3 of Article 8 is the limitation of the scope of the HR’s duty to consult: it 
does not seem to concern such shared external competences areas as enlargement, humanitarian 
aid and crisis response. With respect to the shared competence areas of international cooperation, 
humanitarian aid and crisis response, the gap has been plugged by the 2010 revision of the 
Financial Regulation, which extends the obligation of budgetary consultation to these areas.169  
Drawing up estimates of administrative expenditures in the field of EU enlargement, however, 
remains outside the scope of this obligation. This apparent limit to the obligation to consult is 
without prejudice to the general obligation of consultation enshrined in Article 3(2) EEAS 
Decision. Given that the EEAS is conceived as an ‘institution’ for the purpose of Article 8, one 
may indeed consider that the obligation of Article 13(2) TEU could apply mutatis mutandis.  
                                                     
168 See recital 15 in the preamble to the EEAS Decision.  
169 Article 1(6) of the 2010 Financial Regulation. 
EEAS 2.0 
59 
• In the same vein, paragraph 3 puts a circumscribed obligation of initiative on the shoulders of 
the High Representative: it is s/he who shall consult the designated Commissioners; not the other 
way around. 
• The final word on drawing up the estimates, however, is with the European Commission. After 
all, Article 8(4) EEAS Decision prescribes that the Commission consolidates those estimates in a 
draft budget, ‘which may contain different estimates’; and that the Commission ‘may amend the 
draft budget as provided for in Article 314(2) TFEU’. As such, paragraph 4 echoes the procedure 
of Article 314(1) TFEU: ‘(…) each institution shall, before 1 July, draw up estimates of its 
expenditure for the following financial year. The Commission shall consolidate these estimates 
in a draft budget, which may contain different estimates’. 
• In order to ensure budgetary transparency in the area of external action of the Union, Article 8(5) 
tasks the Commission to transmit to the ‘budgetary authority’, i.e. the European Parliament, 
together with the draft general budget of the EU, a working document presenting, in a 
comprehensive way, all expenditure related to the external action of the Union. Arguably, this 
task is best executed if the Commission engages with the High Representative in the consultation 
called for in Article 8(3).  
(iv) Discharge  
• Finally, regarded as an institution for budgetary purposes, the EEAS is subject to the procedures 
regarding the discharge, as provided for in Article 319 TFEU and in Articles 145 to 147 of the 
Financial Regulation. In this context, the High Representative (or delegated officers within the 
EEAS) will provide the European Parliament with all necessary support for the exercise of the 
latter’s right as discharge authority.170 The EEAS is thus required to provide, as appropriate, the 
additional necessary information, including through attendance at meetings of the relevant 
bodies. As noted above, the EP has thus some sway over the administrative budget 
implementation by the Service.  
                                                     
170 Article 8(6) states that ‘(…) the EEAS is obliged to fully cooperate with the institutions involved in the 
discharge procedure (…)’. 
Christophe Hillion & Steven Blockmans 
60 
ARTICLE 9 
External Action Instruments and Programming∗ 
 
 
1. The management of the Union’s external cooperation programmes is under the responsibility of the 
Commission without prejudice to the respective roles of the Commission and of the EEAS in programming as set 
out in the following paragraphs. 
2. The High Representative shall ensure overall political coordination of the Union’s external action, ensuring 
the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the Union’s external action, in particular through the following 
external assistance instruments: 
— the Development Cooperation Instrument , 
— the European Development Fund , 
— the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights , 
— the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument , 
— the Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries , 
— the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation , 
— the Instrument for Stability, regarding the assistance provided for in Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 
1717/2006. 
3. In particular, the EEAS shall contribute to the programming and management cycle for the instruments 
referred to in paragraph 2, on the basis of the policy objectives set out in those instruments. It shall have 
responsibility for preparing the following decisions of the Commission regarding the strategic, multiannual steps 
within the programming cycle:  
(i) country allocations to determine the global financial envelope for each region, subject to the indicative 
breakdown of the multiannual financial framework. Within each region, a proportion of funding will be reserved 
for regional programmes;  
(ii) country and regional strategic papers; 
(iii) national and regional indicative programmes. 
In accordance with Article 3, throughout the whole cycle of programming, planning and implementation of the 
instruments referred to in paragraph 2, the High Representative and the EEAS shall work with the relevant 
members and services of the Commission without prejudice to Article 1(3). All proposals for decisions will be 
prepared by following the Commission’s procedures and will be submitted to the Commission for adoption. 
4. With regard to the European Development Fund and the Development Cooperation Instrument, any 
proposals, including those for changes in the basic regulations and the programming documents referred to in 
paragraph 3, shall be prepared jointly by the relevant services in the EEAS and in the Commission under the 
responsibility of the Commissioner responsible for Development Policy and shall be submitted jointly with the 
High Representative for adoption by the Commission. Thematic programmes, other than the European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation and that part of 
                                                     
∗ Footnote references have been suppressed here but are included in the discussion below. 
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the Instrument for Stability referred to in the seventh indent of paragraph 2, shall be prepared by the 
appropriate Commission service under the guidance of the Commissioner responsible for Development Policy 
and presented to the College of Commissioners in agreement with the High Representative and the other 
relevant Commissioners. 
5. With regard to the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, any proposals, including those for 
changes in the basic regulations and the programming documents referred to in paragraph 3, shall be prepared 
jointly by the relevant services in the EEAS and in the Commission under the responsibility of the Commissioner 
responsible for Neighbourhood Policy and shall be submitted jointly with the High Representative for adoption 
by the Commission. 
6. Actions undertaken under: the CFSP budget; the Instrument for Stability other than the part referred to in the 
seventh indent of paragraph 2; the Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries; communication 
and public Diplomacy actions, and election observation missions, shall be under the responsibility of the High 
Representative/the EEAS. The Commission shall be responsible for their financial implementation under the 
authority of the High Representative in his/her capacity as Vice-President of the Commission. The Commission 
department responsible for this implementation shall be co-located with the EEAS.  
Article 9 regulates the programming of external action instruments. It concerns only procedural issues, 
not policy issues. Whereas the management of the EU’s external cooperation programmes remains 
under the responsibility of the Commission, the HR is under a particular obligation to avail himself of 
these instruments so as to ensure the overall political coordination, the unity, consistency and 
effectiveness of the Union’s external action (Section 1). In the adoption of the external action 
instruments (Section 2), inter-service cooperation is crucial in the programming cycle in order to 
achieve policy coherence (Section 3). Unlike Articles 3 and 5 EEAS Decision, Article 9 does not 
extend to the evaluation of external assistance and financial responsibility, but these issues have been 
foreseen in the subsequently adopted inter-service ‘Working Arrangements’ between the Commission 
and the EEAS (Section 4). 
1. Shared Responsibilities and Objectives 
 
• The reference in Article 27(3) TEU that the EEAS should comprise officials from ‘relevant 
departments’ of the Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council, as well as diplomats 
from the member states, carried the obvious implication that the organisation and structures for 
development cooperation would be influenced by the emergence of the EEAS. In particular, the 
potential disappearance of most of the Commission’s DG Relex and DG Dev171 meant that 
many questions pertaining to the management, programming and implementation of external 
action instruments would be on the table.172 
                                                     
 
171 See Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the 
European External Action Service, OJ 2010 L 201/30, ANNEX, Departments and functions to be transferred 
to the EEAS, 2. Commission (including Delegations): ‘All staff in the departments and functions listed below 
shall be transferred en bloc to the EEAS, except for a limited number of staff mentioned below as exceptions: 
(…) DG RELEX. Exceptions: Staff responsible for the management of financial instruments. (…) External 
Service. Exceptions: Staff responsible for the implementation of financial instruments. (…) DG DEV. Unit 
CI (ACP I: Aid programming and management): Staff responsible for programming.’ 
172 See D. Duke and S. Blockmans, ‘The Lisbon Treaty stipulations on Development Cooperation and the 
Council Decision of 25 March 2010 (Draft) establishing the organisation and functioning of the European 
External Action Service’, EIPA Working Paper 2010/1.  
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• Yet, the negotiations leading up to the adoption of 2010 Council Decision did not have as great 
an effect on the division of external competences as proposed by some of the parties to the 
discussion. This applies to both the ‘Tasks’ of the EEAS (Article 2), in general, and to the 
specific provisions on ‘External action instruments and programming’ (Article 9).173  These 
provisions changed only slightly, in the sense that the respective roles of the Commission and 
the HR/VP were articulated more clearly than in the HR/VP’s proposal of March 2010.174 
• In the context of (business) administration, ‘management’ is the process of dealing with or 
controlling things or people; the responsibility for and control of a company or organisation. 
Management in all business and organisational activities is the act of getting people together to 
accomplish desired goals and objectives using available resources efficiently and effectively. 
Management comprises designing, planning, organising, staffing, leading or directing, and 
controlling an organisation (a group of one or more people or entities) or effort for the purpose 
of accomplishing a goal. 
• According to Article 9(1), the management of the EU’s external cooperation programmes is 
‘under’ the responsibility of the Commission ‘without prejudice to the respective roles of the 
Commission and of the EEAS in programming’. Thus, the Commission retains overall 
responsibility for dealing with and controlling the Union’s external cooperation programmes, 
whereas it shares the role of ‘programming’, i.e. designing, scheduling, or planning the EU’s 
external cooperation programmes (only an element of the wider concept of ‘management’), with 
the EEAS. In short, the basic prescript, namely that during the whole process of planning and 
implementation both parts of the organisation should work together and that all proposals for 
decision have to be prepared through the Commission procedures and submitted to the 
Commission (Article 9(3)), has remained unchanged. 
• In comparison with the HR/VP’s proposal of March 2010, Council Decision 2010/427/EU lays 
down more clearly the obligation (‘shall’) of the HR to ensure the overall political coordination, 
the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the Union’s external action. As such, Article 9 EEAS 
Decision offers an elaboration of the obligation contained in Article 21(3) TEU: in the 
implementation of this obligation, the HR shall avail himself ‘in particular’ of the external 
assistance instruments listed in paragraph 2. Arguably, the obligation of ensuring ‘overall 
political coordination’ by the HR – not the VP – is superimposed on the Commission’s 
responsibility for the management of the EU’s external assistance programmes.175 
• The first phrase of Article 9(2) is almost identical to the formulation of the second sentence of 
Article 26(2) TEU176 but should not be seen as a lex specialis thereof. After all, the primary 
object of Article 26(2) TEU is how the CFSP is to be put into effect. The scope of Article 9(2) 
EEAS Decision is broader as it refers to the Union’s external action writ large. Neither is there a 
link with Article 26(3) TEU, which deals with Union resources, as EU external assistance 
instruments pertaining to the CFSP are dealt with Article 9(6) EEAS Decision. 
• In its contribution to the Union’s external cooperation programmes, the EEAS is expected to 
work towards ensuring that the programmes fulfil the objectives for external action as set out in 
Article 21 TEU, in particular in paragraph (2)(d) thereof,177 and that they respect the objectives 
                                                     
173 Compare Article 9 EEAS Decision to Article 8 of the HR/VP’s proposal of 25 March 2010. 
174 See the EP’s Amendments 131 (on the role of the Commission) and 132 (on the role of the HR/VP), in 
Amendments 76 – 143 of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 1 July 2010 (document 2010/0816(NLE)). 
175 See the discussion under Article 2(1) EEAS Decision, above.  
176 ‘The Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall 
ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union’.  
177 ‘[F]oster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with 
the primary aim of eradicating poverty’.  
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of the Union’s development policy in line with Article 208 TFEU.178 In this context, the EEAS 
should also promote the fulfilment of the objectives of the ‘European Consensus on 
Development’179 and the ‘European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid’.180 
2. Instrumentarium  
• The HR is under a legal obligation to ensure overall political coordination of the Union’s 
external action so as to meet his Treaty obligation to ensure the unity, consistency and 
effectiveness of the Union’s external action, in particular by coordinating the following external 
assistance instruments listed in Article 9(2): 
− the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI),181 
− the European Development Fund (EDF),182 
− the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR),183 
− the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI),184 
− the Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries (ICI),185 
− the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (NSCI),186 
− the Instrument for Stability, regarding the assistance provided for in Article 4 of Regulation 
(EC) No 1717/2006 (IfS).187 
                                                     
178 See Recital 4 of the Preamble to the EEAS Decision. 
179 OJ 2006 C 46/1. 
180 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council — Towards a 
European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (COM(2007) 317 final, not published in the Official Journal. 
181 Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 
establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation, OJ 2006 L 378/41.  
182 Council Regulation No 5 laying down rules relating to calls for and transfers of financial contributions, 
budgetary arrangements and administration of the resources of the Development Fund for the Overseas 
Countries and Territories, OJ 1958 L 681/58.  
183 Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on 
establishing a financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide, OJ 2006 L 
386/1.  
184 Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 laying 
down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, OJ 2006 L 
310/1.  
185 Council Regulation (EC) No 382/2001 of 26 February 2001 concerning the implementation of projects 
promoting cooperation and commercial relations between the European Union and the industrialised 
countries of North America, the Far East and Australasia, OJ 2001 L 57/10. 
186 Council Regulation (Euratom) No 300/2007 of 19 February 2007 establishing an Instrument for Nuclear 
Safety Cooperation, OJ 2007 L 81/1. 
187 Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2006 
establishing an Instrument for Stability, OJ 2006 L 327/1. Article 9(2) EEAS Decision does not pertain to the 
political coordination by the HR when it concerns assistance in response to situations of crisis or emerging 
crisis. The provision only relates to the HR’s political coordination of assistance in the context of ‘stable 
conditions’ for cooperation, i.e. assistance in the pursuit of strengthening the capacity of law enforcement 
and judicial and civil authorities involved in the fight against terrorism and organised crime, including illicit 
trafficking of people, drugs, firearms and explosive materials and in the effective control of illegal trade and 
transit; support for measures to address threats to international transport, energy operations and critical 
infrastructure, including passenger and freight traffic and energy distribution; contributing to ensuring an 
adequate response to sudden major threats to public health, such as epidemics with a potential transnational 
impact; support for risk mitigation and preparedness relating to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 
materials or agents; support for pre- and post-crisis capacity building.  
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• Humanitarian assistance, the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA)188 and financial 
assistance to non-European Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) are not covered by 
Article 9 of the EEAS Decision. The programming and management of these instruments are 
unified and will continue to be managed by the Commission, under the responsibility of DG 
ECHO, DG ELARG, and DG DEVCO respectively. Nevertheless, DG ECHO and DG ELARG 
will consult the EEAS on strategic priorities when preparing the Multiannual Financial 
Framework for the IPA and on IPA programming, through the inter-service consultation 
process.189 
• The Commission Secretariat General and DG BUDG are responsible for the preparation of the 
Multiannual Financial Framework post-2013, in close cooperation with relevant services of the 
Commission and the EEAS. In this context, the EEAS and the relevant Commission services 
have to ensure a coordinated position in relation to any external relations instruments. This also 
relates to changes in the basic regulations and the programming documents referred to in Article 
9(3) EEAS Decision, which will have to be prepared jointly by the relevant services in the EEAS 
and in the Commission: under the responsibility of the Commissioner for European 
Neighbourhood Policy insofar as the ENPI is concerned (Article 9(5), and the Commissioner 
responsible for Development Policy for the EDF and DCI (Article 9(4)). According to the last 
paragraph of Article 9(3) the decisions shall be submitted jointly, with the HR/VP, for adoption 
by the Commission. 
• In view of the next Multi-annual Financial Framework (2014-2020), Article 9(2) will need to be 
amended to take account of the new generation of instruments, including the renamed ‘European 
Neighbourhood Instrument’ and the ‘Partnership Instrument for cooperation with third 
countries’.190 
3. Inter-service Cooperation in the Programming Cycle  
• According to Article 9(3), the EEAS is under a legal obligation (‘shall’) to contribute to the 
programming and management cycle for the instruments referred to in paragraph 2. In doing so, 
the Service shall use the policy objectives set out in those instruments as a basis for its 
contribution. 
• In particular, the responsibility has been bestowed upon the EEAS to prepare Commission 
decisions concerning strategic, multiannual steps within the programming cycle, on three 
                                                     
188 Council Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006 of 17 July 2006 establishing an Instrument for Pre-Accession 
Assistance (IPA), OJ 2006 L 210/82. 
189 SEC(2012)48, Ref. Ares(2012)41133 - 13/01/2012, para. 3.13 (ECHO). For IPA, see para. 3.12: ‘Planning 
and programming of pre-accession assistance is under the responsibility of DG 
ELARG/REGIO/EMPL/AGRI as the case may be. Strategic and multi-annual planning documents will be 
prepared by the lead service of DG ELARG, or DG REGIO/EMPL/AGRI as the case may be. The 
Commission staff in Delegations will be closely associated to the preparation of programmes and projects 
including: needs assessments, project identification, consultation with local stakeholders, donors and EU 
Member States. (…) As regards decentralised management, the responsibility for conferral of management 
powers rests with DG ELARG/EMPL/REGIO/AGRI. The EU Delegations will be responsible for monitoring 
the implementation of decentralised management in their country of responsibility. DG ELARG will 
coordinate with DG REGIO, EMPL and AGRI as regards the components of pre-accession assistance of their 
responsibility, with a view to ensure harmonised and consistent approaches and instructions issued to 
Delegations.’ 
190 See Joint Communication ‘Global Europe: a new approach to financing EU external action’,  COM(2011) 
865 final, Brussels, 7.12.2011; and Foreign Affairs Council, Press Release 11688/12, PRESSE 282, 25 June 
2012. 
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particular counts: ‘(i) country allocations to determine the global financial envelope for each 
region, subject to the indicative breakdown of the multiannual financial framework. Within each 
region, a proportion of funding will be reserved for regional programmes; (ii) country and 
regional strategic papers; (iii) national and regional indicative programmes’. 
• Throughout the entire cycle of programming, planning and implementation of the instruments 
referred to in Article 9(2), the High Representative and the EEAS are under a legally binding 
obligation (‘shall’) to work with the relevant members and services of the Commission,191 
without prejudice to the fact that the EEAS is placed under the authority of the High 
Representative.192 As such, Article 9(3) provides a lex specialis to the duty of sincere 
cooperation between the EU institutions. 
• The implementation of this particular strand of the obligation has been spelled out in the 
‘Working Arrangements between Commission services and the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) in relation to external relations issues’ of 13 January 2012.193 That document 
provides, inter alia, that the Commission services and the EEAS ‘will perform their respective 
tasks throughout the programming and implementation cycle in full transparency, informing and 
consulting each other, sufficiently in advance, on initiatives or announcements that could have 
an impact on each other’s areas of responsibility. This includes an exchange of information on 
preparation of policy and programme documents of both a formal and informal nature. It relates 
to the representation of EU positions vis-à-vis recipient countries or other donors and related 
reporting and feedback.’194  
• As noted above, all proposals for decisions concerning strategic, multiannual steps within the 
programming cycle have to (‘shall’) be prepared jointly by the relevant services in the EEAS and 
in the Commission, by following the Commission’s procedures, and will be submitted to the 
Commission for adoption: under the authority of the Commissioner responsible for 
Neighbourhood Policy for the ENPI (Article 9(5)), and the Commissioner responsible for 
Development Policy for EDF and DCI (Article 9(4), first sentence). Specifics on the inter-
service cooperation are to be found in the ‘Working Arrangements’.195 
• Thematic programmes ‘shall be prepared by the appropriate Commission service under the 
guidance of the Commissioner responsible for Development Policy and presented to the College 
of Commissioners in agreement with the High Representative and the other relevant 
Commissioners’ (Article 9(4), second sentence). In this respect, two observations can be made. 
First, the Commissioner for Development has been given an elevated status when it comes to 
preparing thematic programmes.196 Second, the obligation does not apply to the preparation of 
                                                     
191 See the discussion under Article 3 EEAS Decision, above. 
192 See the discussion under Article 1(3) EEAS Decision, above. 
193 SEC(2012)48, Ref. Ares(2012)41133 - 13/01/2012. As in the context of the discussion of Article 3 EEAS 
Decision, above,  one may again wonder about the legal nature and justiciability of these ‘Working 
arrangements’. See, in this respect, the Court’s judgment in case C-25/94, Commission v. Council (FAO), 
[1996] ECR I-1469, paragraph 49: ‘[T]he Arrangement between the Council and the Commission represents 
fulfilment of that duty of cooperation between the Community and its Member States within the FAO. It is 
clear, moreover, from the terms of the Arrangement, that the two institutions intended to enter into a binding 
commitment towards each other.’ 
194 Ibid., p. 15. 
195 SEC(2012)48, Ref. Ares(2012)41133 - 13/01/2012, para. 3.4. 
196 See Explanatory Memorandum, Council Decision Establishing the organisation and functioning of the 
European External Action Service, 25 March 2010: ‘horizontal Communications on Development Policy will 
be prepared by the relevant Commission services under the guidance of the Commissioner for Development, 
and presented to the Commission in association with the relevant Vice-Presidents and Commissioners.’ 
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thematic programmes under the EIDHR and the NSCI,197 and that part of the IfS referred to in 
Article 9(2).198 Because the ENPI is covered by Article 9(5), and because Article 9(6) covers 
actions undertaken under the CFSP budget, the part of the IfS other than that referred to in 
paragraph 2,199 the ICI,200 press, communication and public diplomacy actions,201 and EIDHR 
election observation missions (EOM),202 one can reason a contrario that the provision in the 
second sentence of Article 9(4) only applies to the preparation of thematic programmes under 
the EDF and DCI. Arguably, this is a rather cumbersome way of legal drafting. 
• The High Representative, and the EEAS which acts in support of the HR, are endowed with the 
responsibility for actions undertaken under the above-mentioned headings in Article 9(6). 
Arguably, the phrase ‘actions undertaken’ goes beyond the scope of preparatory actions referred 
to in the preceding three paragraphs, i.e. actions of a strategic nature, pertaining to multiannual 
steps within the programming cycle. Yet, the responsibility for actions referred to in paragraph 6 
does not encompass the financial implementation of the CFSP budget, the IfS (other than the 
part referred to in paragraph 2), the ICI, communication and public diplomacy actions, and 
election observation missions. It is the Commission which is responsible for this aspect, albeit  – 
usefully  – under the authority of the first Vice-President of the Commission. The Commission 
department responsible for this implementation, i.e. the Foreign Policy Instruments Service 
(FPI), is co-located with the EEAS. 
• According to the ‘Working Arrangements’ on inter-service cooperation between the 
Commission services and the EEAS, ‘[p]roposals for CFSP actions are discussed in relevant 
Council working parties (thematic or geographic working groups or, in the case of civilian 
CSDP missions, the Committee for the Civilian aspects of crisis management CIVCOM). As the 
Commission representative in the relevant Council Working Parties (Relex Counsellors or, in the 
case of CSDP missions, the Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management), the Foreign 
Policy Instrument Service is consulted by the EEAS from an early stage and fully involved in 
discussions on possible CFSP actions. After political agreement by the Political and Security 
Committee to launch a CFSP action, the FPI prepares the necessary budgetary impact statement 
for each CFSP action (containing an estimate of its costs), in consultation with relevant 
Commission services and the EEAS. The Relex Counsellors’ working party endorses the budget 
of the action. Once the Council adopts a CFSP action under Article 28 TEU, this serves as the 
basic act on the basis of which the FPI prepares a Financing Decision on which it consults 
relevant Commission services through accelerated and restricted inter-service consultation. 
Given the nature of these proposals, the HR/VP has an empowerment from the Commission, as a 
Vice-President, to adopt these Commission Financing Decisions. This may be delegated to the 
Director of the FPI. FPI implements these Financing Decisions. Civilian CSDP missions 
deployed on the ground as well as their Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) may 
be requested to provide technical advice, throughout the programming cycle, and on topics that 
fall within their mandate and realm of expertise’.203   
                                                     
197 For specifics on the inter-service cooperation, see the ‘Working Arrangements’, SEC(2012)48, Ref. 
Ares(2012)41133 - 13/01/2012, para. 3.5. 
198 Ibid., para. 3.6 
199 SEC(2012)48, Ref. Ares(2012)41133 - 13/01/2012, para. 3.7. 
200 Ibid., para. 3.9. 
201 Ibid., para. 3.11. 
202 Ibid., para. 3.10. 
203 Ibid., para. 3.8.  
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4. Evaluation of External Assistance and Financial Responsibility  
• The evaluation of external assistance and financial responsibility are topics which are not 
covered by Article 9 EEAS Decision but which get special attention in the inter-service 
‘Working Arrangements’.204  These arrangements prescribe that DGs DEVCO, ELARG, ECHO 
and the FPI are responsible for the evaluation of external assistance under the EU instruments in 
their areas of responsibility,205 and that implementation of operational expenditure can only be 
performed by the Commission.206 
• The evaluation of the results of country, regional and sectoral policies, programmes and 
programming performance is conducted by the evaluation unit of DG DEVCO or DG ELARG. 
The Commission and the EEAS have agreed that it is up to the so-called ‘Group of External 
Relations Commissioners’ to monitor its work through regular reports by the relevant 
Commissioner. Arguably, this Group’s mandate, covering the chain from programming to 
implementation, allows a comprehensive view of EU cooperation in a sector or with a country. 
To ensure coherence on all levels, the ‘Working Arrangements’ foresee that the evaluation unit 
is also the service responsible for evaluation methodology. The reports from evaluations of 
country, regional and sectoral policies, programmes and programming performance will be 
shared with the EEAS and other Commission services.  
                                                     
204 SEC(2012)48, Ref. Ares(2012)41133 - 13/01/2012.  
205 Ibid., para. 3.15. 
206 Ibid., para. 3.16. See also the discussion under Article 8 EEAS Decision. In the former, it is provided that 
the ‘EEAS shall support Commission efforts to exercise its responsibility for ensuring the legality and 
correctness of its operations and sound financial management. In particular, the EEAS shall refrain from 
taking any measure, such as giving instructions to contractors or implementing bodies, on issues which fall 
under Commission competence, in particular those which could have financial implications for the EU 
budget or for the Commission's responsibilities in relation to the EU budget.’ 
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ARTICLE 10 
Security∗ 
 
1. The High Representative shall, after consulting the Committee referred to in point 3 of Section I of Part II of 
the Annex to Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001 adopting the Council’s security regulations, 
decide on the security rules for the EEAS and take all appropriate measures in order to ensure that the EEAS 
manages effectively the risks to its staff, physical assets and information, and that it fulfils its duty of care and 
responsibilities in this regard. Such rules shall apply to all EEAS staff, and all staff in Union Delegations, 
regardless of their administrative status or origin.  
2. Pending the Decision referred to in paragraph 1:  
— with regard to the protection of classified information, the EEAS shall apply the security measures set out in 
the Annex to Decision 2001/264/EC,  
— with regard to other aspects of security, the EEAS shall apply the Commission’s Provisions on Security, as set 
out in the relevant Annex to the Rules of Procedure of the Commission.  
3. The EEAS shall have a department responsible for security matters, which shall be assisted by the relevant 
services of the Member States.  
4. The High Representative shall take any measure necessary in order to implement security rules in the EEAS, 
in particular as regards the protection of classified information and the measures to be taken in the event of a 
failure by EEAS staff to comply with the security rules. For that purpose, the EEAS shall seek advice from the 
Security Office of the General Secretariat of the Council, from the relevant services of the Commission and from 
the relevant services of the Member States.   
Article 10 of the EEAS Decision is simply entitled ‘security’, that is, security rules as they relates to 
both the protection of classified information and (all) other aspects of security within the EEAS, 
applied to all EEAS staff as well as all staff in Union Delegations. The EEAS security rules raise at 
least three important questions: first, whether these rules constitute a specific part of an EU-wide 
security framework (Section 1); second, whether they amount to the best standards in diplomatic 
security (Section 2) and third, how they relate to the new Council rules on classified information 
(Section 3).  
1. EEAS Security Rules: A Specific Part of an EU-wide Security Framework? 
 
• When the EEAS started operating on 1 January 2011 provision was made for the fact that it 
would not by then have adopted its own security rules and that their full adoption by this 
‘functionally autonomous’ body might take some time. In the meantime, Article 10(2) explicitly 
provided that the existing Council rules (at that time, from 2001)207 would apply with regard to 
                                                     
∗ Footnote references have been suppressed here but are included in the discussion below.  
207 Annex to Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001 adopting the Council's security regulations, 
OJ 2001 L 101/ 1.  
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the protection of classified information and the existing Commission rules (also from 2001)208 
would apply with regard to ‘other aspects of security’. From the way it is presented in the EEAS 
Decision this seems like a neat division; in fact it is not. Both measures contain the general 
security rules of the two respective institutions, the Council and the Commission, and overlap to 
a considerable extent. From the manner in which Article 10(2) is phrased it seems that only the 
Council rules apply to the protection of classified information as such and only the Commission 
rules to (all) ‘other aspects of security’.  
• This potentially unclear situation did not last for long because on 15 June 2011 the EEAS 
formally adopted its own security rules as explicitly envisaged in Article 10(1).209 The decision 
lays down the rules for the safety and security of the EEAS and establishes the general 
regulatory framework for managing effectively the risks to staff, physical assets and information, 
and for fulfilling its duty of care. The EEAS security rules are considered equivalent to the 
security rules of the Commission and the 2011 security regulations of the Council.210 They 
replace the application of the Commission rules with regard to the organisation of security in the 
EEAS and the allocation of security tasks within EEAS structures.211 They do not, however, 
cover ‘the protection of classified information’ as such. Since the High Representative has not 
yet adopted specific rules in this regard within the EEAS, the Council rules on the classification 
of documents in the Council security regulation are still applicable.   
• By the time the EEAS adopted its own security rules, the Council had adopted general new 
security rules (in March 2011) and provision could be made for these rules to apply to the 
protection of classified information within the EEAS, until the moment that the High 
Representative adopts specific EEAS rules in this regard. Those rules must in any event be 
equivalent to those set out in the Council rules.212 The 2011 Council security rules themselves 
provide for a wide-reaching system of equivalence of the Council rules among a wide variety of 
institutions (the Commission and the European Parliament) as well as agencies and bodies or 
offices (in any event these include the EEAS, Europol, Eurojust and others) as well as the 
member states. The EEAS security rules explicitly aim to ‘achieve a more coherent, 
comprehensive general framework within the European Union for protecting classified 
information, building on the Council security rules and the Commission security provisions’.213 
The EEAS security rules exemplify the nature of the EEAS as a central policy hub that offers a 
point of contact and channel of coordination and cooperation between national and EU actors, 
rather than as a purely autonomous EU agency or body.214 It comprises Commission and 
Council officials as well as a meaningful presence of nationals from all member states and aims 
to offer an environment in which national diplomatic and intelligence services are willing to 
share and exchange valuable and sensitive information. 
• The Council’s explicit strategy, reflected in its decision, is to obtain the necessary commitment 
from the Commission, the member states, the other EU institutions, agencies, bodies and offices, 
                                                     
208 Annex to Rules of Procedure of the Commission [C(2000) 3614], OJ 2000 L 308/26. See also 
Commission Decision 2001/844/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 29 November 2001 amending its internal Rules of 
Procedure, OJ 2001 L 317/1.  
209 Decision 2011/C 304/05 of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
of 15 June 2011 on the security rules for the European External Action Service, OJ 2011 C 304/7 
(hereinafter: EEAS security rules). 
210 Annex to Council Decision 2011/292/EU of 31 March 2011 on the security rules for protecting EU 
classified information, OJ 2011 L 141/17. 
211 Recital 6 of the EEAS security rules. 
212 Article 3(1) of the EEAS security rules.  
213 Recital 3 of the EEAS security rules. 
214 See dicussion under Article 3 EEAS Decision, above. 
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to comply with its rules and standards in order to protect the interests of the Union and its 
member states. Several declarations appended to the Council Decision make this perfectly clear. 
In particular, ‘the Council and the Commission consider that their respective security rules, and 
the Agreement between the Member States, meeting within the Council, regarding the protection 
of classified information exchanged in the interests of the European Union, together constitute a 
more comprehensive and coherent general framework within the European Union for the 
protection of classified information originating in the Member States, in institutions of the 
European Union or in EU agencies, bodies or offices, or received from third States or 
international organisations.’215 Article 3(1) of the EEAS security rules specifically requires the 
High Representative to adopt rules for protecting classified information that are ‘equivalent’ to 
those set out in Council Decision 2011/292/EU. Yet the High Representative has not (yet) done 
so and at the time of writing (early 2013) it is understood that it is still being worked on and may 
have some supplementary elements (in particular emphasis on support by the services of the 
member states).216 The EEAS is not alone in not (yet) having adopted specific rules on classified 
information equivalent to the new rules of the Council; it seems that the Commission has not yet 
done so either despite being ‘committed’ to applying equivalent security standards for protecting 
European Union Classified Information (hereinafter: EUCI). Subsequent to the adoption of the 
Council security rules at the end of March 2011, the intention was that the Commission would 
adopt new security rules too, explicitly modelled on those of the Council, which would then be 
included as a new annex to its rules of procedure. This is in line with its earlier practice since 
2001 when it systematically modified its own rules in parallel with those of the Council. It is not 
clear why the Commission has not now formally done so. Explicit provision was made for the 
two institutions to consult one another in advance of any further modification of their respective 
security rules.217 Several agencies had in fact already made their own provision for rules of 
confidentiality in advance of the new Council security rules.218 The EEAS came along 
afterwards.  
• EU agencies generally have well-established bilateral information-sharing relationships with 
each other. Information-sharing more generally serves not only for the purposes of priority-
setting and policy-making, albeit in an unstructured manner, but also for the purposes of 
practical operational implementation. The EEAS is embedded in a much broader vision and 
practice of institutional unity. It also supports those satellite bodies that now fall under the 
authority of the High Representative (viz. the European Defence Agency, the European Union 
Satellite Centre, the European Union Institute for Security Studies and the European Security 
and Defence College).  
                                                     
215 Declaration by the Council and the Commission on the protection and handling of classified information, 
Council of the European Union, Addendum to Note from the Antici Group to COREPER / Council on 
Council Decision on the security rules for protecting EU classified information - Draft declarations for the 
Council minutes, 8054/11 ADD 1, Brussels, 23 March 2011, available at 
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/mar/eu-council-classified-information-8054-add1-11.pdf > (last 
visited 31 January 2013) (hereinafter: Declaration by the Council and the Commission on the protection and 
handling of classified information).  
216 The only public information is in paragraph 36 of European External Action Service, Report by the High 
Representative to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, 22 December 2011, available 
at: <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/images/top_stories/2011_eeas_report_cor_+_formatting.pdf> (last visited 31 
January 2013). 
217 Declaration by the Council and the Commission on the protection and handling of classified information, 
cited above.  
218 See, e.g., Rules of Procedure on the Processing and Protection of Personal Data at Eurojust (Text adopted 
unanimously by the college of Eurojust during the meeting of 21 October 2004 and approved by the Council 
on 24 February 2005) OJ 2005 C 68/1. 
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• EU INTCEN, the acronym for the European Union Intelligence Analysis Centre, acts as the 
intelligence hub of the EEAS.219 In 2011, the Situation Centre (SitCen), which was located 
within the Council of Ministers, was renamed as EU INTCEN and structurally integrated within 
the EEAS. EU INTCEN produces all source intelligence assessments aimed to provide the 
Council with high quality information on public security. Traditionally, SitCen covered both 
external and internal security and the fact that EU INTCEN is now part of the EEAS means that 
the latter is gradually becoming a more robust and central element in the EU’s internal-external 
security nexus. The EU INTCEN is further part of the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity 
(SIAC), which combines civilian intelligence (EU INTCEN) and military intelligence (EUMS 
INT DIR). The EEAS, like certain other EU agencies (Europol, Frontex), must be distinguished 
from intelligence agencies at the level of the member states themselves since none of the EU 
actors have ‘special powers’ to collect information, such as the powers to intercept 
communications, conduct covert surveillance, use secret informants, etc. Nonetheless, a very 
important similarity between national intelligence agencies and the EU actors, including the 
EEAS, is that they receive, produce and disseminate information, including personal data and 
classified information. They analyse and disseminate information – on threats to internal security 
or other interests – to a broad variety of actors, including policy- makers andother executive 
bodies. They perform these functions both within the territory of the EU and in its relations with 
third countries and international organisations.220 International agreements concerning the 
protection of classified information, concluded between the Union and third parties, are 
applicable to the EEAS. The EEAS is in fact listed as one of the entities that form ‘the EU’.221 It 
can be expected that in future agreements between the Union and third countries on the security 
of classified information, which are negotiated under the authority of the High Representative, 
the EEAS will be by default included as one of the EU entities to which the agreement 
applies.222 
2.  EEAS Security Rules: Best Standards in Diplomatic Security?   
• Article 1 of the EEAS security rules provides that they apply to all EEAS staff, including 
officials and other servants, seconded national experts and local agents, and to all staff in EU 
Delegations. The High Representative ensures consistency and the application of the security 
rules, including security inspections (Article 11). S/he adopts more detailed measures for 
implementation on recommendation by a Security Committee (Article 9(6)) composed of 
national experts and representatives of the General Secretariat of the Council and the 
Commission. Article 2 envisages that security risks shall be managed as a process and ‘in line 
with the concept of defence in depth’. This approach to security risk management adopts classic 
                                                     
219 It produces around 200 strategic situation assessment and around 50 special reports and briefings [Joint 
answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission on 16 August 
2012 in reply to written parliamentary questions : E-006018/12 , E-006020/12]. 
220 Wils and Vermeulen, ‘Parliamentary Oversight of Security and Intelligence Agencies in the European 
Union,’ Study for the European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies (2011).  
221 See Article 3 of the Agreement between the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation and the 
European Union on the protection of classified information, OJ 2012, L 229/2.  
222 Up to now, there are 12 EU "Security of Information Agreements" in place, the first was signed in 2003. 
Others are being negotiated. The two most recent ones were concluded with Australia (13 January 2010) and 
Russia (1 June 2010) before the EEAS was created. As shown in the previous footnote, there are permanent 
security agreements with other international organisations (3 and 1 under negotiation) as well as a permanent 
administrative arrangement with the UN, allowing the exchange of EUCI classified at the ‘restricted’ level 
only. See, Council of the European Union, Note from General Secretariat of the Council to Delegations, 
Exchange of EUCI with third states and international organisations, 12619/11, Brussels, 7 July 2011.  
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‘best practices’ strategies common in highly networked and technologically driven 
environments. For classified information security management as a process means that it shall be 
protected ‘throughout its life cycle’. As we have seen the EEAS has not yet adopted its own 
rules for protecting classified information equivalent to those of the Council. The Council’s 2011 
security rules apply beyond CFSP to all information classified ‘in the interests of the Union’. 
This now seems to  apply also to the EEAS, whose work is not limited to foreign and security 
policy but covers the ‘overall political coordination of the Union’s external action’ including, for 
instance, development cooperation, neighbourhood and partnership policy, cooperation with 
industrialised countries, and nuclear safety cooperation.223 
• Article 4 of the EEAS security rules addresses physical security for the protection of classified 
information, as well as staff and visitors. Article 5 deals with personnel security clearance, which 
is the common term for eligibility for access to classified information. Security clearance is 
required for access to ‘TRÈS SECRET/TOP SECRET’, ‘SECRET’ or ‘CONFIDENTIEL’ texts, 
in accordance with the general EU rules.224 It is granted only to those for whom an appropriate 
personnel security background investigation has been completed by their home country's 
intelligence service. Article 6 specifically addresses security of communication and information 
systems and sets out requirements that the rules on the protection of classified information225 
will have to meet. These rules will further have to provide for security awareness and training226 
and for consequences of security breaches.227 
• A Managing Directorate for the issues of administration, personnel, budget, security and 
information systems and communications operating within the EEAS is managed by Patrick 
Child under the supervision of the Chief Operating Officer, which shall ensure that appropriate 
physical and organisational measures are in place for the security and safety of staff and visitors, 
physical assets and information in all EEAS premises.228  
• Article 9 sets out the organisation of security in the EEAS, which is the responsibility of the 
Security Directorate (Article 9(4)). In addition to the internal Security Directorate (MDR B – 
Security – Director: Frans Potuyt), which consists of EEAS officials and is at the disposal of the 
High Representative, Article 9(6) establishes a Security Committee, which is composed of 
national experts and representatives of the General Secretariat of the Council and the 
Commission. The Security Committee is not formally part of the bureaucracy of the EEAS, but 
again exemplifies EEAS’ intention to institutionalise close cooperation between member states, 
the Council and the Commission. It makes recommendations to the High Representative on the 
implementation of the security rules (Article 1(6)) and the High Representative ‘shall seek its 
advice’ on any security matter (Article 9(6)). A first meeting of the EEAS Security Committee 
was held on 21 September 2011.229 
• Article 10 deals with the security of CSDP missions and EU Special Representatives. The 
responsibility lies with the head of mission or special representative pursuant to the rules in the 
decision establishing the mission. 
                                                     
223 See Article 9(2) EEAS Decision and Article 3(1) of the EEAS security rules.  
224 See also the discussion under Article 11 EEAS Decision, below.  
225 Article 3(1) of the EEAS security rules.  
226 Article 7 of the EEAS security rules. 
227 Article 8 of the EEAS security rules. 
228 Article 9(3) of the EEAS security rules.  
229 Paragraph 36 of European External Action Service, Report by the High Representative to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission, 22 December 2011, available at: 
<http://www.eeas.europa.eu/images/top_stories/2011_eeas_report_cor_+_formatting.pdf > (last visited 31 
January 2013).  
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• Article 10(3) of the EEAS Decision stipulates that the competent services of the member states 
shall assist the EEAS Security Directorate. In contrast to some types of cooperation set out in the 
EEAS Decision, this assistance is not reciprocal.230 The EEAS Security Directorate cooperates 
very closely with the relevant services in the Council Secretariat and the Commission. 
• Article 10(4) of the EEAS Decision mandates the High Representative to take the necessary 
measures to protect classified information. It should be read in combination with Article 3(1) of 
the EEAS security rules (see above). The continuing absence of specific EEAS rules on the 
protection of EUCI should not distract from the high relevance of the information created and 
shared by the EEAS to the Union’s overall use and protection of EUCI. Most classified 
documents relate to the Common Foreign and Security Policy231 and a significant number are 
received by the Council from the Commission and the EEAS. Furthermore, Council documents 
are in principle distributed to all members of the Council, the Commission and the EEAS and 
their relevant administrative services, which have to ensure that access is granted only to 
individuals with a need to know and security clearance if appropriate. Article 10(4) of the EEAS 
Decision is another example of how much the EEAS is located equidistant between the 
Commission, the Council and the member states: ‘the EEAS shall seek advice from the Security 
Office of the General Secretariat of the Council, from the relevant services of the Commission 
and from the relevant services of the Member States.’ Moreover, the future EEAS rules on the 
protection of EUCI can be expected to apply to Union delegations and missions. 
3. EEAS Application of the Council’s Rules on EUCI: Equivalence with Pitfalls? 
 
• The EEAS Decision still refers to the 2001 security rules of the Council. However, as we have 
already seen above, after the EEAS was established and operational, in March 2011 the Council 
adopted the next generation of security rules and formally introduced EUCI. These new security 
rules are much more far reaching in terms of scope and breadth of application than their 2001 
counterpart. From 2011 the justifications for classifying documents include in general terms ‘the 
interests of the European Union’ as well as those of ‘one or more of the Member States’. The EU 
now has marked out a classification system that applies across the broad spectrum of all its 
activities with no special mention or position given to the CFSP anymore. The adoption of 
EEAS specific rules on the protection of classified information232 are required under the 
principle of equivalence to reflect the new Council security rules from 2011. In any event, they 
now apply fully in the EEAS context. 
• A balancing exercise needs to be performed between the interests of the EU or of the policy area 
in secrecy and  the need for classification and the interests of the public in transparency. But no 
provision is made for this balancing exercise to be carried out by the person deciding on the 
classification status of a particular document. Because of the way the classification system 
works, this person will not only be an EU official but can also be an official of a member state or 
of a third state or of another international organisation. This is due to the principle of originator 
control. This principle, abbreviated as ORCON, is deeply interwoven in the EU classification 
rules and means that the originator of a document, even if circulated in the EU context, retains 
control over what happens to its classification status. The principle of originator control allows 
originating governments or agencies/institutions to retain control over the declassification of 
information (if it is classified) or its release to non- governmental parties (if it is not). The 
                                                     
230 See discussion under Article 3 EEAS Decision, above. 
231 General Secretariat of the Council, Reply to Written Question E-004374/2012 put by Martin Ehrenhauser 
(NI), Doc. 10684/12 PE-QE 226, 4 June 2012. 
232 See Article 3(1) of the EEAS security rules.  
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ORCON rule thus eliminates the ability of states/agencies/international organisations to make 
their own judgments about the wisdom of releasing shared information. The requirement to 
consult the author (the originator) before granting public access or declassifying is deeply 
embedded within the Council’s rules but also features in several places in the access to 
documents legislation from 2001.233  
• Moreover, the principle of derivative classification means that the person classifying a new 
document who extracts parts  of an old classified document (from whatever source) for use in a 
new document will generally classify the new document at the highest level of classification of 
the old document, irrespective of whether the particular piece of information re-used actually 
justifies that. Both these practices can lead to over-classification, which means essentially 
unnecessary classification or unnecessarily high classification, to an accumulated culture of 
secrecy within a bureaucracy. As of yet, there is  no information available  in the public domain 
as to the numbers of classified documents created by the EEAS nor received by it from other 
(internal and external) sources, nor the degree of its classified information sharing. 
• The main pitfalls of the system of information sharing of classified information in the EU 
context can be summarised as follows. First of all, information sharing and exchange can only 
go as far as member states allow it to go. Agencies, including the EEAS, have limited powers to 
make member states, as well as other actors, share information and experience difficulties in 
obtaining sufficient information.234 The EEAS may be comparatively advantaged by the fact that 
‘at least one-third’ of the EEAS staff directly comes from the member states.235 A pilot project 
for local exchange of classified information is being developed in cooperation with member 
states. For the new system to become operational security approvals at national level will have to 
be put in place.236 
• Secondly, in many cases sensitive information cannot be shared among agencies. Member states 
or other (international) actors remain ‘owners’ of the information and it is only with the 
permission of the originator that this information can be shared. Classification and 
declassification are the monopoly of the respective institutions and bodies. Until very recently 
there was no procedure – or practice – of ‘declassification’. Now the Council has issued 
guidelines in this regard and the first ‘declassification’ decisions are emerging.237 The guidelines 
apply mutatis mutandis to the EEAS.  
• Information is shared among many sources (national and supranational; internal and external; 
private and public) and the information thus shared tends to be a commingling of both internal 
                                                     
233 See, Article 4(4) and Article 9(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
documents, OJ 2001 L 145/43. 
234 See also, House of Lords, European Union Committee, ‘Europol: coordinating the fight against serious 
and organised crime’, 29th Report of Session 2007-08, Report with Evidence, published 12 November 2008; 
M. Busuioc, D. Curtin and M. Groenleer, ‘Agency growth between autonomy and accountability: the 
European Police Office as a ‘living institution’’ (2011) 18 Journal of European Public Policy, 848-867 and 
M. Busuioc, M. Groenleer and J. Trondal (eds.), The agency phenomenon in the European Union: 
Emergence, institutionalisation and everyday decision-making (Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 
2012). 
235 Article 6(9) of the EEAS Decision.  
236 Paragraph 19 of European External Action Service, Report by the High Representative to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission, 22 December 2011, available at: 
<http://www.eeas.europa.eu/images/top_stories/2011_eeas_report_cor_+_formatting.pdf> (last visited 31 
January 2013). 
237 Council Note for the Security Committee, Guidelines on downgrading and declassifying Council 
documents, Brussels, 2 September 2011, available at < http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/nov/eu-
council-sec-cttee-declassifying-docs-md-36-11.pdf> (last visited 31 January 2013).  
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and external security aspects. What is more, how exactly and what information is being utilised 
and in what manner is not at all straightforward and serves a variety of different purposes, 
ranging from priority-setting and policy-making to actual operational implementation. There is a 
certain level of dislocation in the operational function of information, affected by the overall 
fragmentation characteristic of this area, more broadly. Ultimately, it makes it impossible to 
independently verify/check the reliability of such information. The problem is compounded at 
the EU level because the issue of security and classification rules is regulated purely at the level 
of the internal organisation rules of individual institutions.  
• The absence of overall external mechanisms acting as a check over a growing body of ‘secret’ 
information is highly problematic at  EU level, given the growing scope for secrecy and the 
likelihood of over-classification that flow from the benefits that can be derived from the use of 
secrecy and the principles of originator control and derivative classification.238 A new external 
mechanism that is under development in this regard is the ongoing negotiation by the EEAS with 
the European Parliament of a specific inter-institutional agreement to enable the EEAS to give 
the EP access to classified information. In effect, this is part of a wider strategy to engage the EP 
as a security actor alongside the other EU security actors, and may reduce the ability of the EP to 
perform its public accountability function fully and with publicity. 
 
                                                     
238 See also D. Curtin, ‘Top Secret Europe,’ inaugural lecture, University of Amsterdam, 2011, that attempts 
to launch a broader debate. Available at <http://oratiereeks.nl/upload/pdf/PDF-5066weboratie_Curtin.pdf 
(last visited 31 January 2013). 
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ARTICLE 11 
Access to Documents, Archives and Protection∗ 
 
 
1. The EEAS shall apply the rules laid down in Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
documents. The High Representative shall decide on the implementing rules for the EEAS.  
2. The Executive Secretary-General of the EEAS shall organise the archives of the service. The relevant archives 
of the departments transferred from the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission shall be 
transferred to the EEAS.  
3. The EEAS shall protect individuals with regard to the processing of their personal data in accordance with 
the rules laid down in Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 
December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the 
Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data. The High Representative shall decide 
on the implementing rules for the EEAS. 
 
Article 11 relates to access to documents, archives and data protection. As Article 11(2) regarding the 
EEAS archives appears to be rather self-explanatory, the following focuses on access to documents 
and data protection only. First, the application of the principle of transparency to the EEAS will be 
analysed on the basis of the applicable decision of the High Representative and of existing practice 
and case-law on access to documents containing information regarding foreign policy matters, mainly 
with respect to the application of Regulation 1049/2001 (section 1). Second, the application of the 
principle of the protection of personal data to the EEAS will be analysed on the basis of the applicable 
decision of the High Representative and existing case law and practice on personal data protection, 
mainly regarding Regulation 45/2001, and some reflections will be offered on the difficult balancing 
act between those two principles in the light of the European Court of Justice’s judgment in Bavarian 
Lager (section 2). 
1. The EEAS and the Principle of Transparency  
• Article 11(1) of the EEAS Decision provides for Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European 
Parliament and the Council regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and 
Commission documents239 to apply to the EEAS.240 Recital 7 in the preamble to that Regulation 
further notes that it applies to the CFSP.   
                                                     
∗ Footnote references have been suppressed here but are included in the discussion below. 
239 OJ 2001 L145/43.  
240 Nevertheless, the Commission has suggested that Article 3 of the Regulation should be amended to 
include a point 3, defining ‘institutions’ as ‘institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union, 
including the European External Action Service’: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, 
Council and Commission documents, COM(2011) 137 final, 5. 
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• Article 4(1)(a) of the Regulation determines that institutions are to refuse access to a document 
where disclosure would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public 
security, defence and military matters, and international relations, as well as the financial, 
monetary or economic policy of the Union or a member state.  
• Documents affecting public security, defence and military matters also constitute the category of 
‘sensitive documents’. These originate from the institutions or the agencies established by them, 
from member states, third countries or international organisations, and are classified as ‘TRÈS 
SECRET/TOP SECRET’, ‘SECRET’ or ‘CONFIDENTIEL’ in accordance with the rules of the 
institution concerned.241  
• The Regulation does not contain any specific conditions or limitations applicable to the public 
access to documents in the sphere of the CFSP, which can be found in other documents, notably 
in Council Decision 2011/292/EU of 31 March 2011 on the security rules for protecting EU 
classified information.242 It was noted earlier that pending the adoption by the High 
Representative of equivalent rules for protecting classified information, the EEAS is to apply 
mutatis mutandis those security rules of the Council, and the High Representative is to take all 
necessary measures to implement those rules in the EEAS.243  
• On 19 July 2011, the High Representative adopted Decision 2011/C 243/08 on the rules 
regarding access to documents.244 In accordance with that Decision, any citizen of the Union or 
any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a member state, is to have a 
right of access to EEAS documents according to the principles, conditions and limits laid down 
in Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 and the specific provisions laid down in the Decision. This right 
of access concerns documents held by the EEAS, namely, documents drawn up or received by it 
and in its possession.245 
• The European Court of Justice appears to be restrained in its review of decisions of institutions 
refusing access to documents on the basis of public interest. See, for example, Sison:  
o the Council must be recognised as ‘enjoying a wide discretion for the purpose of 
determining whether the disclosure of documents relating to the fields covered by 
those exceptions could undermine the public interest’; and  
o ‘the Community Court’s review of the legality of such a decision must therefore be 
limited to verifying whether the procedural rules and the duty to state reasons have 
                                                     
 
241 Article 9(1) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. See also the discussion under Article 10 EEAS Decision, 
above. 
242 OJ 2011 L141/17. That decision repealed and replaced Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001 
adopting the Council's security regulations, OJ 2001 L101/1, as last amended by Council Decision 
2007/438/EC of 18 June 2007 amending Decision 2001/264/EC adopting the Council’s security regulations, 
OJ 2007 L164/24. 
243 Article 3(1) of Decision 2011/C 304/05 of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy of 15 June 2011 on the security rules for the European External Action Service, OJ 2011 C 
304/7. See the discussion under Article 10 EEAS Decision, above. 
244 Decision 2011/C 243/08 of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
of 19 July 2011 on the rules regarding access to documents, OJ 2011 C 243/16.  
245 Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/C 243/08. Any natural or legal person not residing, or not having their 
registered office, in one of the member states is to enjoy the same right of access to EEAS documents, 
subject to the same principles, conditions and limits, and on the same terms, with the exception of the right to 
make a complaint to the European Ombudsman (Article 1(2)). 
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been complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated, and whether there 
has been a manifest error of assessment or a misuse of powers’.246  
• The General Court too has by and large been deferential and restrained in its review of the 
reliance on Article 4(1)(a) by other institutions.247 More recently, however, the General Court 
has appeared to be willing to conduct a very thorough review.248 A notable example in that 
regard is the In ‘t Veld case, which concerned an opinion of the Council’s Legal Service, issued 
in the context of the adoption of the Council decision authorising the opening of negotiations, on 
behalf of the EU, for an international agreement between the EU and the USA in order to make 
available to the US Treasury Department financial messaging data to prevent and combat 
terrorism and terrorist financing. That opinion was, in essence, concerned with the legal basis of 
that decision and with the respective competences of the EU and the then EC:249 
o since the choice of the legal basis rests on objective factors and does not fall within the 
discretion of the institution, any divergence of opinions on that subject could not be 
equated with a difference of opinion between the institutions as to matters which 
relate to the substance of the agreement.  
o the mere fear of disclosing a disagreement within the institutions regarding the legal 
basis of a decision authorising the opening of negotiations on behalf of the EU was 
not a sufficient basis for concluding that the protected public interest in the field of 
international relations may be undermined.250  
o with the exception of those elements of the requested document that concern the 
specific content of the envisaged agreement or the negotiating directives, the Council 
had not shown how, specifically and actually, wider access to that document would 
have undermined the public interest in the field of international relations, and partially 
annulled the contested decision of refusal of access.251  
o the Council could therefore not reasonably rely on the general consideration that a 
threat to a protected public interest may be presumed in a sensitive area, in particular 
concerning legal advice given during the negotiation process for an international 
agreement.252   
o  ‘the public interest in the transparency of the decision-making process would become 
meaningless if, as the Commission proposes, it were to be taken into account only in 
those cases where the decision-making process has come to an end’.253   
                                                     
246 Case C-266/05 P Sison v Council [2007] ECR I-1233, paragraphs 33–34.  
247 See, for example, Case T-264/04 WWF European Policy Programme v Council [2007] ECR II-911. 
248 See, for example, Case T-59/09 Germany v Commission [2012] ECR II-0000; Case T-465/09 Ivan 
Jurašinović v Council, judgment of 14 February 2012, nyr; and Case T-63/10 Ivan Jurašinović v Council 
judgment of 3 October 2012, nyr . 
249 Case T-529/09 In 't Veld v Council, judgment of 4 May 2012, nyr, para 26. The Council’s appeal to the 
judgment is currently pending before the ECJ: Case C-350/12 P Council v  In 't Veld.  
250 In 't Veld, paragraphs 47-50.  
251 In 't Veld, paragraphs 57-60. 
252 In 't Veld, paragraphs 71-74. 
253 In 't Veld, paragraphs 100-101.  
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2. The EEAS and Data Protection  
• Regulation (EC) 45/2001254 does not cover activities that wholly fall within the scope of the 
CFSP. Nevertheless, Article 3(1), which provides that the Regulation is to apply ‘to the 
processing of personal data by all Community institutions and bodies insofar as such processing 
is carried out in the exercise of activities all or part of which fall within the scope of Community 
law’,255 does seem to imply that activities that are only partly within the CFSP are covered by 
the Regulation. At any rate, the status of the right to data protection as a fundamental right 
enshrined in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU implies that it applies 
throughout the Union legal order, including in the CFSP.   
• On 8 December 2011, the High Representative adopted a decision on the rules regarding data 
protection,256 which lays down the implementing rules concerning Regulation (EC) 45/2001 as 
regards the EEAS.257 
• Regulation (EC) 45/2001 contains no reference to the possibility of disclosure of personal data 
for reasons of transparency. Conversely, Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 provides 
that the institutions are to refuse access to a document where disclosure would undermine the 
protection of ‘privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with 
Community legislation regarding the protection of personal data’. 
• The European Court of Justice had the chance to clarify the relationship between Regulation 
(EC) 45/2001 and Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 in Bavarian Lager. That case concerned the 
Commission’s decision to reject, on the basis of Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001, 
the request by Bavarian Lager for access to the full minutes of a meeting of 11 October 1996, 
after which the Commission withdrew a procedure for failure to fulfill obligations brought 
against the United Kingdom regarding a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative 
restriction on imports of beer contrary to what is now Article 34 TFEU: 
o by limiting the application of the exception under Article 4(1)(b) to situations in which 
the privacy or  integrity of the individual would be infringed for the purposes of 
Article 8 of the ECHR and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, 
without taking into account the legislation of the Union concerning the protection of 
personal data, particularly Regulation (EC) 45/2001, the General Court had 
disregarded the wording of Article 4(1)(b), which is ‘an indivisible provision and 
requires that any undermining of privacy and the integrity of the individual must 
always be examined and assessed in conformity with the legislation of the Union 
concerning the protection of personal data, and in particular with Regulation No 
45/2001’.258  
 
                                                     
254 Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and 
bodies and on the free movement of such data, OJ 2001 L 8/1.  
255 Emphasis added.  
256 Decision 2012/C 308/07 of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
of 8 December 2011 on the rules regarding data protection, OJ 2012 C 308/8. 
257 Pursuant to Article 24(8) of Regulation (EC) 45/2001, which provides for further implementing rules 
concerning the Data Protection Officer to be adopted by each Community institution or body. 
258 Case C-28/08 P Commission v Bavarian Lager [2010] ECR I-6055, paragraphs 57-59. 
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o Where a request based on Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 seeks to obtain access to 
documents including personal data, the provisions of Regulation (EC) 45/2001 
become applicable in their entirety.  
 
o By requiring that, in respect of the five persons present at the meeting who had not 
given their express consent to disclosure, Bavarian Lager establish the necessity for 
those personal data to be transferred, the Commission complied with the provisions of 
Article 8(b) of Regulation (EC).  
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ARTICLE 12  
Immovable Property 
 
 
1. The General Secretariat of the Council and the relevant Commission services shall take all necessary 
measures so that the transfers referred to in Article 7 can be accompanied by the transfers of the Council 
and Commission buildings necessary for the functioning of the EEAS. 
2. The terms on which immovable property is made available to the EEAS central administration and to the 
Union Delegations shall be decided on jointly by the High Representative and the General Secretariat of 
the Council and the Commission, as appropriate. 
  
It was not only the personnel of the relevant Council and Commission departments that were 
transferred 259 but also the buildings required for the functioning of the EEAS. As with Article 7, to 
which it refers, Article 12 deals with the transitional arrangements that were needed for this transfer of 
immovable property. Bringing together staff from eight different buildings in Brussels was one of the 
first priorities of the HR/VP.260 
Article 12(2) refers to the terms on which immovable property was to be made available to the EEAS 
central administration and to the Union Delegations: these had to be decided on jointly by the HR/VP 
and the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission, as appropriate. Indeed, at the time the 
Decision was adopted, a final arrangement had not been made. Originally, the expectation was that the 
EEAS would be based in the Commission’s Charlemagne building but the building was thought to be 
too small and would take too long to renovate. The HR/VP preferred to rent the Council’s Lex 
building but was rebuffed. In October 2010 she chose the Axa/triangle building.261 
It is worth mentioning, in passing, that the ‘functioning of the EEAS’ included those specific tasks 
falling to the crisis management bodies262 which, due to the nature of their tasks, require a specific 
security environment. As a consequence, they were not transferred to the new premises referred to 
above.  
                                                     
259 See commentary of Article 7, above.  
260 House of Lords Select Committee on The European Union, Evidence Session with Baroness Ashton of 
Upholland, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Vice President of the European 
Commission, United Kingdom,14 June 2011, p. 8.  
261 A. Rettman, Ashton chooses €12-million-a-year EU headquarters, Euobserver, 27 October 2010, 
http://euobserver.com/institutional/31140. 
262 See Article 4(3) EEAS Decision. 
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ARTICLE 13 
 
Final and General Provisions 
 
1. The High Representative, the Council, the Commission and the Member States shall be responsible for 
implementing this Decision and shall take all measures necessary in furtherance thereof.  
2. The High Representative shall submit a report to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission 
on the functioning of the EEAS by the end of 2011. That report shall, in particular, cover the implementation of 
Article 5(3) and (10) and Article 9.  
3. By mid-2013, the High Representative shall provide a review of the organisation and functioning of the EEAS, 
which will cover inter alia the implementation of Article 6(6), (8) and (11). The review shall, if necessary, be 
accompanied by appropriate proposals for the revision of this Decision. In that case, the Council shall, in 
accordance with Article 27(3) TEU, revise this Decision in the light of the review by the beginning of 2014.  
4. This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption. The provisions on financial management and 
recruitment shall take effect once the necessary amendments to the Staff Regulations, the CEOS and the 
Financial Regulation, as well as the amending budget, have been adopted. To ensure a smooth transition, the 
High Representative, the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission shall enter into the necessary 
arrangements, and they shall undertake consultations with the Member States.  
5. Within one month after the entry into force of this Decision, the High Representative shall submit to the 
Commission an estimate of the revenue and expenditure of the EEAS, including an establishment plan, in order 
for the Commission to present a draft amending budget.  
6. This Decision shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. 
 
The last article of the EEAS Decision has a twofold function: first, it identifies the steps needed, and 
the actors responsible for implementing the Decision (Section 1) and second, it calls for the latter’s 
review and opens the way for its adaptation, ‘if necessary’ (Section 2). 
1. Implementing the EEAS Decision 
 
• Paragraph 4 of Article 13 foresees that the EEAS Decision enters into force on the day of its 
adoption. Full implementation nevertheless required several preliminary steps, most notably the 
revision of the Staff and Financial Regulations.263 Moreover, in line with paragraph 5 (and 
Article 8(4)), the HR submitted an estimate of the revenue and expenditure of the Service to the 
Commission, so as to modify the EU budget and to provide the EEAS with a start-up budget 
(paragraph 5).264 The required transitional arrangements were thus entered into, while the above-
                                                     
263 Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 1080/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
November 2010 amending the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities and the 
Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of those Communities, OJ 2010 L 311/1Regulations (EU, 
EURATOM) No 1081/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 amending 
Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general 
budget of the European Communities, as regards the European External Action Service, OJ 2010 L 311/9. 
See the discussions under Articles 6 and 8 EEAS Decision, above.  
264 European Parliament resolution of 20 October 2010 on Council's position on Draft amending budget No 
6/2010 of the European Union for the financial year 2010, Section II - European Council and Council; 
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mentioned Regulations were duly amended, all with the approval of the European Parliament. 
The completion of final negotiations on the EEAS Decision and the adoption of the three 
flanking measures in barely six months’ time triggered one insider to call it a ‘Guinness record 
for speed’.265 But, as noted above, the speedy compromise has come at a price: EU institutions 
and member states made sure to keep their influence over the new Service.266 
• Paragraph 1 of Article 13 stipulates that the implementation of the EEAS Decision is the 
responsibility not only of the High Representative, but also of the Commission, the Council and 
the member states; each of them being bound to take all necessary measures to that effect. That 
the Commission, the Council and the member states should be mentioned in this list is 
unsurprising. The organisation and the functioning of the EEAS were from the outset conditional 
upon each of these actors taking a whole series of practical steps, e.g. for the transfer of staff 
(Article 7) and buildings (Article 12), as well as the additional measures evoked in the previous 
paragraph.  
• What is remarkable, however, is that the European Parliament is not explicitly included in the 
list of Article 13(1). Not so much because the Parliament had the right to be consulted in the 
process of adoption of the Council Decision (as per Article 27(3) TEU), but more in view of its 
essential role in allowing for the full implementation thereof. It is recalled that neither the staff 
provisions, nor the budget-related articles of the EEAS Decision could enter into force without 
the preliminary consent of the Parliament. Moreover, the Parliament’s budgetary powers entail a 
significant influence on the financial assets and thus operational capability of the Service.267 
Including the Parliament in the list of actors responsible for implementing the EEAS Decision 
would not only have reflected the reality, it could also have increased the sense of ownership and 
thus of commitment by the Parliament towards the smooth functioning of the Service.   
• Indeed, in emphasising that the actors responsible for the EEAS Decision’s implementation 
‘shall take all measures necessary in furtherance thereof’, Article 13(1) establishes an obligation 
of good faith, which echoes the provisions of Article 3 EEAS Decision on cooperation. Included 
in a CFSP act, such an obligation is admittedly limited in its normative effects, in view of the 
non-contamination principle of Article 40(1) TEU, the declarations to the Lisbon Treaty and the 
limited jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in this area, as evoked earlier.268 However, 
as it arguably encapsulates the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU 
and Article 13(2) TEU, the obligation referred to in Article 13(1) is not as toothless as it might 
initially look.     
2.  Reviewing the Implementation of the Decision 
 
• Given the originality of the EEAS in the EU institutional landscape, and the ambiguity of the 
provisions governing its organisation and functioning, it is unsurprising that the monitoring of 
the Decision’s implementation, and its possible revision, were deemed necessary.  
(Contd.)                                                                  
Section III - Commission; Section X - European External Action Service (13475/2010 – C7-0262/2010 – 
2010/2094(BUD)).  
265 P. Skytte Christoffersen, ‘A Guinness Record for Speed’, in E. Drieskens and L. Van Schaik (eds.), ‘The 
European External Action Service: Preparing for Success’, 1 Clingendael Paper (2010). 
266 See the discussion under Articles 2, 7, 8 and 12 EEAS Decision, above. 
267 See the discussion under Article 8 EEAS Decision, above.  
268 See discussion under Article 3 EEAS Decision, above.  
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• Thus, paragraph 2 envisages that by the end of 2011, just a year after the EEAS actually began 
operating (see Article 7(1) EEAS Decision), the HR had to submit a report on its functioning, 
with a particular focus on the sensitive provisions on HR and Commission’ instructions to Heads 
of Delegations, the role of EU delegations in consular protection of Union’s citizens, and 
external action instruments programming. This report was submitted to the European Parliament, 
the Council and the Commission on 22 December 2011.269   
• More generally, Article 13(3) foresees that the organisation and functioning of the Service 
should be reviewed by mid-2013. Such a Review, which is the basis of the current exercise, is to 
cover, notably, the EEAS’ composition and recruitment, in particular the geographical and 
gender balance of its staff, as well as member states’ representation therein, and formulate 
proposals for correcting possible imbalances (Article 6(6)).270 The same paragraph adds that the 
Review shall include, ‘if necessary’, appropriate proposals for the revision of the Decision. Such 
revision would then take place ‘by the beginning of 2014’, through the procedure used for its 
adoption, namely Article 27(3) TEU.  
• While the review process is underway, it is unclear whether a fully-fledged revision will be 
proposed. The protracted negotiations resulting from the demanding procedural requirements for 
the adoption of the EEAS Decision, and the significant role played therein by the European 
Parliament, may well dissuade certain member states from such a revision. The temptation might 
be to limit the review process to the formulation of recommendations which might become 
effective ‘à droit constant’, i.e. by using the interpretative room in the existing provisions 
without amending Council Decision 2010/427/EU.  
• In light of this commentary, and considering implementation to date, the second EEAS 2.0 
publication intends to assess whether such interpretative room exists to accommodate changes to 
the organisation and functioning of the EEAS, to formulate recommendations accordingly and/or 
to make proposals for revisions, if deemed necessary. 
 
 
 
                                                     
269 EEAS, Report by the High Representative to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, 
22 December 2011, made available to the public on 5 January 2012. See also ‘Remarks by High 
Representative Catherine Ashton at the AFET Committee in European Parliament in Strasbourg, 12 
December 2011’, Press release A 511/11, Brussels, 13 December 2011; and ‘Speech by High Representative 
Catherine Ashton on the Common Security and Defence Policy in the European Parliament in Strasbourg’, 
Press release A 512/11, Brussels, 13 December 2011. For analysis and recommendations, see S. Blockmans, 
‘Fit for Purpose? The European External Action Service One Year On’, OXFAM Briefing Paper 159, 23 
January 2012; and S. Blockmans, ‘The EEAS one year on: first signs of strengths and weaknesses’, CLEER 
Working Paper 2012/2.  
270 See S. Duke and S. Lange, ‘Achieving Geographical and Gender Balance in the European External Action 
Service’, Study for Directorate-General for External relations of the Union, Directorate B, Policy 
Department, EP/EXPO/B/AET/2012/02, Brussels, 2013. 
  
 
